US embassy cable - 04MADRID1867

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001867 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, SP, NATO 
SUBJECT: SPAIN:  DCM WITH SPANISH NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR 
ON AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ AND ICC ROLLOVER RESOLUTION 
 
REF: A. STATE 111287 
 
     B. STATE 111359 
     C. STATE 12355 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission J. Robert Manzanares for reasons 
 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  DCM Manzanares met with Spanish President 
Zapatero's national security advisor Carles Casajuana May 20 
to brief him on our request for increased Spanish support for 
ISAF, urge the GOS to vote in favor of the UNSC ICC rollover 
resolution and share USG's initial thoughts on the UNSC Iraq 
resolution (refs a-c).  Casajuana said that the GOS was aware 
that it needed to come forward with a more robust program of 
troops and resources for Afghanistan, but said the GOS likely 
would not be able to fulfill all of our requests.  He said 
that Zapatero would not likely make any decision on this 
issue until after the June 13 European Parliamentary 
elections, as he and his party want to ensure a big victory 
for Socialist candidates and do not want to confuse public 
opinion by authorizing an increase in troops to Afghanistan 
just as Spanish troops from Iraq return.  He noted that NATO 
SYG de Hoop Scheffer would visit Madrid June 4, but said no 
decision would be made by then.  Casajuana said that Spain 
wanted to abstain on the ICC resolution, unless the USG did 
not have the votes to win (which he thinks we have).  On the 
Iraq resolution, Casajuana said he was aware of our thinking, 
having been briefed by Dr. Rice in Berlin. He said Spain 
would play a positive role in seeking consensus on the 
resolution.  End summary. 
 
2.  (C)  In his initial call on new national security advisor 
Carles Casajuana, DCM Manzanares, accompanied by PolCouns and 
Poloff, expressed appreciation for the welcome given to 
Assistant Secretary Burns earlier that week, including a 
meeting with Casajuana.  Manzanares noted that all of our 
encounters with officials from the new government in various 
ministries and at all levels have been very pleasant, and all 
officials had expressed their desire for good relations with 
the United States.  Manzanares said the USG wanted to put 
meat to the bones of this sentiment by building concrete 
examples of US-Spain support and cooperation. 
 
3.  (C)  One important area for cooperation, DCM noted, is 
Afghanistan, where the NATO Secretary General had identified 
significant needs that must be met by the NATO Summit in 
Istanbul to ensure that ISAF succeeds.  DCM reviewed each of 
the six requests for Spain, detailed in ref a, and left 
talking points as a non-paper.  DCM stressed the need for a 
decision by May 26 in order to properly prepare for the 
Istanbul summit and noted we are seeking an appointment for 
the Ambassador to present our request to Defense Minister 
Bono.  Casajuana was aware of our requests, as we had briefed 
MFA earlier in the day (septel) and he had heard from Spain's 
NATO channels. 
 
4.  (C)  Casajuana replied that Zapatero was aware that Spain 
needed to provide more than symbolic augmentation of Spain's 
presence in Afghanistan and that proposals were currently 
under consideration.  Spain wants to show it remains 
committed to the fight against terror, particularly in light 
of its Iraq pullout.  However, Zapatero, who would be the 
final decision-maker, would probably not make any decision on 
this matter until after the June 13 European Parliamentary 
elections, which the Socialist party was intent on winning 
big.  He said Zapatero believes that authorizing a 
significant increase in Spain's military presence in 
Afghanistan now would confuse public opinion as Spanish 
troops return from Iraq, making it appear that Spain was 
trading its pullout from Iraq for increased troop presence in 
Afghanistan. 
 
5.  (C)  Casajuana acknowledged Afghanistan was different 
from Iraq in that Spain considered it an authorized 
international operation directly related to Spain's own 
counter-terrorism needs.  Nonetheless, the Socialist party 
was intent on avoiding any controversy that could reduced 
their chances for a strong victory on June 13.  Casajuana 
said that the next three weeks would be difficult for all of 
us, as the Socialists essentially remained in a campaign mode 
with all of the attendant rhetoric.  DCM said he hoped the 
rhetoric would avoid using the USG as a campaign target. 
(Comment:  The Socialists want the June 13 elections to 
vindicate their March 14 electoral victory.  They remain 
stung by criticism that their victory was a result of the 
terrorist attacks). 
 
6.  (C)  Casajuana said that while the GOS likely would 
increase Spanish presence in Afghanistan (and had already 
decided to double their presence as a result of their 
participation in EUROCORPS), it likely would not be able to 
meet all of the requests we put forward.  Casajuana noted, 
however, that the GOS could easily market provision of a 
medical facility  to the Spanish public, simply on a 
humanitarian basis.  He said Spain's increase likely would 
focus on the Kabul battalion.  He seemed a bit taken aback by 
the request for a 1000 troops for the Combined Afghanistan 
Forces to rout out the Taliban, but acknowledged that this 
activity was in Spain's own counter-terrorist interest. 
Casajuana noted that Spain was also looking at participating 
in a Provisional Reconstruction Team (PRT) with perhaps in 
conjunction with Italy, but did not want to take on a PRT 
alone, as that would indicate responsibilities and resources 
for the long term that Spain was not prepared to undertake. 
 
7.  (C)  DCM also took the opportunity to review USG thinking 
on elements of a draft UNSC resolution on Iraq.  Casajuana 
was aware of our thoughts following his discussions with Dr. 
Rice in Berlin.  Casajuana  raised the issue of the 
two-conference proposal put forward by the Russians.  We 
noted A/S Burns' comment that the idea had not yet caught 
fire and that we wanted to focus on areas of consensus as we 
pursue this resolution.  Casajuana said Spain was concerned 
about an open-ended mandate for the Multinational Force (MNF) 
and might want to have the resolution provide a one-year, 
renewable mandate for the MNF.  In any case,  Casajuana 
averred that the GOS would play a positive, constructive role 
in developing the resolution, and did not want to make 
trouble for the US.  He said the US and Spain share the 
desire for stability and democracy in Iraq.  Casajuana 
confirmed the GOS would fulfill its monetary commitments made 
at the Madrid Iraq Donors' conference and would continue its 
participation in the Iraq Core Group. 
 
8.  (C)  Comment:  On Afghanistan, we expect Spain eventually 
to agree to augment the Kabul battalion by some 200 or more 
troops.  They may also provide the medical facility.  We 
doubt they will offer 1000 Spanish troops for the CFC-A. 
Given the Socialists' desire to avoid any controversy that 
might hurt their changes in the June 13 elections, Zapatero 
will not likely announce Spain's increased participation in 
Afghanistan until after the elections but, we expect, still 
before the Istanbul Summit. 
ARGYROS