US embassy cable - 04RANGOON637

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NATIONAL CONVENTION: CENTER OF THE REGIME'S PTOLEMAIC UNIVERSE

Identifier: 04RANGOON637
Wikileaks: View 04RANGOON637 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rangoon
Created: 2004-05-20 10:37:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV BM National Convention
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000637 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, BM, National Convention 
SUBJECT: NATIONAL CONVENTION: CENTER OF THE REGIME'S 
PTOLEMAIC UNIVERSE 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 612 AND PREVIOUS 
     B. RANGOON 601 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  The Burmese regime's National Convention has 
thus far revealed little more than instructions and warnings 
to its hand-picked delegates who will have no opportunity to 
reconsider pre-drafted components of a new constitution.  It 
is clear that the SPDC has reconvened the Convention simply 
to rubber stamp a new constitution as the first step toward a 
military-controlled "disciplined democracy."  The generals 
seem to view the boycott by the NLD and the UNA as a mere 
irritant, given an attending cast of delegates that will 
bless the entire process.  Although the more restive 
cease-fire groups in attendance could create some minor 
drama, the SPDC has no intention of letting this version of 
the National Convention spin out of its control.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) The SPDC's National Convention nears completion of 
its first week in session and GOB authorities, as 
anticipated, show no signs of allowing open debate or 
reconsideration of pre-drafted components for a new 
constitution.  The new constitution, once "approved" by the 
1,000-plus hand-picked delegates, will allow the armed forces 
to retain a preeminent role in the governance of Burma. 
 
3. (U) According to official reports, 1,076 delegates are in 
attendance at the Convention, or as the GOB puts it, "98.9 
percent of the 1,088 (registered) delegates."  Although the 
regime categorizes over 60 percent of the delegates as 
representatives of Burma's ethnic nationalities, many of 
these pro-regime delegates are identified as members of 
obscure social organizations and unknown political splinter 
groups (e.g., the "KNPP Dragon Group," the "Homein Region 
Welfare and Development Group," the "Rahkine Group of the 
Burma Communist Party," etc.) 
 
4. (SBU) The regime has emphasized that the delegates 
represent a broad spectrum of Burmese society; however, only 
25 delegates represent political parties and a mere 12 
delegates are members-elect of Parliament, from among the 485 
MPs elected in 1990 (Note: Among the MPs-elect in attendance 
at the Convention, six are former NLD members who were 
dismissed from the party in the 1990s.  End note.)  One 
elderly delegate, from the pro-regime Union Karen League, is 
unable to walk or to speak and was reportedly hospitalized 
upon arrival at an on-site medical facility. 
 
5. (SBU) An unknown number of delegates at the Convention, 
though likely the majority according to Embassy sources, are 
civil servants and members of the SPDC's mass-member 
organization, the Union Solidarity and Development 
Association (USDA).  In fact, many local Burmese deride the 
Convention as nothing more than a mass rally of the USDA and, 
in a play on words in the Burmese language, refer to the 
event as the "Cheat the Nation Convention." 
 
6. (U) State-controlled media have devoted considerable print 
and air time to "coverage" of the National Convention which, 
for the first week, has consisted mostly of a series of 
instructions and warnings for delegates regarding their role 
in the proceedings.  In the opening days, Minister for 
Information Brigadier General Kyaw Hsan, in his capacity as 
Secretary of the Convention's Convening Commission, spelled 
 
SIPDIS 
out a series of "procedures" for delegates, including 
(exactly as published): 
 
--Whenever entering or going out of the meeting hall, all are 
to bow to the State flag; 
 
--Do not talk about the interests of organizations and 
persons that are not in the framework of law; 
 
--A delegate is to discuss the topics in line with the 
proposal paper sent (and approved) in advance and not to 
discuss the topics that are not included in the paper; 
 
--When the plenary meeting or the meeting of the delegate 
groups are in progress, the delegates are not allowed to walk 
out individually or in groups; 
--Delegates are advised to put on suitable clothes, to avoid 
having bath at an unreasonable time and eat junk food. 
 
--These regulations are prescribed not for repression but for 
the interest of the national races and the delegates. 
 
7. (U) Lt General Thein Sein, the junta's fifth-ranking 
member and chairman of the Convening Commission, addressed 
the delegates with a sober message that the 1993-1996 
National Convention had "already formulated" the basis for a 
State Constitution and informed the delegates that their 
present, and unique, duty was to ensure "the emergence of a 
discipline-flourishing democracy." 
 
8. (C) Thein Sein's message struck a discordant note with the 
main cease-fire groups in attendance at the Convention, many 
of whom view the drafting of a new constitution as their only 
opportunity to codify the autonomy they enjoy on most 
administrative, security, and economic matters.  In addition 
to the grievances expressed by a loose coalition of eight 
major cease-fire groups, expressed via letter to Prime 
Minister Khin Nyunt on May 12 (ref B), two leading Kachin 
cease-fire groups (the KIO and the NKA-K) also wrote to the 
PM on May 16 urging the SPDC to make accommodations allowing 
the NLD to participate, observing that a failed Convention 
would be an "ugly blemish on Burma's history." 
 
9. (C) Comment:  There is no question that the SPDC has 
reconvened the National Convention to rubber stamp a 
pre-drafted constitution as the first step toward a 
"disciplined democracy."  To the regime, the NLD and the UNA 
boycott (ref A) is apparently a mere irritant to this 
showcase event, given the generals' ability to assemble, in 
some cases with the help of threats and intimidation, a cast 
of delegates that will bless the entire process.  Although 
the cease-fire groups could create some drama through further 
public airing of their grievances, or even an eventual 
walk-out, such actions are unlikely to deter the SPDC, which 
has no intention of letting this version of the National 
Convention spin out of its control.  End Comment. 
Martinez 

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