US embassy cable - 04SANAA1193

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001193 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KDEM, YM, DEMOCRATIC REFORM 
SUBJECT: GME: REFORM YEMENI-STYLE 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 106755 
     B. SANAA 956 
     C. SANAA 1172 
     D. SANAA 1178 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edmund J. Hull for Reasons 1.5 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Embassy Sanaa continues to engage government, 
civil society and business leaders on the Greater Middle East 
draft proposals (ref a).  While most interlocutors express 
opposition to the idea of reform being "imposed from outside 
the region," the discussion generated by the GMEI appears to 
have spurred increased attention on reform efforts within 
Yemen.  The acceptance by President Saleh to attend the G-8 
summit and to host the pilot microfinance project proposal 
(refs c and d), along with reform efforts by non-government 
actors, point towards increased willingness to allow 
practical considerations to override reluctance stemming from 
anger over Iraq, the MEPP and the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. 
Ongoing reform efforts in Yemen, including economic reform 
and the parliament's recent increased attention on government 
corruption, illustrate that the seeds of reform are already 
growing in Yemen. Few interlocutors have indicated opinions 
on any of the specific proposals, preferring to make general 
comments and/or concentrate on what is needed in Yemen.  End 
Summary. 
 
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP REACTION 
 
2. (C)  Ambassador met with Senior Presidential Advisor and 
former Prime Minister Dr. Abdul Karim al-Iryani 5/11.  Iryani 
said he sees a "positive evolution" in Arab attitudes towards 
GMEI that he expects to be reflected in the outcome of the 
Arab summit May 22-23.  He said he understood that Arab 
Foreign Ministers have agreed on a generally positive 
position on reform, without necessarily any reference to 
GMEI.  He noted one sticking point has been (and possibly 
remains) Saudi refusal to endorse multi-party democracy. 
Iryani noted a "healthy ferment" on reform in Yemen.  He 
raised two concerns on GMEI.  He asked if there was "any 
meat" to the proposals, to which Ambassador noted the 
microfinance initiative (ref d).  He said Arab public opinion 
continues to perceive GMEI as a dodge for engaging seriously 
the Palestinian issue, whether or not that is the case. 
 
3. (C) With the exception of Prime Minister Ba Jammal, 
reactions at the highest levels of the ROYG are indicative of 
support, with President Saleh accepting the invitation to Sea 
Island and Deputy Prime Minister Sofan noting support in a 
written letter (refs c and d).  The PM, however, made a 
statement in the press that the only reform Yemen needs is 
unification.  Comment:  The PM is notorious for making 
statements outside the ROYG norm and is currently under 
pressure from a corruption scandal.  End Comment. 
 
4. (U) The Consultative (or Shura) Council, Yemen's appointed 
111-member upper house, held a conference 5/17-18 to discuss 
the 2003 Arab Human Development report and the GMEI papers 
that was attended by high-ranking ROYG officials (including 
DPM Sofan, FM Qirbi and al-Iryani), political parties, NGOs, 
academics and others. 
 
NGOS AND THINK TANKS ACTIVE ON ISSUE; POLITICAL PARTIES 
 
5. (U) Several NGOs and think tanks have recently held 
seminars and discussions on reform in Yemen.  For example, 
the Yemen Institute for Democratic Development (YIDD) held a 
workshop in late April, attended by political parties, 
journalists and other intellectuals at which the Foreign 
Minister spoke.  The tenor of discussion centered around 
fueling reform within Yemen while not allowing reform to be 
imposed by the outside. A prominent think tank leader Dr. 
Fares al-Saqqaf held discussions with government, opposition 
and non-partisan Yemenis, with Emboffs invited to listen. 
Although a few references were made to the absence of 
Israel-Palestine solutions in the initiative and a rejection 
of reform from the outside, most of the discussion focused 
practically on reforms needed within Yemen.  Dr. al-Saqqaf 
told Pol/Econ Deputy that he formed a committee of 
government, political party and NGO leaders, including Deputy 
Foreign Minister Mustafa Noman (ref b), to formulate a 
"National Initiative for Political Reform." 
 
6. (C) Prominent NGO leader Izzedine al-Asbahi of the Human 
Rights Training and Research Center (HRITC) echoed several 
other interlocutors when he told Pol/Econ Deputy that he was 
concerned that the recent scandals regarding abuses at Abu 
Ghraib lessened the credibility of the U.S. in pushing for 
reform, which he saw as a disappointing development for the 
region. 
 
7. (U) Opposition political parties took the opportunity 
presented by GMEI to put pressure on the ROYG for continued 
reform within Yemen, despite most parties publicly rejecting 
any reform initiatives coming from the West.  The Yemen 
Socialist Party (YSP) is most supportive among political 
parties.  The YSP Secretary General Ali Saleh Obad Muqbil was 
quoted in a speech given to his Central Committee 5/6 
(printed in the party newspaper), "this motion created by 
international initiatives for reforms in the region provides 
a valuable opportunity for the will of reform and change at 
the national levels of all Arab and Muslim states. 
Therefore, we have to rush to seize the moment to generate a 
strong pressuring force to accomplish real reforms."  YSP 
leaders in Taiz, the third-largest city in Yemen, echoed this 
sentiment to Pol/Econ Deputy, noting that outside pressure 
was useful in their fight for Yemeni reform but also 
expressing hope that the initiatives would be practical 
rather than just rhetorical.  The second-largest opposition 
party Islah displayed skepticism at the central level about 
whether the GME would "end up supporting the regime or the 
reform seekers," while Islah moderates in Taiz expressed 
cautious support to Pol/Econ Deputy. 
 
COMMENT 
 
8. (C) Embassy interlocutors seem torn between wanting to 
support GMEI for their own reasons, i.e., watering the seeds 
of Yemeni reform, and being reluctant to support any 
initiative that comes from the outside.  Several noted a 
decided lack of credibility stemming from the recent prison 
abuse scandal in Iraq and the absence of the Palestinian 
issue.  The widespread exploration of the reform agenda 
regardless probably stems from a typically Yemeni willingness 
to be practical, internal and external political calculations 
and the desire by Yemen to maintain what it perceives as its 
leadership in political reform in the region.  End Comment. 
HULL