US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE1210

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PROSPECTS FOR RENEWAL OF DUTCH DEPLOYMENT IN IRAQ

Identifier: 04THEHAGUE1210
Wikileaks: View 04THEHAGUE1210 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy The Hague
Created: 2004-05-17 15:19:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: MOPS PREL IZ NL
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 001210 
 
SIPDIS 
 
JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 
USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE 
USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE 
USNMR SHAPE BE IMMEDIATE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2014 
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, IZ, NL 
SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR RENEWAL OF DUTCH DEPLOYMENT IN IRAQ 
 
REF: THE HAGUE 1164 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD M. SOBEL 
FOR REASONS 1.5 (B AND D) 
 
1. (C)  Summary:  Balkenende's cabinet is leaning toward 
approving an eight-month extension of the Dutch force in Iraq 
by mid-June, but it is far from a done deal.  Junior 
coalition member D66 has spelled out conditions for 
supporting a renewal, several of which cannot be fulfilled 
prior to the June 4 cabinet meeting at which a decision will 
most likely be taken.  Senior cabinet officials predict that 
D66 coalition partners will concur with the extension, but 
are concerned about an acrimonious debate in parliament if 
the UNSC has not yet agreed on a resolution.  We will need to 
continue efforts to convince the Dutch that progress toward 
achieving a UNSC resolution and other conditions provide 
sufficient justification for a positive decision.  End 
summary. 
 
2. (C) Reftel outlined Dutch reactions to the first death of 
one of their soldiers in Iraq, and outlined the challenges 
facing PM Balkenende's government as it decides whether or 
not to extend Dutch troops in al Muthanna province beyond 
their current July 15 mandate for at least eight months 
(i.e., to accommodate two four-month troop rotations). 
Embassy The Hague has aggressively reached out to 
parliamentary floor leaders, defense and foreign affairs 
spokesmen of the government parties (Christian Democrats, 
Liberals and Liberal Democrats, AKA, "D66") and the main 
opposition Labor party, MFA Pol Director Siblesz, and PM's 
senior foreign advisor Swartbol.  The Ambassador has also 
spoken with FM Bot and Deputy PMs Zalm and de Graaf.  We will 
continue to address the apparent lack of understanding 
regarding sequencing of UNSCR discussions the transfer of 
authority to an Iraqi interim government demonstrated in the 
public statements of some Dutch parliamentarians.  The 
pro-extension Liberal (conservative) party has repeatedly 
cited as a problem the political fallout following the 
prisoner abuse scandal.  The loss of moral high ground deeply 
troubles Dutch conservatives, who are watching carefully to 
see how the U.S. addresses the problem. 
 
3. (C) After a difficult start to last week which saw junior 
coalition partner D66 expressing strong public reservations 
about renewing the deployment, the situation has improved. 
Much of the cabinet is now leaning towards endorsing an 
extension, under the strong leadership of PM Balkenende, FM 
Bot and Defense Minister Kamp, but parliament remains queasy. 
 D66 members are nervous about an extension.  Deputy PM de 
Graaf of D66 told the Ambassador that while D66 ministers are 
leaning toward agreeing to an extension for the sake of 
government unity, it will be difficult for them to do so if 
the D66 MPs remain reluctant.  In a meeting with DCM may 17, 
D66 foreign affairs spokesman Bert Bakker stressed that while 
he and other party members hoped to be able to vote yes on an 
extension, such a decision was not yet guaranteed.  (Note: 
there is no automatic linkage between votes of cabinet 
members and their parliamentary party, i.e., while the two 
D66 ministers might support a renewal, D66 MPs are not bound 
by their decision.  End note). 
 
4. (C) D66 has stressed the importance of a new UNSCR, a 
credible and central UN role, and an explicit invitation from 
the Iraqi government for coalition forces to remain as keys 
to securing its support for an extension.  In spelling out 
the conditions necessary for D66 support, Floor leader Boris 
Dittrich and Bakker have made clear that they are as 
interested in keeping the Dutch decision-making process open 
and honest as they are with the technical fulfillment of the 
conditions, including the security of the Dutch forces.  In 
response to DCM's questioning, Bakker acknowledged that 
positive and transparent movement toward fulfilling D66's 
conditions should be enough to produce a positive vote. 
 
5. (C) We expect a Cabinet vote on June 4.  From our 
soundings thus far, we must report that nothing is certain 
yet, including the surety of a united cabinet.  In order to 
pull this off, the Prime Minister will have to: 
 
--  Get his cabinet to approve the deployment.  (He intends 
to delay a decision until the June 4 cabinet meeting to allow 
the UN process to evolve, and then go to D-Day celebrations 
with a positive decision in hand.)  Deputy PM Zalm chaired 
the May 14 cabinet meeting and told us that the tone was 
positive concerning a renewal, though no straw poll was 
taken. 
 
--  Debate the decision in parliament.  Assuming a positive 
June 4 decision, the Dutch parliament would debate the issue 
during the following two weeks and a parliamentary 
confirmation of the government's decision would be likely 
just in time to meet the military's rotation requirement of 
June 21. 
 
--  Stick to his guns even if there is significant opposition 
in parliament.  Usually, Dutch make deployment decisions with 
a super majority.  To move forward without the main 
opposition Labor party, as Balkenende appears to be prepared 
to do, would break precedent.  Harder still would be to move 
ahead if D66 members of parliament oppose.  Technically, the 
government would have the votes without D66, owing to the 
support of the populist opposition List Pim Fortuyn party, 
but hard decisions are never made with winner takes all votes 
in this country.  Even the Christian Democrats, the party of 
the PM, FM and NATO SYG, are nervous about going ahead with a 
deployment without D66 on board.  For this reason, Embassy is 
blanketing D66 with up to the minute information.  (Dittrich 
and Bakker have both said they were pleased to learn the 
degree to which the U.S. is serious about pursuing a UNSCR.) 
 
6. (C) Comment:  GONL sources confirm that the Secretary's 
call to FM Bot on May 11, and invitation to Pol Director 
Siblesz and other coalition PolDirs for consultations on May 
20 were very welcome.  The Dutch cabinet's timeline will not 
allow the extension decision to wait until the transfer of 
sovereignty to an Iraqi Interim Government capable of issuing 
an invitation to the international community.  It may not 
even wait until the adoption of a new UNSC resolution. 
Therefore, the more the U.S. (and the UK and UN) can do to 
signal that this process is well and truly in train, the 
easier it will be in early June for the GONL to win 
convincing political backing for an extension.  Keeping 
Coalition partners like the Dutch well-informed on 
developments in the UNSC will be extremely valuable over the 
course of the coming weeks.  End Comment. 
MINIMIZED CONSIDERED. 
SOBEL 

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