US embassy cable - 04ANKARA2774

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002774 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR EDELMAN 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2014 
TAGS: CY, PREL, TU 
SUBJECT: UPCOMING UN AND U.S. ACTION ON CYPRUS 
 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 0860 
     B. 30 MARCH 2004 RIES EU MEETINGS 
     C. ANKARA 2341 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman, E.O. 12958, 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 
1.  (C) With the SYG's report on the Cyprus negotiations and 
the referendum set to come out soon, it is important that we 
engage in a full-court press for a strong follow-on UNSCR 
despite the formidable UNSC obstacles and other political 
hurdles.  The SYG's report, and the resulting UNSC debate and 
resolution, are critically important to our twin strategic 
goals of comprehensively settling Cyprus and assisting 
Turkey's EU vocation.  I read with concern ref A's account of 
the GC campaign to orchestrate a report excluding relevant 
information unfavorable to the GCs.  I expect a similar 
effort in the UNSC.  As Ambassador Klosson noted, I hope the 
SYG's report and resulting UNSC action include what happened 
in the negotiations and through the referendum -- and why. 
 
 
2.  (C) Fairness demands no less.  The UN rightly castigated 
Turkish and TC obstructionism after the Copenhagen and the 
Hague; this time should be no different.  Failure to 
completely and accurately reflect what happened and why 
leaves a distorted post-referendum UN record.  That record 
currently consists of bland press releases on April 28 and 
29.  The April 28 press release of U/S Pendergast's briefing 
notes that "now was not the time to go into details" in 
several key areas.  That time is now. 
 
 
3.  (C) The UN's language will influence Turkey's fate in the 
EU, which links Turkey's EU bid to cooperation with the SYG's 
Good Offices Mission.  The EU will use the report and 
resulting UNSCR to judge Turkey's performance in this area. 
By December, EU memories of the negotiations and the 
referendum will have faded.  Some EU Turkey-skeptics are 
inclined to hold any failure to reach settlement against 
Turkey (see, e.g., ref B).  Unambiguous UN language is the 
only effective antidote. 
 
 
4.  (C) The tone of the UNSCR and the SYG's report will also 
influence the Turks' willingness to re-engage in future UN 
efforts toward a comprehensive settlement.  Despite the 
positive initial international response to GOT efforts in 
support of a Cyprus settlement, the Turks have a lingering 
distrust of UN involvement in Cyprus.  They will view the 
SYG's report and UNSCR as leading indicators of whether the 
GOT's pro-solution policy brought real benefits for Turkey 
and the TCs. 
 
 
5.  (C) I am also concerned that we have not yet been able to 
show or even announce the steps we will take to reach out to 
Turkish Cypriots.  We have been telling the Turks steps are 
coming, but lack of any more concrete news is beginning to 
cause problems.  The MFA told us last week that military 
hardliners opposed to settlement who had remained silent over 
the past few months are beginning to complain, with 
increasing intensity, that nothing has changed for the TCs. 
Over time, this damages USG credibility and threatens 
Ankara's tenuous pro-settlement consensus (ref C).  U/S Ziyal 
has called me in to discuss Cyprus tomorrow, and I expect 
some pointed questions about where we are in our 
decisionmaking process. 
EDELMAN