US embassy cable - 04BRUSSELS2114

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 002114 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR; CA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2014 
TAGS: CMGT, CVIS, SMIG, ELAB, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: VISA WAIVER PROGRAM AND AN ENLARGED EU 
 
REF: (A) 03 BRUSSELS 5470 (B) BRUSSELS 1907 (C) 
     BRUSSELS 0916 
 
Classified By: PRMOFF MARC J. MEZNAR.  REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C) Summary.  The enlargement of the EU on May 1 raised 
the number of EU countries not included in the visa waiver 
program (VWP) from one to ten.  New Member States harbor 
hopes that their EU accession can become a way to wrest from 
the U.S. via the EU what they could not obtain bilaterally: 
inclusion in the VWP.  Under existing rules of the Schengen 
Agreement, EU Member States which are not granted visa waiver 
by third countries can in theory invoke a "solidarity 
mechanism" requiring automatic visa reciprocity.  The 
European Commission (EC) fears that votes might not be in 
place to override the solidarity mechanism if invoked by one 
of the new Member States, and is pressing the U.S. to expand 
VWP to include the new members.  The EC argues that 2007 
(when internal Schengen borders with the new members are 
expected to be dropped) will be the logical time for VWP 
expansion to occur.  The EU warns that failure to address the 
grievances of the new Member States over visa rules -- or 
removing any current EU Member State from the VWP -- could 
lead to a reaction both side want to avoid.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------ 
VWP:  Impact of Enlargement 
------------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) The different treatment of Member States under the 
VWP has emerged as an especially nettlesome issue with the 
enlargement of the EU.  Before enlargement, only one EU 
member state was not on VWP (Greece).  After enlargement, 
that number rises to ten.  At a time when increased scrutiny 
and tightening of the VWP is taking place in Washington, the 
EU has stepped up its lobbying campaign to expand the program 
to include all 25 EU Member States (reftel a).  Expanding VWP 
is consistently at the top of the EU's agenda in all 
transatlantic migration dialogues, including the inaugural 
session of the Policy Dialogue on Borders, Transportation and 
Security (PDBTS) on 4/26 (reftel b), and increasingly is in 
the media as well. 
 
3.  (C) The EU is under pressure to be seen making the case 
for new Member States which already suffer from feelings of 
second-class status.  Transitional provisions invoked by the 
15 Member States -- including restricted access to labor 
markets for up to seven years (reftel c) and internal border 
checks until at least 2007 -- have created ill will between 
the old and the new members.  The newcomers have also been 
forced to accept the Schengen Agreement's visa black list, 
which includes their immediate eastern neighbors with whom 
they have traditionally enjoyed strong commercial, cultural 
and political ties.  In return for accepting the burdens of 
Schengen, the new members fully expect to reap the benefits 
-- which they see as including visa free travel to the U.S. 
(Comment: In some sense, the EU is trying to salve feelings 
they have created by foisting them onto the bilateral 
relationship.  End Comment.) 
 
4. (C) While EU officials have heard our views that adding to 
the current list of VWP grantees is unlikely, and some have 
privately acknowledge they are swimming against the tide in 
this regard, others have convinced themselves that their 
rationale is persuasive and that the U.S. may in due time 
expand the VWP list.   Optimists in Brussels envision the 
following scenario for 2007, their target year for expanding 
VWP: 
 
-- all EU Member States will be issuing biometric passports 
as a result of internal EU directives (with some going beyond 
the required ICAO and U.S. domestic standards by 
incorporating both fingerprints and digitized photographs); 
-- the new Member States will have just passed a rigorous 
assessment of their border controls in order to accede to the 
benefits of the Schengen agreement as internal borders 
between old and new are removed.  (The EC stresses that this 
assessment will be more than just a pro-forma, rubber-stamp 
because of all the hysteria in the Western Europe about waves 
of "benefit tourists" and other hordes of migrants long 
trumpeted by the media.); 
-- the EU Border Agency, most likely to be based in either 
Warsaw or Prague, will be fully functioning and coordinating 
border security measures among the 25 Member States, 
including policy, training and equipment purchases; 
-- the upgraded lookout information system (SIS 2) will be 
providing instant access to all Member States, including 
biometrics-based data on malafide travelers and potential 
terrorists; 
-- the Member States will also be tied together by the new 
Visa Information System where visa issuances can be instantly 
verified at ports of entry; 
-- some old Member States will have opened up their labor 
markets to all new EU citizens; those Europeans eager to gain 
higher wages will have legal options nearby, reducing the 
attractiveness of the U.S. as a destination for clandestine 
laborers; 
-- as happened before with Spain, Portugal and Ireland, the 
economic and social benefits of EU membership will be felt 
most strongly after enlargement.  Labor migration will 
increasingly become cyclical; and 
-- expatriates will increasingly move home with their nest 
eggs and stimulate domestic markets, many of which have 
already been growing faster than the EU norm. 
 
------------------------ 
Solidarity Mechanism: Potential Transatlantic Risk 
------------------------ 
 
5. (C) This is obviously a rosy scenario, especially 
regarding how quickly the economic benefits of EU membership 
would penetrate to the wider population in the new member 
states.  Still, under current Schengen regulations, the EU 
could in theory be forced at any time by the new Member 
States to invoke a "solidarity mechanism" which might 
ultimately result in a visa requirement for all American 
citizens traveling to the 25 members of the Schengen 
Agreement.  Under existing terms, any Member State which 
suffers from a lack of visa waiver reciprocity can (but is 
not required to) invoke the solidarity mechanism.  An 
automatic visa requirement would begin after 30 days for 
citizens of that county traveling to all 25 Schengen members 
unless a qualified majority vote determined otherwise.  For 
now, EC officials have been trying to discourage new Member 
States from triggering the solidarity mechanism, but they are 
worried about their ability to manage the process. 
 
6. (C) During the PDBTS meeting, Justice and Home Affairs 
Director General Jonathan Faull stated, "We urge you to think 
again about ways to treat all EU countries the same way in 
the foreseeable future."  He acknowledged Washington-based 
difficulties by noting that the expansion was not expected to 
take place immediately and that the EC would not expect all 
countries to be added simultaneously.  Faull explained that 
the EU's own certification process on new member compliance 
with Schengen border standards will be done on a 
country-specific basis.  This certification process, which 
must take place for new members to gain unhindered movement 
within the union, will begin in 2006.  (Note.  Although 
certification is done individually, for practical reasons it 
is likely that the eastern European countries will be brought 
in as a block.  If not, a huge effort would have to be made 
on "temporary" external frontiers, such as the Polish-Slovak 
border, if one of these two countries were certified before 
the other and granted full Schengen privileges.  End note.) 
 
7. (C) Faull described the internal struggle to keep "the 
more worried, more excitable" new Member States from invoking 
the solidarity mechanism.  "We have had to fight to keep the 
lid on this," he said.  Regarding a potential visa 
requirement for Americans traveling to the Schengen area, 
Faull noted, "We don't want to do that" and added "we're not 
trying to frighten" the U.S.  He also briefly mentioned theEC might attempt to 
modify the existing solidarity mechanism 
to make reciprocity less automatic. 
 
8. (C) During separate consultations on 4/26 with CA DAS 
Janice Jacobs, DG JHA Head of Unit for Borders and Visas Jan 
de Ceuster sketched a few more details about current thinking 
to diffuse the potentially damaging nature of the solidarity 
mechanism vis-a-vis the transatlantic relationship.  This 
would include eliminating the automatic visa imposition in 
order to give the EC more room to maneuver and negotiate with 
the third party.  Another change would be taking the 
initiative from an aggrieved state to trigger the solidarity 
mechanism, and replacing it with an obligation for all states 
to notify the EC about any lack of reciprocity. 
Theoretically, this would relieve any aggrieved Member State 
from being labeled a spoiler or troublemaker.  (Greece, for 
example, has chosen to ignore the lack of reciprocity with 
the U.S. and has not invoked the solidarity mechanism.) 
 
9. (C) De Ceuster said that JHA Commissioner Vitorino was 
convinced that the agreement needed to be amended.  However, 
whether this will be possible given the highly charged 
atmosphere remains to be seen.  Already, some press reports 
characterize this rethinking of the Schengen agreement as 
"caving in" to the U.S. 
 
10. (SBU) Jacobs outlined the procedure for adding any new 
countries to the VWP, pointing out that the first criterion 
was B1/B2 visa refusal rates of three percent or less.  In 
the post 9/11 world, EU interlocutors have a hard time 
remembering that socio-economic factors loom large in visa 
waiver in addition to homeland security concerns.  Instead, 
they continue to pin high hopes on technological advances 
with passports and border controls. 
 
------------------------ 
Other Countries on the Radar Scope 
------------------------ 
 
11. (U) As of May 1, other developed countries have joined 
the US in treating EU Member States differently with regard 
to visas.  Because the new Member States were obliged to 
adopt the visa white list as of May 1, their Schengen 
obligations forced them to drop visa requirements for Canada, 
New Zealand, Australia and other countries on the white list. 
 These countries, by and large, have not reciprocated in 
full.  Canada retains visa requirements on all ten except 
Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia.  New Zealand's status is similar 
to Canada, although Hungary is also on their visa waiver 
list. 
 
12. (U) Australia recently liberalized its travel regime for 
the new EU Member States by granting "electronic visa 
arrangements" (EVA) for the nine new members who do not enjoy 
the "electronic travel authority" in place with the other 16. 
 Under the EVA, travelers submit visa requests and payments 
on line.  They can either be granted a visa electronically 
and travel without any further bureaucratic impediment, or 
they are directed to a consulate for a personal interview. 
 
13. (C) According to a Canadian immigration officer in 
Brussels, Canada fears that the new Member States might first 
invoke the solidarity mechanism against Canada rather than 
the U.S.  The political ramifications would be fewer, as 
would potential consular workload increases and disruptions 
to tourist industries. 
 
14. (C) On 5/6, New Zealand DCM told PRMOff that although New 
Zealand was not considering immediate changes to its visa 
waiver list, they had made a policy decision (which will not 
be advertised) to extend visa waiver to all 25 EU Member 
States in 2007 or as soon as the new Member States are fully 
certified to meet Schengen standards and the internal 
boundary between old and new is removed.  Meanwhile, New 
Zealand plans to expand its work holiday program (similar to 
some of our J-1 visas), and it will also open an embassy in 
Warsaw.  Officials hope these positive signals discourage any 
activation of the solidarity mechanism against New Zealand. 
Furthermore, the DCM noted that there are no significant 
Eastern European magnet communities in New Zealand (as is the 
case in the U.S., Canada and Australia) which largely fuel 
the demand for visa waiver. 
 
------------------------ 
Comment 
------------------------ 
 
15. (C) We doubt EU dissatisfaction over the VWP situation 
will escalate to the worst-case scenario (visas all the way 
around -- except the UK and Ireland) with regard to the U.S. 
European countries are not equipped to begin issuing visas to 
Americans any more than we are prepared to ramp back up visa 
issuance for VWP-eligible countries.  The negative impact on 
U.S. tourism in Europe would also be a major disincentive. 
And peer pressure from other EU countries that benefit from 
VWP would prove a natural brake on those countries that might 
consider invoking the solidarity clause.  The EC is most 
probably "buying time" with the new Member States on VWP by 
selling the rationale (described in paragraph 4) that 
positive changes will come in 2007. 
 
16.  (C) Still, the risks are there.  At the Visa Working 
Group on May 12, Lithuania threatened to invoke the 
solidarity mechanism, and it reporedly took high level 
intervention from Commissioner Vitorino to dissuade them. 
Sensitivities of enlargement countries -- such as no access 
to western European labor markets and border checks remaining 
in place between old and new Member States -- give the EC 
very little room for maneuvering internally if one or more of 
the new members take up this issue with a vengeance.  For 
this reason Commissioner Vitorino raised VWP during his 
consultations in Washington on May 12.  The mention of VWP in 
the Department's press statement regarding his meeting with 
DepSec Armitage provoked a series of press inquiries, both to 
the Commission and to USEU, regarding the outcome of 
consultations on this issue.  Whereas interest from the 
Poles, Czechs and Hungarians has long been heard in Brussels, 
new interest is being shown by the Baltics countries. 
 
17. (C) The Washington dynamic and review process of current 
VWP Members could also precipitate a transatlantic clash over 
visas.  While we doubt the EU would have the stomach to 
provoke a visa spat over the new members, a decision to 
remove VWP privileges from one of the EU's older members 
would likely tip the balance within the Schengen group 
against the U.S.  In the spirit of the newly created PDTBS, 
any possible changes in the visa regime should take place 
only after close consultations with the EC, the EU Member 
States and a well-coordinated public diplomacy campaign. 
 
SCHNABEL