US embassy cable - 04KABUL1381

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NORTHERN VIEWS ON AFGHANISTAN,S FUTURE

Identifier: 04KABUL1381
Wikileaks: View 04KABUL1381 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kabul
Created: 2004-05-15 04:09:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: MASS PGOV PINR PINS PREL AF
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
O 150409Z MAY 04
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5055
INFO ISLAMIC CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE
NATO EU COLLECTIVE 0538
AMEMBASSY ALMATY
AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY RIYADH
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
AMCONSUL DUBAI
AMCONSUL JEDDAH
AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
NSC WASHDC
DIA WASHDC
CIA WASHDC
JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5/UNMA//
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J-3//
CJCS WASHINGTON DC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
COMJTF180 BAGRAM AFG//CG/C3/C9/POLAD//
SECDEF WASHDC//USDP/J3//
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ3/CCJ4/CCJ5/POLAD//
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
USMISSION USNATO
USMISSION GENEVA
CJTF 180CMDGRP
USCINCCENT INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCENT MACDILL AFB
C O N F I D E N T I A L  KABUL 001381 
 
 
NSC FOR RBLACKWILL 
DEPT FOR SA/FO AMBASSADOR TAYLOR, SA/PAB, S/CT, SA/A 
CENTCOM FOR POLAD, CJTF180 FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2014 
TAGS: MASS, PGOV, PINR, PINS, PREL, AF 
SUBJECT: NORTHERN VIEWS ON AFGHANISTAN,S FUTURE 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ZALMAY KHALILZAD FOR REASONS 
1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
1. (C) Summary.  VII Corps General Wasiq met with the 
Ambassador on May 10 to discuss major initiatives to bring 
stability and promote economic and political progress in 
northern Afghanistan.  Key topics included: northern 
disappointment with the perceived slow pace of reconstruction 
efforts in the north; VII Corps objections to Phase II of the 
Disarmament, Demilitarization and Reintegration (DDR) 
program; and reports of covert Iranian funding of Shia 
elements in the Mazar-e-Sharif area.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) General Wasiq, one of Tajik Jamiat leader Usted 
Atta,s top field officers, noted the northern perception 
that there did not appear to be adequate international 
assistance allocated to northern Afghanistan.  The Ambassador 
outlined several major USG initiatives under way in northern 
Afghanistan, such as programs to build and revamp schools and 
clinics and irrigation projects. Wasiq added that 
construction of a new Balkh University campus had just begun. 
 The Ambassador expressed interest in hearing more about 
progress on the university. 
 
3. (C) Wasiq outlined VII Corps objections to including its 
1st and 26th Divisions in Phase I DDR.  He claimed that 
General Dostum deserved 95 per cent of the blame for recent 
hostilities.  Wasiq said that if VII Corps gives up its 
weapons, Atta and his followers might as well pack up and 
leave Mazar-e-Sharif.  The Ambassador replied that it was not 
feasible for Dostum to attack.  Any such action would not be 
ignored and would not be tolerated. 
 
4.(C) Wasiq reiterated Atta,s position that Phase II DDR is 
not fair.  Wasiq remarked that he thought Minister of Defense 
Fahim had not paid a lot of attention to this matter.  The 
Ambassador noted that Atta appears to have a DDR agenda that 
he has coordinated with Fahim Khan.  The Ambassador stated 
that DDR is the top priority and that if Phase I DDR is not 
completed on time, it could delay the national elections. 
 
5. (C) Wasiq also noted that Mohaqeq,s return to the 
national government would benefit the government, but would 
have a negative impact on his political support.  Wasiq 
suggested that this would undercut Mohaqeq,s strategy of 
presenting himself as sticking to his principles in support 
of his people,s interests. 
 
6. (C) Wasiq then said he had reliable information that 
Iranian agents had been covertly funding Shia groups in the 
Mazar-e-Sharif area.  This assistance reportedly including 
the provision of some arms.  The Ambassador indicated we take 
such matters seriously and would look into it. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
7. (C) This was a useful discussion that covered Jamiat views 
on urgent issues that dominate political debate in northern 
Afghanistan. It provided an opportunity to spotlight 
significant U.S. initiatives in the region. 
 
8. (C) The allegations about Iranian agents, activities in 
the Mazar-e-Sharif warrant further examination. Iran has a 
history of involvement in the region; local suspicions were 
rekindled when Iran reopened its consulate general in 
Mazar-e-Sharif earlier this year.  End Comment. 
 
 
Khalilzad 

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