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| Identifier: | 04KABUL1381 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04KABUL1381 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Kabul |
| Created: | 2004-05-15 04:09:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | MASS PGOV PINR PINS PREL AF |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
O 150409Z MAY 04 FM AMEMBASSY KABUL TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5055 INFO ISLAMIC CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE NATO EU COLLECTIVE 0538 AMEMBASSY ALMATY AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT AMEMBASSY BEIJING AMEMBASSY BISHKEK AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI AMEMBASSY OTTAWA AMEMBASSY RIYADH AMEMBASSY ROME AMEMBASSY TASHKENT AMCONSUL DUBAI AMCONSUL JEDDAH AMCONSUL KARACHI AMCONSUL PESHAWAR NSC WASHDC DIA WASHDC CIA WASHDC JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5/UNMA// JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J-3// CJCS WASHINGTON DC USMISSION USUN NEW YORK COMJTF180 BAGRAM AFG//CG/C3/C9/POLAD// SECDEF WASHDC//USDP/J3// USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ3/CCJ4/CCJ5/POLAD// USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL USMISSION USNATO USMISSION GENEVA CJTF 180CMDGRP USCINCCENT INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL USCINCENT MACDILL AFB
C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 001381 NSC FOR RBLACKWILL DEPT FOR SA/FO AMBASSADOR TAYLOR, SA/PAB, S/CT, SA/A CENTCOM FOR POLAD, CJTF180 FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2014 TAGS: MASS, PGOV, PINR, PINS, PREL, AF SUBJECT: NORTHERN VIEWS ON AFGHANISTAN,S FUTURE Classified By: AMBASSADOR ZALMAY KHALILZAD FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D) 1. (C) Summary. VII Corps General Wasiq met with the Ambassador on May 10 to discuss major initiatives to bring stability and promote economic and political progress in northern Afghanistan. Key topics included: northern disappointment with the perceived slow pace of reconstruction efforts in the north; VII Corps objections to Phase II of the Disarmament, Demilitarization and Reintegration (DDR) program; and reports of covert Iranian funding of Shia elements in the Mazar-e-Sharif area. End Summary. 2. (C) General Wasiq, one of Tajik Jamiat leader Usted Atta,s top field officers, noted the northern perception that there did not appear to be adequate international assistance allocated to northern Afghanistan. The Ambassador outlined several major USG initiatives under way in northern Afghanistan, such as programs to build and revamp schools and clinics and irrigation projects. Wasiq added that construction of a new Balkh University campus had just begun. The Ambassador expressed interest in hearing more about progress on the university. 3. (C) Wasiq outlined VII Corps objections to including its 1st and 26th Divisions in Phase I DDR. He claimed that General Dostum deserved 95 per cent of the blame for recent hostilities. Wasiq said that if VII Corps gives up its weapons, Atta and his followers might as well pack up and leave Mazar-e-Sharif. The Ambassador replied that it was not feasible for Dostum to attack. Any such action would not be ignored and would not be tolerated. 4.(C) Wasiq reiterated Atta,s position that Phase II DDR is not fair. Wasiq remarked that he thought Minister of Defense Fahim had not paid a lot of attention to this matter. The Ambassador noted that Atta appears to have a DDR agenda that he has coordinated with Fahim Khan. The Ambassador stated that DDR is the top priority and that if Phase I DDR is not completed on time, it could delay the national elections. 5. (C) Wasiq also noted that Mohaqeq,s return to the national government would benefit the government, but would have a negative impact on his political support. Wasiq suggested that this would undercut Mohaqeq,s strategy of presenting himself as sticking to his principles in support of his people,s interests. 6. (C) Wasiq then said he had reliable information that Iranian agents had been covertly funding Shia groups in the Mazar-e-Sharif area. This assistance reportedly including the provision of some arms. The Ambassador indicated we take such matters seriously and would look into it. ------- Comment ------- 7. (C) This was a useful discussion that covered Jamiat views on urgent issues that dominate political debate in northern Afghanistan. It provided an opportunity to spotlight significant U.S. initiatives in the region. 8. (C) The allegations about Iranian agents, activities in the Mazar-e-Sharif warrant further examination. Iran has a history of involvement in the region; local suspicions were rekindled when Iran reopened its consulate general in Mazar-e-Sharif earlier this year. End Comment. Khalilzad
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