US embassy cable - 04RANGOON594

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NLD SAYS SPDC WON'T BUDGE ON ASSK RELEASE AND PREPARES FOR THE WORST

Identifier: 04RANGOON594
Wikileaks: View 04RANGOON594 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rangoon
Created: 2004-05-13 10:25:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PGOV BM Human Rights ASSK NLD
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T RANGOON 000594 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR EAP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, BM, Human Rights, ASSK, NLD 
SUBJECT: NLD SAYS SPDC WON'T BUDGE ON ASSK RELEASE AND 
PREPARES FOR THE WORST 
 
REF: RANGOON 587 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (S) NLD spokesman U Lwin requested a meeting with P/E 
chief on May 13 and reported that he had met the previous 
evening with ASSK.  He conveyed to ASSK the Embassy's 
oft-repeated offer to assist her and the NLD in any way 
possible.  ASSK, who was "delighted and very encouraged" by 
the USG's continuing support, requested that U Lwin share 
with us the following: 
 
--ASSK has recently held a number of secret, but productive, 
meetings with SPDC envoys, including Minister of Home Affairs 
Colonel Tin Hlaing and OCMI deputy chief Major General Kyaw 
Win, and the regime has agreed with many of the NLD's 
demands.  For example, if the NLD agrees to attend the 
National Convention, the party will be allowed to choose its 
own delegates, which could include members who are currently 
under arrest.  The regime has also agreed, in principle, to 
allow the reopening of NLD offices, but only on a gradual 
basis and commencing after the conclusion of the Convention. 
 
--On the NLD's most important requirement, the release of 
ASSK and U Tin Oo, the SPDC refuses to budge.  ASSK met with 
Tin Hlaing and Kyaw Win on May 12 and, according to U Lwin, 
"she had a very tough time."  Although the two envoys have 
undertaken many recent efforts "to try and please ASSK and 
the NLD, they were extremely rigid on the issue of releases." 
 
--The NLD will not attend the Convention unless ASSK and U 
Tin Oo are released.  U Lwin allowed that the SPDC might 
commit to releasing the two after the Convention is over, 
"but that would be unacceptable."  He added that ASSK is not 
looking out for her own well being, but demands to be 
released on principle so her party can participate in the 
Convention process.  U Lwin also noted that SPDC envoys have 
ignored the fate of U Tin Oo in these discussions and focused 
exclusively on ASSK, a source of irritation to the NLD 
leaders. 
 
--It is abundantly clear to NLD leaders that on the question 
of releasing ASSK there is a division within the senior ranks 
of the SPDC.  He described SPDC Chairman Than Shwe as 
representing "the hard-line" which is worried that ASSK would 
pursue the May 2003 Depeyin attack with the media were she to 
be released.  U Lwin noted that Home Minister Tin Hlaing 
represented Than Shwe's rigid stance on ASSK's release, while 
Kyaw Win (who reports directly to Prime Minister Khin Nyunt) 
has been somewhat flexible. 
 
--ASSK expects to meet again with SPDC envoys late on the 
evening of May 13.  If the envoys do not have good news on 
releasing her and U Tin Oo, ASSK will demand a definitive 
answer from the SPDC no later than Saturday May 15. 
 
2. (S) U Lwin said he "hopes for the best, but expects the 
worst."  He believed that if the regime refuses to release 
ASSK and U Tin Oo, and the NLD in turn declines to attend the 
Convention, military intelligence could immediately place 
members of the NLD CEC back under house arrest.  Should this 
scenario unfold, U Lwin said that he would instruct an 
intermediary to deliver a statement to the U.S. Embassy and 
several trusted international media stringers expressing NLD 
views on the situation.  ASSK, he said, suggested that the 
USG "do whatever it thought was practical with such a 
statement."  U Lwin added that the NLD would welcome any 
suggestions from the USG on next steps "should this worst 
case scenario emerge." 
 
3. (S) Comment: NLD leaders have been very cautious in their 
recent interactions with Emboffs and other diplomatic 
missions, clearly not wanting to derail ongoing negotiations 
with the SPDC.  However, now that the eleventh hour 
approaches on the May 17 reconvening of the National 
Convention, the NLD may soon desire a boost from friends and 
supporters outside the country--should negotiations collapse 
and the party's situation deteriorate further.  If the SPDC 
gives in, however, there may be a different outcome 
altogether. 
Martinez 

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