US embassy cable - 04ANKARA2691

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ISAF SHORTFALLS: TURKS CONTEND THEY HAVE THE POLITICAL WILL, BUT LACK THE RESOURCES

Identifier: 04ANKARA2691
Wikileaks: View 04ANKARA2691 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2004-05-12 15:53:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: MOPS PREL TU AF
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002691 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR EUR/RPM, EUR/SE, PM 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2014 
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, TU, AF 
SUBJECT: ISAF SHORTFALLS:  TURKS CONTEND THEY HAVE THE 
POLITICAL WILL, BUT LACK THE RESOURCES 
 
 
REF: A) USNATO 457 B) ANKARA 2475 C) ANKARA 1881 D) 
     STATE 068430 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman.  Reasons:  1.5 
(B and D). 
 
 
1. (C) During a recent discussion on Turkish helos for 
Afghanistan (ref b), NATO Department Head Alper Coskum 
confirmed what MFA officials had told us in late March (ref 
c):  the Turkish military does not possess Role 2 and 
Casualty Staging Medical Unit capability.  Coskun said the 
Turkish General Staff (TGS) also had informed the MFA that it 
did not possess the dedicated aircraft requested by COMISAF. 
 TGS reportedly instructed the Turkish MNR at SHAPE to inform 
Allies accordingly. 
 
 
2. (C) TGS Deputy J5 for Strategy MG Arslan (who accompanied 
TGS CHOD GEN Ozkok to Brussels for the May 5-6 NATO CHOD 
meetings) told pol-mil counselor May 11 that the NATO CHODs 
correctly identified political will and resources as the keys 
to filling ISAF shortfalls.  For Turkey, Arslan argued there 
is no question of political will; it is a matter of 
resources.  He noted that while Turkey may have seven 
brigades that are capable of being deployed, deployments 
require resources, and the Turkish military did not have the 
requisite resources. 
 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
 
3. (C) Arslan's statement that Turkey possesses the political 
will to help NATO meet ISAF shortfalls tracks with what we 
have heard from other TGS and MFA officials.  Arslan is 
correct that in the case of Turkey, one of the keys to 
securing Turkish contributions to coalition operations is 
money, as we have seen in the case of the three helos for 
ISAF.  MFA officials tell us that TGS is not prepared to fund 
contributions to ISAF or other operations in Afghanistan out 
of its existing budget, and that TGS will continue to request 
funding from the PM before making commitments.  It is 
conceivable that the Turkish military may not have within its 
normal budget sufficient resources to finance contributions 
to operations such as ISAF, and that any contributions 
financed by the military may come at the expense of other 
operations or modernization programs.  That said, the Turkish 
military has access to other funds (in addition to any 
funding the PM may provide) that furthers its modernization 
program and increases its ability to contribute to operations 
such as ISAF:  Foreign Military Financing (FMF).  During our 
recent discussions with PM and MFA officials, we noted that 
the USG recently apportioned $35M in FMF for Turkey for FY04, 
and that this funding could be used to facilitate Turkish 
contributions to ISAF. 
 
 
4. (C) Regarding the areas that NATO SYG is looking to Turkey 
to provide for ISAF (ref a), we doubt that the Turkish 
military will reverse its long-standing position and provide 
infantry companies for Stage One.  We suspect TGS may be open 
to contributing a limited number of infantry to support the 
vote registration and election process.  TGS already has 
stated that it does not have a Role 2 medical facility 
capability.  On the three previously committed helicopters, 
MFA officials told us following CHOD Ozkok's statement during 
the May 5-6 meeting that the three helos would be in 
Afghanistan by the end of the month that, while PM Erdogan 
had not formally authorized the $1.5M requested by TGS, the 
MFA did not believe Ozkok would have made such a statement in 
Brussels if he was not confident the Turkish military could 
deliver the helicopters as promised. 
 
 
5. (C) Ambassador telephoned MFA U/S Ziyal to follow up on 
the President's telephone call to PM Erdogan, and the DCM did 
the same with PM Foreign Policy Advisor Ambassador Arat (ref 
b).  Ziyal (after consulting with TGS D/CHOD GEN Basbug) said 
there were two main issues associated with the President's 
request: one, the Turkish military had lost a number of helos 
during the past year and did not have many helos left in its 
inventory; and two, funding. 
 
 
6. (C) If Washington decides to approach the GOT at the 
senior levels to reinforce the NATO SYG's efforts, we suggest 
that it remind GOT officials of the availability of the FMF 
funding to help Turkey contribute to coalition operations, 
assuming the USG is prepared to allow Turkey to use FMF 
funding for such purposes. 
EDELMAN 

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