US embassy cable - 04COLOMBO772

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000772 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS 
DEPARTMENT ALSO PLEASE PASS TOPEC 
NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  05-12-14 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PREL, CE, NO, IN, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT:  Norwegian facilitators upbeat after meetings 
with GSL and LTTE, but arranging talks will take time 
 
Refs:  Colombo 747, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. 
Reasons 1.5 (b, d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The Norwegians found President 
Kumaratunga and LTTE Chief Prabhakaran determined to 
move ahead on negotiations.  The sides need to decide 
agenda, locale and timing.  It's months, not weeks, and 
negotiations could not begin before late-July at a 
minimum.  The new government needs to understand 
unilateral actions are not helpful.  The Indians have no 
interest in changing the nature of their engagement. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen 
briefed donor Chiefs of Mission May 12 on the visit by 
Norwegian Foreign Minister Petersen May 10-11.  Petersen 
met President Kumaratunga twice, and met Prabhakaran in 
Kilinochchi on May 11.  Helgesen stayed on after 
Petersen's departure and would meet Kumaratunga again 
before leaving himself on Thursday.  Helgesen said that 
despite the difficult political scene in the South, he 
found both parties "determined to move ahead."  There 
were three categories of issues that needed to be 
discussed before negotiations resumed, however. 
 
3.  (C) The first item was what should be on the agenda. 
The LTTE's Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) 
proposal would obviously be a part of that.  There was a 
question as to how to link that discussion to one on the 
final settlement.  It would also be necessary to keep 
attention on the Ceasefire Agreement.  The second issue 
was where.  Public statements by both sides on this 
issue had been unhelpful, and Petersen had made it clear 
the two sides needed to agree.  (Helgesen said that the 
LTTE wanted Europe, because with Balasingham now back in 
the picture, his health condition made long trips a 
problem.) 
 
4.  (C) The last question was when.  Helgesen said that 
with the amount of preparatory work needed, this was a 
matter of months, not weeks.  At the earliest, 
negotiations might resume in late-July, early-August. 
He said that he thought Kumaratunga understood now that 
it was not desirable to rush into negotiations. 
 
5.  (C) Helgesen found it interesting the LTTE was using 
more "political" content in their discussions now.  For 
instance, they said that they (through their Tamil 
National Alliance proxies) had won all of the 
parliamentary seats in the North on the promise to bring 
development.  Therefore they needed to do so to fulfill 
their campaign commitments.  Ambassador asked Helgesen 
if he had at that point, or any other point, pointed out 
to LTTE that their behavior before and during the 
elections -- intimidation and murder of rival 
candidates, stuffing of ballot boxes, etc -- was 
unacceptable.  It was also stupid, because they would 
have won a great majority of seats anyway.  Helgesen 
said the Norwegians had not.  Ambassador asked if this 
was not a type of "political moral hazard."  Donors 
should not allow such statements to go unchallenged, or 
the LTTE would think we accepted their arguments. 
Netherlands and Canadian Ambassadors chimed in to agree, 
and said they might go to Kilinochchi to make these 
points, which Ambassador applauded. 
 
6.  (C) Helgesen said Kumaratunga had not yet chosen her 
chief negotiator or negotiating delegation.  She said 
she would do that once the time of negotiation was 
settled.  Helgesen and a number of others around the 
table had heard a rumor that Finance Minister Amunugama 
might get the nod as chief negotiator.  Most agreed he 
seemed a reasonable choice. 
7.  (C) In sum, Helgesen said, the challenge with the 
new government was to make them understand that 
unilateral actions were not welcome.  (n.b. this applies 
especially to Foreign Minister Kadirgamar, who has a 
habit of revealing his uncleared thoughts to the press.) 
The point to be made to the GSL, Helgesen said, was that 
they had to "move in parallel." 
 
8.  (C) As a last thought, Helgesen added that he had 
stopped in Delhi and had a long conversation with NSA 
Mishra.  Despite public comments by Kadirgamar and 
others on an enhanced Indian role, Delhi has no 
intention of changing the nature of its engagement. 
India did not want a direct role in the negotiations. 
 
9.  (C) COMMENT:  The Norwegians are doing the hard 
slogging work of trying to prepare the ground well for 
the eventual resumption of negotiations.  We were a bit 
disturbed by their apparent reluctance to call the LTTE 
on their egregious human rights violations during 
election time.  We think they heard the message, but it 
would be useful to reinforce at the June 1 Co-Chairs 
meeting in Brussels.  END COMMENT 
 
10.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
LUNSTEAD