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| Identifier: | 04KUWAIT1500 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04KUWAIT1500 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Kuwait |
| Created: | 2004-05-12 10:12:00 |
| Classification: | SECRET//NOFORN |
| Tags: | PTER PREL MARR ASEC IZ SY SA IR KU |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KUWAIT 001500 SIPDIS NOFORN STATE FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/NGA, S/CT E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X1 TAGS: PTER, PREL, MARR, ASEC, IZ, SY, SA, IR, KU SUBJECT: (S) DNSA TOWNSEND PRESSES GOK TO DO MORE AGAINST EXTREMISTS Classified By: CDA FRANK URBANCIC; REASON 1.4 (B,C,D). 1. (S) INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: DNSA Townsend met with the Prime Minister May 4, delivered the President's letter to the Amir, and pressed for more aggressive action against extremists. The PM instructed his security services to cooperate strongly with the U.S., but was clearly focused on maintaining "calm" inside Kuwait. He insisted the GOK's approach of monitoring and rehabilitating extremists was working, saying "if we use force, it will create violence," mostly against Americans. He urged strong action against Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiyya satellite TV stations, which he said are inciting hatred and violence. The PM also complained of practices that make the U.S. military vulnerable in Kuwait: convoys moving without notifying MOI, and soldiers visiting restaurants and shopping malls in uniform. 2. (S) In a follow-on meeting with the Chairman of the National Security Bureau, who had attended the meeting with the PM, Ms. Townsend reiterated more starkly that the USG is not satisfied with the leadership of Kuwait State Security (KSS). She also met with the Justice Minister, who said he was receptive to increasing cooperation against terrorist finance. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. 3. (S/NF) PARTICIPANTS: Deputy National Security Advisor for Counter-Terrorism Frances Townsend was accompanied by Charge, NSC Director Nicholas Rasmussen, Arabic interpreter Gemal Helal, ORCA Chief, and A/DCM (Notetaker). Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmed was accompanied by Chairman of the National Security Bureau (NSB) Sabah al-Khaled, MFA Undersecretary Amb. Khaled al-Jarallah, the PM's Office Director Amb. Ahmed al-Fahd, and the NSB Chairman's Office Director Thamer al-Sabah. Minister of Justice Ahmed Baqer al-Abdullah met with the delegation alone. Sabah al-Khaled and Thamer held a follow-on meeting with the delegation. (NOTE: Only the meeting with the PM was conducted through the interpreter. END NOTE.) (U) PRIME MINISTER ------------------ 4. (S) After a cordial exchange of greetings in which the PM congratulated Ms. Townsend on her appointment as Advisor to the President for Homeland Security, she gave him the President's letter to the Amir and Mr. Helal read an Arabic translation aloud. Stressing that she came in the spirit of strong friendship and partnership between the two countries, Ms. Townsend urged the GOK to be more aggressive against Kuwaiti extremists who are supporting violence in Iraq. She said KSS has competent people but lacks strong leadership. She noted that the U.S. had learned from its own mistakes about the need to take strong actions internally against extremists. She added that the Saudi crackdown could lead terrorists to turn their sights on Kuwait, including the ruling family here. In Saudi Arabia, extremists had demanded the withdrawal of U.S. forces, but when that occurred, they shifted to target Saudis and the royal family. Closing her initial presentation, Ms. Townsend noted that we have provided information to the KSS, but we are looking for more cooperation from the Kuwaiti side in acting on that information. She told the PM that his leadership would be enormously helpful in inspiring KSS to work with the U.S. more effectively. 5. (S) The PM promised to convey the letter to the Amir. He emphasized the excellent bilateral relationship and Kuwait's commitment to close security cooperation with the U.S. However, he insisted that the GOK's approach of monitoring and trying to rehabilitate extremists was more appropriate here than confronting terrorists directly with force as be believes the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have done: this is a small country, the Government knows everyone and stays in close touch with society; few in Kuwait wish harm to Americans; the GOK cannot jail people who have not violated the law, but it does jail violators, as in the case of Hamed al-Ali who was recently arrested "just for talking" and is being prosecuted. 6. (S) Sabah al-Ahmed made clear that his focus is on maintaining "calm" inside Kuwait: nobody is allowed to cross the Kuwait-Iraq border to do harm; the GOK cannot prevent citizens from traveling to Syria (and thence to Iraq), but it monitors those who do so; "if we use force, it will create violence" mostly against "guests" (read: Americans); "if it is calm here, there is no need for a different approach"; no American has been harmed here in over a year; it is true that some Kuwaitis have been killed fighting in Iraq but if anybody were to attack Americans in Kuwait, "obviously our position would be very different." 7. (S) DNSA Townsend reiterated to the PM that our two countries can do more to identify and disrupt those who would do us harm. She cited Jaber al-Jalahma as an extremist who needs to be stopped. Sabah was familiar with Jalahma and insisted "we have him under control." 8. (S) The PM voiced two complaints: -- Al-Jazeera satellite TV station broadcasts from Qatar, a GCC country that claims friendship for the United States, yet it is inciting hatred and violence against the U.S. and against Saudi Arabia with no apparent detriment to its relationship to the United States. It is regrettable that this is sponsored by a GCC member; he had discussed this with the Qatari Amir recently. The U.S. should use all its influence forcefully and relentlessly to stop it. The same problem exists with Al-Arabiyya in the UAE. Ms. Townsend replied that the USG has addressed this concern very directly with Qatar. -- U.S. military forces have crossed to/from Iraq without going through border controls; some 1,197 U.S. military convoys have been reported moving in Kuwait without notification to MOI, which thus could not provide protection; U.S. soldiers frequent restaurants and shopping malls in uniform, making themselves obvious targets. The Charge thanked the PM for Kuwait's protection, noted that an MOU on border controls is close to being signed, and promised to remind the military to follow existing procedures. He said however that this dialogue on logistics should not be allowed to detract from the issue of extremists operating in Kuwait. 9. (C) The PM mentioned that according to a tribal shaykh in Syria (later identified as Ahmed al-Jarba of the Shammar), the Syrians had caught nine Bangladeshis who were on their way to Iraq to fight the Coalition; they had been paid one thousand dollars each. 10. (S/NF) Towards the end of the meeting, the PM made a point of stating plainly, while looking directly at the NSB Chairman, that he wanted NSB and KSS to give "serious cooperation" to the USG on counter-terrorism. He promised to tell the same thing to KSS, which was not at the meeting. He concluded by conveying thanks to the President on behalf of the Amir, and vowing that Kuwait will remain a solid friend of the United States. (SBU) NSB CHAIRMAN ------------------ 11. (S) In the follow-on meeting with NSB Chairman Sabah al-Khaled, Ms. Townsend repeated her message more bluntly: the U.S. is not satisfied with the leadership of the KSS Director. Calm in Kuwait is not enough while Americans are being killed in Iraq. It is of "the utmost urgency" to stabilize Iraq in advance of the June 30 transfer of authority. The Chairman agreed with the need for stability in Iraq; he described the PM's instruction to cooperate with the U.S. against terrorism as a "loud, clear message" and promised to follow up with KSS and MOI, its parent ministry. Noting that he participates in weekly national security meetings with MOD, MOI and the National Guard, he pledged that Kuwait would "work as a team" with the U.S. 12. (S) Ms. Townsend handed Sabah al-Khaled a one-page list of Kuwaiti extremists the U.S. is particularly worried about; this was the same list she had given Kuwait's ambassador in Washington on April 29. Topping the list was Jalahma, who she said has committed crimes in many countries; "we would be happy to take him off your hands." Sabah al-Khaled replied that KSS has "sat with" Jalahma often and follows him; some extremists no longer trust Jalahma, perceiving that he has gone over to the Government's side. The Chairman pointed out that Kuwaiti law constrains the security forces: a suspect can only be held for four days, then must be turned over to the prosecutor who can detain him for 21 days, renewable one time; neither KSS nor NSB has any control over the prosecutor or the court. The Chairman brought up a complaint Ms. Townsend had made to the Kuwaiti ambassador, that another extremist on the list, Mohammed al-Dosari, was using a cellphone in jail. "We are reviewing our regulations," Sabah al-Kha led said, adding "we will follow this list and share information." 13. (S) The Chairman said some Kuwaitis are financing "mujahedin" and the GOK is trying to track the money, but that is difficult because it moves outside the banking system. He noted that GCC Interior Ministers were meeting in Kuwait the same day to sign a counter-terrorism agreement. He emphasized that the GOK is working bilaterally, within the GCC, and within the Arab League. It is also providing information to the UNSC committee established pursuant to Resolution 1373. 14. (S) Sabah al-Khaled expressed concern that Iran could see Kuwait as a soft target and activate sleeper cells or use Hizballah or Shiites from Bahrain or the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. Surrounded by Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, Kuwait finds itself in "a triangle of problems." There are many threats to Kuwait, from the Far East, Usama Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawaheri, and others. He was very concerned about terrorists' evolving tactics and the discovery in Turkey of "bottles of chemical liquids." (U) JUSTICE MINISTER -------------------- 15. (S) Justice Minister Ahmed Baqer al-Abdullah, a Salafi and the only elected member of parliament in the Cabinet, began his meeting with Ms. Townsend by stating that all Kuwaitis welcome cooperation with the United States and recognize what it has done for them. Most Kuwaitis and most Muslims, he continued, despise terrorism, which is destroying the image of Islam in the West. It is important to understand the reasons for terrorism, first and foremost the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which needs to be resolved. That does not justify terrorism, which is a crime regardless of its cause. In Kuwait, "good Muslim scholars negotiate with" extremists, teaching that Islam is a religion of peace and that Kuwaitis should cooperate with other nations. 16. (S) The Minister highlighted the importance of transparency in the finances of Islamic charities. He said all legitimate charities accept the need for this. In his view, Kuwait's laws are sufficiently stringent ever since an assassination attempt against the Amir in the 1980s, but he was "ready to study any suggestion" to strengthen controls. DNSA Townsend pointed out that convicted conspirators in the Failaka terrorist attack are now free on bail after serving short sentences. The Minister replied that laws are one thing, application by the court is another. He stressed the independence of the judiciary and its multi-stage appeals process. He considered Failaka "a very obvious case" and expected that the defendants would be sentenced on appeal. He did not favor legislating minimum sentences, for fear that judges would find defendants not guilty if they thought the minimum sentence was too harsh (there are no juries in the Kuwaiti judicial system). 17. (S) COMMENT: The meetings were cordial throughout, but the PM's body language indicated he was unhappy and defensive. He stuck to his line of argument, which was characteristic of his desire not to rock the boat. While he remains fixated on maintaining calm inside Kuwait, we are certain PM Sabah does not want Americans to be harmed outside Kuwait either, and shares our desire to stabilize Iraq urgently. For now, the most constructive course of action is to keep up the pressure by seizing upon his clear instruction to KSS and NSB to cooperate with us, and promptly flagging for him any failure to do so. 18. (U) Ms. Townsend has cleared this message. 19. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. URBANCIC
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