US embassy cable - 04ANKARA2664

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002664 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2029 
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, GR, CY, TU, PINR 
SUBJECT: TURKISH MILITARY WANTED YES/NO CYPRUS OUTCOME 
 
REF: ANKARA 2204 
 
 
(U) Classified by DCM Robert S. Deutsch.  Reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: The Turkish General Staff is appreciative of 
US and UK assistance in forging a balanced although 
problematic Cyprus plan.  TGS wanted the yes/no outcome from 
the referenda, although it has no clear idea of where to go 
from here.  The Turkish military worries that Cyprus might 
use its EU membership (or be used by others) to block 
Turkey's accession.  End Summary. 
 
 
2. (C) TGS wanted a positive vote on the Annan Plan in 
northern Cyprus and a negative vote in the south, according 
to TGS/J5 Greece/Cyprus Chief RADM Mucahit Sislioglu (please 
protect).  He told PolMilCouns May 10 that while the Turkish 
military was satisfied with the security provisions of the 
plan, there were problems with other parts of the plan and 
implementing it would have been "difficult."  The biggest 
worry for TGS was the cost (both financial and in human 
terms) of relocating Turkish Cypriots displaced by land 
returns.  However, TGS did not oppose the plan because 
relocations were mainly a matter for the government and not 
the military to handle, and because TGS calculated that Greek 
Cypriots would reject the plan.  In fact, Sislioglu said he 
told Prime Minister Erdogan in Switzerland in the final days 
of the negotiation that the security provisions would likely 
increase the no vote in the south by 20% and increase the yes 
vote in the north by 15%.  Nonetheless, Erdogan and Foreign 
Minister Gul hoped that the plan would pass on both sides of 
the island. 
 
 
3. (C) Recalling TGS Chief Gen Ozkok's April 13 press 
conference (reftel), Sislioglu said Ozkok had not wanted to 
address the issue in public.  Nonetheless, he was under 
considerable pressure from "people" who wanted to know TGS's 
position.  Sislioglu said that he personally drafted Ozkok's 
remarks which emphasized the negative aspects of the 
agreement, but anticipated that the statement would prompt a 
question about the positive aspects and prepared Ozkok for 
it.  He said he chose to emphasize the negative because the 
public and the government needed to realize and prepare for 
the difficulties that laid ahead in the event the plan was 
adopted.  At the same time, the positive security aspects of 
the plan in the answer to the inevitable question would worry 
the Greek Cypriots and reassure the Turkish Cypriots. 
 
 
4. (C) Comment:  Sislioglu, Ozkok and TGS Deputy Chief Basbug 
were the only military officers who knew everything the 
military was doing with the government and in the 
negotiations.  (Sislioglu lamented that his Cyprus staff 
didn't have enough English to be useful, so he was "working 
like a lieutenant," drafting papers, briefing the NSC, and 
negotiating the security aspects of the agreement.)  Last 
April, there were as many "people" pressing for an 
explanation of TGS's policy on Cyprus in the military as 
outside it.  Sislioglu admitted that Ozkok's words were 
chosen carefully to send messages to several groups.  These 
included not only to the GOT and Greek Cypriots, but the 
Turkish military as well.  End comment. 
 
 
5. (C) Sislioglu was complementary of the AK Party 
government, noting that the negotiations turned out the way 
they did largely due to the strong political decisions made 
by the government.  He noted that although the plan had 
elements that the military did not like, it was the product 
of a negotiation in which both sides had to compromise.  He 
agreed that the final product was a balanced agreement.  He 
expressed appreciation for the assistance of both the USG and 
HMG; while Washington and London's help was not evident at 
the beginning of the process, he said, it was quite clear in 
Switzerland that both governments were working hard to be 
helpful. 
 
 
6. (C) Sislioglu was not sure of the way ahead.  He worried 
that as time goes on, anger at the GOC for opposing the plan 
would fade and the diplomatic advantages Turkey and Turkish 
Cypriots had gained from supporting it would evaporate. 
Nicosia now had a stronger hand by virtue of its EU 
membership and could cause problems for Turkey's EU 
aspirations.  For example, France might hide behind Cyprus to 
keep Turkey from getting an accession negotiation date in 
December, he feared. 
7. (C) Comment: Sislioglu appeared to admire PM Erdogan and 
his government's decisiveness on the Cyprus issue while being 
critical of the government's acceptance of territorial 
concessions.  Although the military appears to have been 
prepared to back the Annan Plan, it was with some reluctance. 
 We expect the military would resist any further concessions 
if negotiations were reopened.  End comment. 
EDELMAN