US embassy cable - 04HARARE790

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000790 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER, D. TEITELBAUM 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER 
DS/OP/AF 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, PHUM, ASEC, ZI 
SUBJECT: VIOLENCE LOWER IN RUN-UP TO RURAL BY-ELECTION 
 
REF: A. HARARE 752 
     B. HARARE 751 
     C. HARARE 530 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Audu Besmer for reasons 1.5 b/d 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: On May 10 the Ambassador met with MDC 
Secretary General Welshman Ncube and MDC Spokesperson Paul 
 
SIPDIS 
Themba-Nyathi.  Ncube commented on lower levels of violence 
in the pre-election period in Lupane, sympathetic meetings 
with South African officials, and an internal MDC conflict 
between trade unionists and non-trade unionists.  END SUMMARY. 
 
By-Election Environment 
----------------------- 
 
2. (C) Having just returned from two weeks in Lupane 
(Matabeleland North) where campaigning for a May 15 - 16 
by-election is well underway, Ncube reported that violence 
was lower than in previous elections, however intimidation 
was widespread.  He said the MDC had been able to hold almost 
all of its campaign meetings and rallies without disruption. 
Ncube said the MDC had been able to convey its message 
effectively, but it was unclear whether that would be 
sufficient to win the election in the face of ZANU-PF tactics. 
 
3. (C) Ncube reported that the GOZ-appointed District 
Administrator had given kraalheads (traditional village 
sub-chiefs) specific instructions to organize residents under 
their jurisdictions to vote.  The kraalheads were to maintain 
lists of their residents, bring their people to the polling 
stations, and record the names of residents who actually 
voted.  The voters were supposed to write down the serial 
number of their ballot paper, and give that number to their 
kraalheads after voting to verify votes for ZANU-PF. 
 
4. (C) There were rumors circulating in Lupane that a 
"Gukurahundi" (the name commonly used for the government 
massacres of residents of Matabeleland in the early 1980s) 
would happen again if the ZANU-PF candidate in Lupane did not 
win. 
 
5. (C) Ncube said that ZANU-PF rallies and campaign meetings 
had been sparsely attended and that kraalheads were 
subsequently requested to convey campaign messages in 
community meetings with their residents.  Some ZANU-PF 
rallies were later billed as "community meetings" in order to 
get more residents to attend. 
 
6. (C) Ncube said that there had only been about 4 - 5 
incidents of direct violence on MDC supporters during the 
campaign period.  In one case a provincial organizer was 
threatened by ZANU-PF youths and was escorted home without 
incident.  In another case ZANU-PF youths visited the home of 
a ward chairman and assaulted his son when they did not find 
the chairman.  Ncube said there were 2 - 3 other cases about 
which he did not have details. 
 
7. (C) He reported that MDC leaders met with ZANU-PF 
provincial authorities for Matabeleland North and agreed that 
violence should be avoided.  Ncube said that ZANU-PF 
candidate Martin Khumalo had made a public statement that he 
lived in Lupane, and would not want to preside over an 
election marred by violence where anyone was killed.  Ncube 
said he thought ZANU-PF might have assessed that violence, 
given the memory of the Gukurahundi, would backfire.  Ncube 
said police had been helpful making arrests irrespective of 
political affiliation. 
 
8. (C) Ncube said that Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC) 
members, many actually from Lupane, had spoken at many MDC 
rallies conveying the message that using kraalheads for 
campaign organizing was illegal, and reinforcing an ESC 
pamphlet that the ballot was secret.  Ncube thought, however, 
that it was unlikely ESC representatives made similar 
comments at ZANU-PF rallies. 
 
9. (C) Ncube said that some residents were angry at ZANU-PF 
for having being ferried some 25 kilometers to a large 
ZANU-PF rally held on May 8 at which Vice President Msika 
spoke, but then having to walk home afterward. 
Sympathy from South Africa 
-------------------------- 
 
10. (C) Ncube reported that in a trip to South Africa during 
Mbeki's inauguration, he met with several Foreign Ministry 
officials including Deputy Minister Aziz Pahad.  Ncube said 
that especially in the wake of the violence in Zengeza, South 
African officials were unhappy that the situation in Zimbabwe 
was not improving.  They acknowledged that waiting for 
ZANU-PF's willingness to talk was like drifting without 
urgency.  RSA officials observed that ZANU-PF might simply be 
waiting for the MDC to implode and cease to be a political 
force.  Ncube said he encouraged the GOSA to communicate to 
the GOZ that proceeding to the March 2005 elections under the 
current electoral environment was unacceptable and would not 
result in a legitimate outcome. 
 
Parliamentary Elections and Talks 
--------------------------------- 
 
11. (C) Ncube opined that ZANU-PF clearly did not want 
presidential and parliamentary elections coordinated because 
the ruling party had no presidential candidate. 
 
12. (C) Ncube said that even with a favorable outcome from 
March 2005 parliamentary elections, without formal interparty 
talks, there would be no political reform because of 
presidential authority to use unchecked executive power. 
Similarly, without a new constitution, power sharing between 
the MDC and ZANU-PF would be impossible. 
 
Internal Conflicts Simmering 
---------------------------- 
 
13. (C) Commenting on MDC internal differences, Ncube said 
that there was cohesion and direction within the membership 
and also between the membership and leadership.  Ncube said 
there was internal cohesion within all provincial party 
structures except Harare, Chitungwiza (a large high-density 
suburb of Harare) and Masvingo. 
 
14. (C) Commenting on cohesion problems affecting Harare and 
Chitungwiza, Ncube said differences between MDC leaders were 
being resolved.  He said that someone, presumably within the 
MDC leadership, undoubtedly directed MDC youths to attack MDC 
MP Job Sikhala but Ncube did not specify whom.  Ncube said 
current conflicts within the leadership stemmed from the 
flawed selection of the party's candidate for the Zengeza 
by-election (a high-density suburb of Harare) (Ref C).  Ncube 
said the party simply did not follow its own candidate 
selection procedures in that case, but now some within the 
party were defending the candidate because he was a trade 
unionist.  Ncube said trade unionists within the party were 
complaining that they were being prevented from running for 
MP slots.  Ncube said this confused the issue, the party 
structures did not select the trade unionist as their 
candidate simply because he was less popular than the 
candidate they had in mind.  It had nothing to do with him 
being a trade unionist. 
 
15. (C) Nyathi explained that MDC President Morgan 
Tsvangirai, essentially under house arrest, sometimes did not 
 
SIPDIS 
hear the whole story.  Ncube, however, took responsibility 
for the issue acknowledging that it was the Secretary General 
who had ultimate responsibility for internal cohesion. 
 
Restructuring Underway 
---------------------- 
 
16. (C) Ncube confirmed that the plan to restructure the 
whole party to prepare for the March 2005 elections was 
underway (Ref A).  Ian Makoni, who had been appointed head of 
the elections directorate, had not yet presented the 
leadership with a strategy plan.  On receipt of such a plan, 
the leadership would review and approve it, then Makoni would 
go forward with programming.  Ncube said Makoni was now 
reviewing the party's performance in previous elections in 
developing his plan. 
 
Comment: 
-------- 
 
17. (C) That the pre-election environment in Lupane has so 
far been less violent that usual is a very good sign for the 
MDC.  Residents still resent the government for the 
atrocities of the Gukurahundi, and it is possible that the 
ruling party is afraid to do anything too violent in fear of 
provoking people to vote against ZANU-PF.  The ruling party's 
pattern has generally been to repress people only as much as 
is necessary.  Organizing kraalheads could be a more 
effective way to motivate votes for ZANU-PF, but it remains 
unclear whether residents will all follow instructions. 
 
18. (C) Responsible for the party's internal cohesion, Ncube 
has generally downplayed internal conflicts.  Nevertheless, 
he has previously identified Party Chairman Isaac Matongo as 
behind the debacle in Zengeza (Ref A), but this time he 
shifted blame to "trade unionists" in general -- clearly 
identifying yet another fissure within the fledgling 
opposition party. 
 
19. (C) Ncube had very little to report from his engagement 
within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in South Africa except 
general sympathy for the MDC's plight.  The MDC and we still 
look to the region for increased pressure on the GOZ, but 
without South Africa's leadership, other countries are 
unlikely to take a stand against Mugabe, regardless of any 
respective bilateral beefs (Ref B). 
SULLIVAN