US embassy cable - 04RANGOON563

S E C R E T RANGOON 000563 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, BM, National Convention, NLD 
SUBJECT: NLD LOOKING AHEAD TO CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM? 
 
REF: RANGOON 544 
 
Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ; REASON 1.4 (B & D). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Post has received some indications from NLD 
insiders that the party plans to focus its efforts on the 
constitutional referendum phase of the SPDC's road map. 
Rather than fight against terribly long odds at the 
stacked-deck National Convention, the party may feel its 
continuing mass appeal offers the best hope of turning back 
the regime's plan to frog-march Burma to a 
military-controlled "disciplined democracy."  End Summary. 
 
2.  (S) Looking Ahead:  At our early May meeting with two NLD 
insiders and Aung San Suu Kyi confidants, the discussion did 
not dwell at all on the National Convention, but revolved 
around questions concerning constitutional referenda, 
including an urgent request for information directly from 
Aung San Suu Kyi.  One of our interlocutors said, "What would 
happen if the referendum on the constitution failed? 
Wouldn't that be interesting?" 
 
3.  (SBU) Doing the Math:  About thirty NLD members have 
received invitations to participate in the National 
Convention, as have six former members.  When the National 
Convention began in 1993 it had 702 participants.  Between 
700 and 900 invitations have been issued for May 17th, 
although some speculate the number of participants could go 
as high as 1,400.  We have been told that there will be no 
voting and all decisions will be by consensus.  With a 
maximum of 3.5% of the delegates, the NLD is not apt to carry 
the day.  The party must realize that the likelihood of an 
SPDC-backed draft constitution being approved is very high. 
 
4.  (SBU) Why Bother to Attend, Then?:  The NLD said it would 
attend the National Convention if three "suggestions" (not 
demands or conditions) were agreed to: A) release the two 
senior NLD leaders still under house arrest, B) open 210 
party offices, and C) set a firm timeline for the whole road 
map, as reported reftel.  Detailed concerns about National 
Convention procedures, which scuttled the 1993-96 effort, 
could be discussed in due course, the NLD allowed.  These 
three softball conditions have very little to do with the 
National Convention per se.  The NLD attended before when 
ASSK was under house arrest and prior to the 2002-03 opening 
of so many district offices.  The opening date of May 17 
seems firm.  So why make these suggestions rather than just 
attend or announce a boycott? 
 
5.  (C) Taking it to the People:  All three suggestions are 
vital for the NLD to have a chance of turning back the SPDC's 
road map at the constitutional referendum phase.  Aung San 
Suu Kyi and U Tin Oo need to be out and able to fire up the 
party faithful.  District and provincial offices are 
important for grass-roots coordination.  A fixed date means 
the SPDC can't procrastinate forever.  Thus, the three 
suggestions support the notion that the referendum, not the 
National Convention, is where the NLD may chose to make its 
stand.  The NLD will not be able to control the convention, 
but might hope to stun the regime with a show of support at 
the ballot box.  Will the regime allow a free and fair 
referendum vote?  Maybe so, maybe not, but if the junta 
cheats on the referendum vote, what chance does the planned 
general election have to be fair?  Better to find out now, 
perhaps. 
 
6.  (S) Comment:  The NLD as an organization is in bad shape. 
 Some previously stalwart Youth Wing leaders recently fled 
the country in despair.  There is no good reason for the 
regime to agree to the NLD's three suggestions, apart from a 
minimal need to have the road map process appear at least 
superficially inclusive.  Encouragingly, the regime has 
allowed the full NLD leadership to meet three times in the 
past fortnight, but it has not yet responded to the NLD's 
suggestions.  If the NLD's suggestions are not agreed to, 
Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD will have to review their policy 
of forbearance and patience.  If the three suggestions are 
agreed to, the party can gear up for a political fight on the 
referendum, while perhaps sitting passively through the 
National Convention.  This has the added advantage of kicking 
the NLD make-or-break point down the road another six months 
or so.  End Comment. 
Martinez