US embassy cable - 04ROME1756

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 001756 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL: 05/04/2014 
TAGS: MARR, PREL, AF, IT, NATO, AFGHANISTAN, IRAQI FREEDOM 
SUBJECT:  ITALIAN PRT-FSB DECISION RESTS WITH PM BERLUSCONI 
 
REF: A. STATE 96082 
B. IIR 147 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR THOMAS COUNTRYMAN 
FOR REASONS 1.5(B)(D) 
 
1. (C)  Summary. Italy's ability to contribute a Forward 
Support Base (FSB) or Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in 
western Afghanistan depends on whether the Prime Minister's 
office can free up scarce resources to fund the effort, 
according to Embassy contacts at the MFA, MOD and the PM's 
Office.  Francesco Talo', a deputy Diplomatic Advisor in the 
PM's Office, told Pol-Mil Officer on May 4 that he would take 
reftel points directly to PM Berlusconi, who has been 
studying the issue this week.  Post plans to make full use of 
USNATO Ambassador Burns' visit to Rome on May 7 to emphasize 
the critical need for Italy to take on the western 
Afghanistan FSB.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) Pol-Mil Officer delivered reftel points to MFA NATO 
Affairs Office Director Giovanni Brauzzi, DefMin Diplomatic 
Advisor Francesco Trupiano, and Talo' in separate meetings on 
May 4.  DATT also conveyed the points to VCHOD Gen. 
Castegnetti.  Brauzzi and Trupiano indicated that the issue 
is now under review in the Prime Minister's Office.  The 
decision on whether to stand up an FSB and/or contribute a 
PRT in western Afghanistan will most likely be made by PM 
Berlusconi himself because it will require shifting limited 
resources among existing obligations and priorities, Brauzzi 
said.  In a later meeting, Talo' explained that no defense 
funds are available to cover the associated costs.  If the PM 
decides to make the FSB/PRT an MOD priority, funds will have 
to be reallocated from an existing mission before the FSB/PRT 
project can move forward.  Given Italy's tight economic 
situation, Talo' added, it will not be easy to free up the 
kind of funding needed for a mission of this magnitude.  He 
said he would take reftel points directly to PM Berlusconi, 
who has been reviewing the issue this week. 
 
3. (C) The VCHOD, Gen. Castegnetti, echoed this message in 
his May 4 meeting with the DATT (see IIR).  After studying 
the matter, the MOD has concluded that it cannot afford to 
fund either an FSB or a PRT, Castegnetti told the DATT.  The 
MOD has informed the PM's Office of this conclusion; if 
contributing an FSB and/or a PRT is determined to be an 
Italian priority, funding will need to be shifted from an 
existing obligation or additional defense funds will need to 
be appropriated by parliament. Castegnetti said defense 
officials have weighed the possibility of bringing Italy's 
mission in Albania to a close as one possible source of 
funds.  Another approach might be to designate some military 
forces now operating within Italy to the job.  At this point, 
the PM's Office will need to make the call. 
 
4. (C) Comment.  Our contacts are keenly aware that Italy's 
commitment to take on the FSB is critical to ISAF expansion 
into western Afghanistan.  PM Berlusconi and DefMin Martino 
offered to contribute a PRT last fall as a sign of Italian 
support for ISAF expansion; that support continues, despite 
our retraction of our request for a PRT in Ghazni.  Concerns 
about finding the resources to do the job are real, however. 
With approximately 1.5% of GDP allocated for defense 
spending, the MOD is already straining to support operations 
in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan and over 20 other hotspots, 
while also modernizing and transforming the military 
services. 
 
5. (C) Comment cont'd.  Amb. Burns' visit to Rome on May 7 
presents an ideal opportunity to urge the Italians to think 
creatively about how to support ISAF expansion in western 
Afghanistan.  Amb. Burns and Amb. Sembler can engage directly 
with Martino and Berlusconi's Diplomatic Advisor, Giovanni 
Castellaneta, at a dinner Amb. Sembler is hosting on May 7. 
We are coordinating with the PM's office to arrange an 
earlier meeting between Amb. Sembler and Castellaneta, should 
that be required.  End Comment. 
 
6. (U) Minimize Considered 
 
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