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| Identifier: | 04BOGOTA4534 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04BOGOTA4534 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Bogota |
| Created: | 2004-05-04 20:26:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN |
| Tags: | ECON ETRD CO FTA |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 004534 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR BENNETT HARMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2014 TAGS: ECON, ETRD, CO, FTA SUBJECT: ANDEAN FTA ANALYSIS: CUSTOMS ISSUES IN COLOMBIA Classified By: DCM Milton Drucker for reasons 1.5 (b and d) 1. (C) SUMMARY: Despite previous reforms to Colombia's customs administration, more modernization is needed to fully support trade under an FTA. The customs bureaucracy itself hampers trade, lacking specialized staff and equipment, and suffering from high management turnover. Pilferage in customs warehouses and truck robberies are frequent, and shipments may be detained indefinitely or refused entry for minor infractions. In FTA talks, Colombia may request assistance to modernize laboratories, train experts, and develop online systems. This would promote transparency and efficiency, and improve oversight, control and customer service. This is the third of a series of sector briefs developed in preparation for the Andean FTA. The summaries are based on in-depth studies which are available from USAID Bogota. END SUMMARY. Background 2. (C) Despite two 1990's reforms to Colombia's customs administration that reduced costs, improved consistency and addressed contraband and money laundering, more modernization is needed to fully support trade under an FTA. Customs policy and operations are managed by DIAN, the country's tax collection agency. DIAN lacks specialized technical divisions to conduct origin, valuation and classification of merchandise, and require better-trained staff and specialized equipment. High turnover of management -nearly 100 percent annually for non-political posts- adds to DIAN's institutional instability. 3. (C) The DIAN bureaucracy itself forms a barrier to trade for both local and foreign companies. Pilferage in customs warehouses and truck robberies are frequent. Shipments may be detained indefinitely or refused entry for improper tariff classification, incorrect address, or typing errors. Minor infractions are subject to stiff penalties. Issue: Rules of Origin 4. (C) Certificates of origin demonstrate that products qualify for preferential treatment under the FTA. Though the Trade Ministry determines the origin of goods, issues certificates and rules on the validity of foreign certificates, it lacks the specialized personnel and funds to provide adequate and effective control. Certificate formats and origin verification procedures are not standardized. Ideally, origin verification should be a post-import procedure, with inspections used only when fraud is suspected. Certificates should be issued at the customers' request, and shipments should be released without necessarily requiring certificate presentation. Private exporters should provide importers with standardized information on rules of origin; under the current system the GOC certifies origin of goods on behalf of Colombian exporters. Issue: Valuation and Reference Prices 5. (C) DIAN's valuation of goods is partially compliant with the WTO customs code. Currently DIAN requires an Andean Valuation Statement for each import. For greater efficiency, this should be required only in specific instances like for post-import controls and visits. 6. (SBU) Colombia used minimum prices of reference to determine the customs value of merchandise until disallowed by the WTO in April 2003. However the GOC replaced them with "estimated prices," which are ranges of maximum and minimum prices used to control prices of imported goods. Currently these apply to tires, certain textiles and apparel products, shoes, and some electric products. The GOC also applies a price-band for agricultural products, as well as reference prices for other sensitive products including paper, liquor, iron and steel products. DIAN may confiscate and charge a surtax on goods whose declared price is below the reference price, a practice inconsistent with the WTO. Issue: Classification 7. (SBU) The Brussels Convention on Classification of Customs Goods and Tariffs established three criteria for classification of merchandise that were also adopted by the WTO and the GOC based upon the definition of the product, its cost and its place of origin. Unfortunately, the DIAN lacks the specialized personnel and up-to-date laboratories needed to adequately classify merchandise. Issue: Inspections, Sanctions and Control 8. (U) Customs officials inspect merchandise to verify the importer's declaration. Trained inspectors perform random post-clearance investigations to detect fraud, foreign exchange irregularities, and tax evasion. Major brokers have a customs office in their own bonded warehouses where merchandise is cleared before delivery to the customer. 9. (SBU) Some 231 actions or omissions may result in fines and suspension or cancellation of shipments. Just 25 percent of sanctions are made on substantive grounds, while most are due to faulty import declarations or delays in payment of accrued tariffs. Evidence provided directly to DIAN from foreign authorities is invalid in Colombian courts if not collected via the MFA, thus slowing the legal settlement of cases. Issue: Foreign Trade Procedures and Management 10. (U) DIAN requires nearly all importations to be undertaken through customs brokers, with exceptions for large-scale importers, tourists and a few others. This requirement was imposed to improve control mechanisms, and despite the higher initial transaction costs to users, the system has helped to professionalize foreign trade management processes. 11. (SBU) Colombian customs offices lack a central electronic system to manage all import, export and transit regimes. Offices in Cartagena, Buenaventura, Medellin and Bogota use obsolete systems that are not compatible and cannot track temporary imports. Smaller border offices like Leticia perform procedures manually, causing delays and inefficiency. Issue: Legal Compliance with International Regimes 12. (SBU) Colombian Law 6 of 1971 and Law 7 of 1991 regulate customs procedures and foreign trade. These laws need to be updated to reflect WTO customs valuation procedures and the simplification of customs regimes established by the Kyoto agreement. Colombia belongs to the WTO agreement on customs valuation, to the Brussels World Customs Organization, and to the Kyoto agreement. Issue: Special Regimes 13. (C) The oversight procedures and systems in place to operate Colombia's special regimes are woefully deficient. The Vallejo Plan is a tariff and VAT-free special regime that encourages import of raw materials, intermediate and capital goods and spare parts to produce goods and services for export. Free Zones are tariff and VAT-free areas that encourage economic development. In practice, however, it is extremely difficult to track and verify the final destination of goods covered by the regimes to guarantee that benefits are warranted. Thus producers may avoid tariffs and the VAT undeservedly, regardless of the final destination of the goods in question. The Trade Ministry and DIAN should improve their coordination, as well as training in legal and procedural norms. Training is needed to better control the entry and exit of goods in special regime zones and to verify the eligibility of production and assembly operations located in the zones. 14. (C) Getting to the Table: What GOC Needs to Do A. Colombia needs to implement an intensive training program to improve compliance with WTO valuation guidelines. Training should include instruction on approved valuation methodologies and practical exposure to WTO compliance systems used in the region. B. The valuation rules defined by DIAN should be publicized to educate and update users. C. Colombia needs to demonstrate that its rules of origin are transparent, do not distort international trade, and are managed impartially and consistently. D. DIAN needs to improve its institutional stability, possibly restructuring the DIAN over the long-term. Turnover of management must be addressed. E. DIAN technical divisions should be beefed up with adequate equipment, modern laboratories and specialized personnel to investigate and sanction violations to the rules of origin, valuation, and classification of merchandise. F. Although customs intermediary companies must comply with DIAN's regulations, they should be monitored more closely to insure quality of procedures and to clamp down on unauthorized brokers. Integrated customs and sanctioning regimes would improve efficiency. 15. (C) Overall GOC Position on Customs A. Colombia may request assistance to modernize customs laboratories, training in rules of origin as well as in valuation, classification, and development of integrated online information and customs transactions systems. These would promote transparency and efficiency in valuation, classification, rules of origin, as well as oversight, control and customer service. B. In NAFTA and other international trade agreements, rules of origin are based on "substantial transformation" and require aggregate value tests. These require a country to track a broad range of products, which is costly and requires specialized skills. In an FTA, Colombia may press instead for rules of origin similar to those applied under the Andean Community Agreement. These are based on more generic criteria related to the value of inputs from non-member countries as a percentage of the value of the final product, as well as changes in product classification in relation to imported inputs. Colombia may argue that the cost of aggregate value tests could be higher than the gains from tariff reductions for specific products. C. Colombia may press for auto-certification by producers instead of Trade Ministry certification, as in the Chile FTA. The Ministry would instead police certificate validity. 16. (C) GOC Negotiating Strategy for Customs A. The GOC understands that customs modernization is key to a successful FTA. They will point to modernization efforts and may request U.S. technical assistance. WOOD
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