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| Identifier: | 04BOGOTA4326 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04BOGOTA4326 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Bogota |
| Created: | 2004-04-29 14:54:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN |
| Tags: | EAGR ECON ETRD CO FTA |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BOGOTA 004326 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR BENNETT HARMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2014 TAGS: EAGR, ECON, ETRD, CO, FTA SUBJECT: ANDEAN FTA ANALYSIS: AGRICULTURE SECTOR IN COLOMBIA Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.5 (b and d) 1. (C) SUMMARY: Agriculture will probably be one of Colombia's most sensitive sectors in the FTA negotiations, due to its historical role and the sector's high level of government intervention. The U.S. has comparative advantage in the products most protected by Colombia, particularly wheat, corn and oilseeds. The GOC's negotiating strategy for an FTA will most likely be to try to retain all ATPDEA benefits while claiming that key crops should be protected to underpin the fight against drugs and civil disorder. The GOC will also most likely seek to offset U.S. domestic supports for key products through safeguard mechanisms or long transition times (up to 20 years). This is the first of a series of sector briefs developed in preparation for the Andean FTA. The summaries are based on in-depth studies which are available from USAID Bogota. END SUMMARY. Background 2. (SBU) While ATPA and ATPDEA have brought benefits to some Colombian producers, an earlier market opening still haunts farmers. When commercial reforms opened the market in 1990, Colombian agricultural exports increased from US $2.7 billion in 1991 to US$ 4.7 billion in 1997. But producers blame the reform for the sector's anemic 1 percent GDP growth in recent years, and claim that the resulting 9 percent rural job loss fueled illicit drug production and violence. 3. (U) Current GOC agricultural policies tend to support products with a strong political base. A recent USAID and WB-sponsored study found that protected agricultural commodities, especially basic grains, would be uncompetitive even if world prices rose as much as 30 percent. The study concluded Colombia is highly competitive in many nontraditional agricultural products (flowers, fresh fruits and vegetables, palm oil, cacao, and forestry products). These have stronger direct and indirect employment-generation effects than basic grain products favored by current protections. The current system distorts agricultural finance, with subsidies making protected products more attractive than under a market-based system. 4. (U) The recent recovery of agriculture (4.5 percent growth in 2003) was fueled largely by non-traditional exports. But protectionists dismiss this as a "fragile" recovery that could fail if traditional agricultural interests are not protected from domestically-supported U.S. products. Though the GOC worries about rural unemployment, cheap U.S. grain exports would benefit Colombia's rural and urban consumers as well as dairy, poultry and swine production. A Variety of Trade Barriers 5. (U) The Andean Common External Tariff applies to most products. It varies from 5 percent and 10 percent for inputs and 15 percent and 20 percent for final products. Some excepted products are tariff-free to encourage growth of their productive chains. Finally, a group of sensitive products are included in the price-band system. 6. (SBU) The Price-Band System includes the 14 most protected Colombian products (including basic grains, soybeans and chicken) and 150 substitutes and derivatives. It was designed to stabilize prices of agricultural imports with high price volatility in international markets, and to counter export and production subsidies. When international prices surpass the band ceiling, tariffs are reduced; when prices drop below the band floor, tariffs are raised. Tariffs are calculated using reference prices and not real transaction values, a practice similar to setting a "minimum price," violating WTO rules. Although the price-band has succeeded in stabilizing prices, it also raises the cost of key inputs for other products, lowering their competitiveness and dampening consumption through higher local prices. According to a USAID/WB study, it often raises the effective protection on some products to over 200 percent. This system is not compatible with the WTO and will need to be phased out. 7. (C) Voluntary Tariff-Rate Quotas (TRQs) protect six of the most politically-sensitive agricultural products-- white and yellow corn, grain sorghum, rice, soybeans and cotton. The TRQs are set by historic import levels and then auctioned off by the Agricultural Commodities Board. Importers offering to purchase the most domestic production win the right to purchase the imports bid at a reduced tariff rate. Imports beyond the TRQ are allowed, but face the general tariff rate. GOC sees TRQs as a way to decrease protection for sensitive agriculture sectors while preparing them for free trade. FTA talks will then provide the political cover and concessions necessary to dismantle them. 8. (SBU) Stabilization Funds provide income support for producers of sugar, palm oil, cocoa, beef and dairy products by maintaining domestic prices above world prices. The cacao and cotton funds are currently not operating due to funding shortfalls. The Funds are financed by a levy on domestic sales, with the resulting income used to subsidize exports of surplus production. While the GOC and producers deny that these are export subsidies, these are producer-financed exports subsidies covered by WTO limits. Subsidized beef exports are relatively small, but export subsidies for sugar, palm oil and dairy products are in excess of WTO limits. These programs should be removed. 9. (SBU) Special Safeguard Measures are applied to 56 products listed with the WTO. Here an additional tariff is applied when the volume of imports increases or when the price of imports decreases against a set reference price. Special safeguard measures also apply to 85 products listed under the Andean Community. Many of these safeguards are not being applied because of other protectionist measures in place such as price bands and tariff rate quotas. The GOC says the measures are permitted by the WTO, but they may not comply with the most-favored nation principle. 10. (U) Promotion Fund Quotas (PFQs) are tariffs collected on certain imported goods to help fund scientific research, development, and technological transfer projects to promote domestic exports. Such levies are applied on products such as malt, cacao, almonds, cotton, cottonseeds, and tobacco among others, raising the cost of imports. 11. (SBU) Discretionary Import Licensing requirements were removed for corn, rice and poultry with the expiration of a WTO waiver January 1, 2004. However, requirements remain for dry beans, beef and milk powder, the latter two instituted in 2003 in violation of WTO rules. The FTA will need to eliminate these requirements and the legislative authority of the Ministry of Agriculture to implement such restrictions in the future. 12. (SBU) Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) have not been a major problem. U.S. beef and poultry are currently banned due to BSE and Avian Influenza concerns, but restrictions may be lifted prior to FTA negotiations. Salmonella requirements on poultry were previously a problem and could be used again to block imports. SPS restrictions could increase as the FTA removes the GOC's discretionary authority to protect sensitive products through import licensing and high tariffs. 13. (U) Technical Barriers to Trade have generally been in the form of restrictive registration requirements. While these requirements have not been used to keep products out, the long and complicated process significantly delays the entry of new products. Biotechnology restrictions have not been a problem, but stricter enforcement of biotech regulations related to international agreements could be a problem in the future. 14. (C) Getting to the Table: What the GOC Needs to Do A. Develop an export promotion strategy that eliminates protectionist barriers. B. Implement key policy and institutional reforms to improve land market access and allocation and public infrastructure planning to reinforce comparative advantages in highly labor-intensive export sectors. C. Review protection for less-competitive products that serve as inputs for other agricultural goods, negatively affecting their competitiveness. D. Develop more market-based approaches for integrating the agricultural and agro-business sectors into the formal financial system. E. Resolve the ongoing battle between the ministries of Trade and Agriculture fro control of agricultural trade policy. 15. (C) Overall GOC Demands in Agriculture A. U.S. domestic subsidies should betaken into account in FTA negotiations. GOC will leverage this issue to push the U.S. to examine alternative financial mechanisms (such as compensation or reconversion funds) and extended phase-out periods for protectionist mechanisms (eg. price-bands) to "counter" U.S. subsidies. B. U.S. phytosanitary standards should be negotiated or modified to give Colombia rapid market access to dairy, beef, poultry, fruit and horticultural exports. GOC should agree to establish a harmonization or equivalence strategy for improved registration, control, inspection and certification procedures and intensive technical and institution-building assistance to achieve international standards. C. Retain current ATPDEA benefits on all agriculture products. 16. (C) GOC Positions on Key Agricultural Products A. Basic crops (rice, sorghum, corn and cotton) should enjoy special consideration in the FTA. The GOC argues these crops play a critical role in providing rural jobs that enhance social stability and keep farmers from illicit drugs and conflict. While seemingly valid, this argument is false. Basic grains offer a minor source of employment and subsistence farmers most likely to switch to illegal crops are not grain producers. The GOC and alternative development donors are shifting their focus from grains to more financially viable crops as better substitutes for drug crops. The GOC will seek long-phase-in periods, technical assistance and crop substitution financing for dismantling of protection for basic grains. B. Keep out U.S. corn and soybean oil to protect Colombian corn and palm oil. The GOC wants import substitution opportunities for Colombian corn & soybeans and will try to ensure a lengthy transition period for tariff reductions in these areas. The GOC may be willing to eliminate export subsidies for palm oil more rapidly. C. Keep out high fructose corn syrup to protect high domestic sugar prices and provide a large sugar quota for Colombia (over 100,000 MT). D. Keep U.S. poultry leg quarters out of Colombia for as long as possible. Colombians prefer leg quarters while U.S. consumers prefer breast meat. E. Emphasize market access for exotic fruits and vegetables. F. Gain greater access for Colombian beef (including removal of foot-and-mouth related restrictions) and dairy products into the U.S. market. 17. (C) Overall GOC Negotiating Strategy for Agriculture A. Plan A will be to argue that Colombian agriculture must be protected in order to underpin the fight against narcoterrorism. Plan B will be to demand long phase-in periods for sensitive crops. The GOC is likely to assume a hard line for an extended period of time, until they sense that the success of the FTA is imperiled. B. Agriculture Minister Cano, a hard-line protectionist, is seen as reflecting President Uribe's policy instincts on agriculture, and is pitted against Trade Minister Botero on the FTA. Final decisions on tough issues will be taken by President Uribe. WOOD
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