US embassy cable - 04AMMAN3288

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VARIED JORDANIAN REACTION TO TELEVISED TERRORIST CONFESSIONS

Identifier: 04AMMAN3288
Wikileaks: View 04AMMAN3288 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Amman
Created: 2004-04-28 15:54:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PTER ASEC KISL JO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 003288 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2014 
TAGS: PTER, ASEC, KISL, JO 
SUBJECT: VARIED JORDANIAN REACTION TO TELEVISED TERRORIST 
CONFESSIONS 
 
REF: A. AMMAN 2555 
     B. AMMAN 2594 
     C. AMMAN 3128 
     D. FBIS GMP20040426000216 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm for reasons 1.5 (b and d) 
 
1.  (C)  Jordanian emotions were all over the map in reaction 
to the televised confessions of suspected al-Qaeda/Zarqawi 
affiliates who planned to unleash massive truck bombs against 
GOJ targets and the U.S. Embassy in Amman.  The GOJ's 
motivations in airing the confessions appear to have been to 
a) persuade the public that the terrorist threat is real and 
affects average people, and therefore should be resisted by 
all Jordanians b) clarify a confusing picture made by a 
series of public statements on the ongoing investigation, c) 
dispel a widely discussed conspiracy theory that the 
authorities themselves had concocted the story of the plot to 
distract people from controversial tax hikes, d) boost public 
confidence in the GID, and e) spotlight the Syrian background 
of many of the plotters.  To reinforce the impact of the 
dramatic JTV broadcast, print media have clearly been told to 
toe a line of factual reporting and silencing of any 
commentary.  Reactions include expressions of shock and 
hatred towards al-Qaeda, relief and congratulations to the 
King and GID, but also lingering doubts about whether the 
cell was really capable of pulling off the murder of 80,000 
people with chemicals, about the overly slick confessions, 
and about the impact of the publicity on Jordan,s tourist 
and service sector.  Relief that the plot was disrupted is 
mingled with fear at the prospect of facing a long-term 
terrorist threat.  End 
Summary. 
 
2.  (C)  After three weeks of contradictory, confusing and 
partial government accounts about the unfolding investigation 
of an al-Qaeda/Zarqawi truck bomb plot, on April 26 state 
television broadcast a primetime special, publicized in 
morning papers, and flanked by ten minutes of national songs 
and images.  It dramatically publicized taped confessions by 
the accused plotters, video footage of their arrest and of 
seized bomb-making substances and chemicals, and an animated 
version of how the plotters intended to carry off a bombing 
at GID.  Significantly, it included statements by prominent, 
independent clerics denouncing such behavior as un-Islamic. 
Woven into the accounts were clear subtexts.  One was 
repeated reference to the Syrian background to the story, 
including the Syrian nationality of some of the plotters and 
their use of Syria as a partial staging ground.  Another 
subtext involved filmed statements by innocent Jordanians who 
had interacted with the plotters, commenting on their 
anti-social behavior.  Throughout the production, the 
efficiency and bravery of GID and public security personnel 
were made evident. 
 
3.  (C)  This broadcast had the desired dramatic impact. 
Reports of the most elaborate and potentially deadly 
terrorist plot to date in Jordan, coming against the backdrop 
of recent attacks in Saudi Arabia, have focused ordinary 
Jordanians on their personal safety, and generated some shock 
that Jordanian nationals were involved.  There was an 
outpouring of expressions of solidarity with King, country, 
and GID, as notables sought to align themselves with the 
regime, and curry favor by doing so.  After weeks of rallies 
showing anger toward Israel, the U.S., and developments in 
Iraq (issues which tended to place the Jordanian government 
in opposition to public opinion), Amman will experience a 
"Loyalty to Jordan" march on April 29 to protest terrorism. 
The broadcast turned the tables on opposition elements, which 
have been compelled to join in this exercise.  The Muslim 
Brotherhood issued a statement rejecting terrorism and 
condemning the plotters' attempt to kill Jordanians and sow 
instability.  The Islamic Action Front, which initially 
accused the GOJ of concocting the reports of the plot to 
distract attention from price hikes, has changed its tune, 
but only slightly.  A spokesman said it was wrong to have 
planned to attack Arabs and Muslims; the plotters should have 
pointed their "guns at the enemy occupying (Muslim) lands in 
Palestine and Iraq."  He also noted the importance of waiting 
for the judicial process to judge the accused. 
 
4.  (C)  Doubts remain.  We have heard some question whether 
this group could have carried off the sort of massive 
casualties the government has said.  Others questioned the 
slickness of the confessions.  Plot leader Jayoussi,s 
account was delivered in a relaxed, conversational manner, 
and a young, uneducated Syrian plotter spoke in polished 
classical Arabic, leading a human rights activist trained in 
cross-examination tactics to conclude the whole thing was 
staged in an effort to impress the U.S. that Jordan is an 
important ally against terrorism.  Others found Jayoussi's 
manner compelling but disconcerting: "how could he sit there 
so calmly and talk about killing thousands of people?!" a 
Jordanian university student exclaimed to Poloff.  An FSN 
commented that the confessions were suspiciously neat, but 
her mother had believed every word, exclaiming something to 
the effect of: "Hang the bastards!"  Still others remain 
unconvinced.  One 30-something Jordanian woman who spends 
considerable time in the U.S. told CAO the whole thing is 
preposterous:  "Jordan is a safe place... we don't have 
people like that here."  The GOJ's airing of the views of 
Islamic cleric Ali al-Halabi won praise, in part because he 
is known for his independent thinking and for speaking his 
mind. 
 
5.  (C)  Comment:  The GOJ had a number of likely motives in 
releasing this dramatic program.  For starters, it had to 
correct a confusing record of public statements about the 
ongoing investigation and explain why exceptional security 
measures had been taken (and remain in place) in Amman.  It 
also appears to have been aimed at enlisting public opinion 
behind its anti-terror policies, and association with the 
U.S., by showing that average Jordanians, not just diplomats 
and intelligence officers, would have been victims.  By 
sensitizing Jordanians to the gravity of the threat, some 
observers also see an effort to heighten Jordanians, 
alertness to suspicious activity (the plotters had conducted 
themselves relatively openly, renting property and buying 
material).  The Jordanian Armed Forces Deputy Chief of Staff 
told the DATT that an additional objective was to highlight 
the Syrian dimension, in terms of the nationality of some 
plotters and use of Syria as a launching pad for part of the 
operation.  Despite the doubts, this strategy seems to have 
convinced Jordanians that the plot actually existed.  But it 
also leaves behind unease about the risk of the next 
terrorist plot. 
 
Visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman or access the site 
through the State Department's SIPRNET home page. 
GNEHM 

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