US embassy cable - 04BOGOTA4297

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 004297 
 
SIPDIS 
 
GENEVA FOR POLITICAL COUNSELOR JEFF DELAURENTIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (SUBJECT LINE CHANGED) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2014 
TAGS: PTER, PHUM, PGOV, PINR, PINS, SNAR, ASEC, CO, ELN Peace Process 
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH MOD AND PEACE 
COMMISSIONER 
 
REF: BOGOTA 04278 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) On April 27, Ambassador spoke to Minister of Defense 
Uribe and Peace Commissioner Restrepo about that day's 
presidential declaration on the peace process (reftel). 
 
2. (C) Minister Uribe said that the declaration had been 
composed the day before and had been reviewed before issuance 
by himself, Minister of Interior and Justice Pretelt, 
Restrepo, and the military High Command.  Although the 
President wrote most of the declaration himself, the message 
was a product of many hands.  Ambassador told Restrepo that 
the Embassy strongly supported the declaration. 
 
3. (C) Regarding the opening line on paramilitary threats 
against the President, Minister Uribe said they had good 
information that drug trafficker/paramilitary "Don Berna" and 
others were trying to organize an attempt on the President's 
life.  Paramilitary attacks on the President are a new 
phenomenon and run counter to their rhetoric of "patriotism." 
 
 
4. (C) Regarding the line that "those who wished to avoid 
extradition must demonstrate to the international community 
good faith and a purpose of amending their ways," Minister 
Uribe said it was not meant to open the door to evasion of 
extradition.  Rather, the declaration was clear that 
extradition was not on the negotiating table and equally 
clear that it was the "international community" who must be 
convinced in any case where extradition was not granted. 
Extradition would remain an open possibility in all cases 
and, at least for the time being, the subject was closed. 
 
5. (C) Minster Uribe commented that the declaration should 
serve to separate any paramilitaries interested in a genuine 
peace process from those, increasingly dominant, who are 
merely narco-terrorists trying to masquerade as political 
actors to get in on the benefits.  He shared the view that 
Carlos Castano was dead and that the paramilitary movement 
was falling increasingly into purely narco-terrorist hands. 
 
6. (C) Restrepo said that the declaration was not an 
ultimatum, in spite of the language saying "(if the 
paramilitaries) do not comply, the government will continue 
fighting them until they are done with."  Restrepo said it 
was a "clarification," which would help him at the 
negotiating table, remove any doubts that his tough line was 
not also that of the President, and present the 
paramilitaries with a clear choice.  He stressed the criteria 
of a real cease-fire, concentration of forces, and movement 
toward demobilization were key to progress. 
 
7. (C) The declaration coincided, by chance, with a rally in 
Cali in favor of a "humanitarian exchange" of prisoners of 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) for kidnap 
victims.  The evening news in Colombia focused on the 
declaration's statement that the FARC would not be permitted 
to impose a humanitarian exchange by threat that would weaken 
the Government's policy of democratic security.  A parade of 
family members of kidnap victims criticized the declaration. 
 
WOOD