US embassy cable - 04MANAMA612

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DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE'S APRIL 19-20 MEETINGS WITH THE KING AND CROWN PRINCE OF BAHRAIN

Identifier: 04MANAMA612
Wikileaks: View 04MANAMA612 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Manama
Created: 2004-04-28 14:28:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PREL BA
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000612 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR D, NEA, NEA/ARP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2014 
TAGS: PREL, BA 
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE'S APRIL 19-20 MEETINGS 
WITH THE KING AND CROWN PRINCE OF BAHRAIN 
 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY CDA ROBERT S. FORD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B AND 
D). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: In separate meetings with Deputy Secretary 
Armitage, King Hamad and Crown Prince Sheikh Salman pledged 
their government's full commitment to its strategic alliance 
with the US. The King and Crown Prince stressed the need to 
immediately restore order in Iraq with the selection of a 
strong, Iraqi nationalist leader. However, the Crown Prince 
stressed that stability in Iraq and the region was contingent 
upon the US sponsoring an "even-handed" resolution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (S) King Hamad argued that the US's primary goal in Iraq 
should be stability and the creation of a secular, modern 
Iraq that poses no threat to its neighbors.  To do so, the 
King maintained that the US should shift its focus in Iraq 
from fostering democratic processes to finding a strong 
leader who would ensure security and order in the country. He 
maintained that the US needed to do this spade work rather 
than wait for a leader to emerge. King Hamad suggested that 
we identify someone from the former Iraqi military, with a 
substantially clean record, to lead a new government. He felt 
that the USG should give less weight to confessional or 
tribal ties, and instead focus on a strong leader.  King 
Hamad suggested Shia ex-Iraqi army general Nama El-Faris as a 
potential candidate. 
 
3. (S) The Deputy Secretary requested that Bahrain look for 
ways to publicly support US efforts to stabilize the Sunni 
Triangle and Southern Iraq. The Crown Prince agreed that they 
could urge all Iraqis to work together with the CPA to 
rebuild Iraq. He stated that, in addition to installing a 
nationalist Iraqi leader, the US needed to commit itself to 
national reconciliation. National reconciliation could only 
be achieved by trying the worst offenders of Saddam Hussein's 
regime and declaring a national amnesty for lower-ranking 
Baathis and unthreatening regime collaborators. Sheikh Salman 
asserted that these steps would "co-opt" people into the new 
order. He used America's occupation of post-war Japan as an 
example. 
 
4. (S) Although King Hamad did not comment on the Middle East 
Peace Process, Sheikh Salman warned that US efforts in Iraq 
and its war on terrorism would fail if we if we did not 
exercise consistent foreign policy goals across the region. 
Rhetorically, he asked, how can the US advocate freedom, 
democratic institutions and stability in Iraq when, to the 
majority of Arabs, the US does not consistently exhort these 
goals when addressing the Israeli/Palestinian conflict? He 
stated that it is essential to stop Israeli settlements now. 
Salman commented that Arab leaders know that any new 
agreement will not be able to conform to the 1967 boundaries. 
 Yet, he said, nothing the US does will count until its 
efforts are on a par with former President Bush's efforts. 
A/S Burns noted that the Israeli idea of moving out of Gaza 
is part and parcel of the road map. He added that the World 
Bank and the international community would have to start 
rebuilding Gaza the day after Israeli withdrawal. Sheikh 
Salman guaranteed the Deputy Secretary and A/S Burns that 
resolution of the Israeli settlement and Palestinian boundary 
issues was an essential factor in winning the war on 
terrorism and that Islamic militant groups would  atrophy as 
a result. 
 
5. (S) Moreover, Sheikh Salman commented that he had told 
Israel's Foreign Minister, Silvan Shalom, that Arab states 
and Israel are natural partners against regional threats such 
a Iran. However, the Crown Prince reported that he told 
Shalom that Bahrain could never work with Israel to counter 
common threats as long as the Israeli/Palestinian conflict 
continued. 
 
6. (S) With regard to more local regional issues, King Hamad 
castigated Qatar's emir and Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim for their 
independent approach to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
issues. King Hamad asked the Deputy Secretary to encourage US 
efforts to maintain GCC unity. He stated that it was Hamad 
bin Jassim who took action and ensured that Qatar was 
consistently out of step with its neighbors, although the 
Emir was the "idea man." Both the King and the Crown Prince 
proffered a withering analysis of, what they felt, was 
Al-Jazeera's tendentious editorial point of view. (They noted 
that both Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya news services are not 
allowed to operate in Bahrain.) The King and Crown Prince 
asserted that Qatar views Saudi Arabia as the real threat to 
its sovereignty, not Iran. The Qataris depend on the US 
presence to protect them from the Saudis. 
 
7. (C) COMMENT: The Deputy Secretary and his party were 
warmly received by King Hamad and Sheikh Salman. The King and 
Crown Prince strongly identified with US regional interests 
and stressed that any US success was also their success. It 
was in this context that the King and Crown Prince offered 
their advice to help the US achieve its goals in the region. 
 
8. (U) Deputy Secretary Armitage has cleared this message. 
FORD 

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