US embassy cable - 04ABUDHABI1344

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001344 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/RA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/09 
TAGS: OVIP, PGOV, PREL, ECON, TC 
SUBJECT: UAE OFFICIALS QUERY DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE ON 
ARAB MEDIA, IRAQ, AND ISRAEL 
 
 
1.  (U) Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba for 
reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
2.  (C) Summary: During his visit to Abu Dhabi April 20-21, 
Deputy Secretary Armitage held wide-ranging discussions in 
separate meetings with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Khalifa bin 
Zayed Al-Nahyan, Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al- 
Nahyan (MbZ), and UAE Foreign Minister Rashid Abdullah Al- 
Nuami.  The Dep Sec briefed his UAE interlocutors on events 
in Iraq and asked them for their support in bringing Iraqi 
Sunnis into the process.  While supportive of the overall 
U.S. objectives in Iraq, MbZ was critical of Washington's 
handling of Arab media coverage of events in Iraq and the 
recent U.S. statements on the Palestinian/Israeli issue. 
The Emirati officials offered some suggestions on dealing 
with the current ethnic and religious factions in Iraq, but 
Rashid Abdullah warned that intervention by neighboring 
countries (i.e. Iran) would be very dangerous.  CP Khalifa 
and MbZ made very clear that Israel's targeted killing of 
Al Rantissi just days after Sharon met with President Bush 
led many in the Arab world to believe that Tel Aviv had 
received the "green light" from Washington to eliminate 
Palestinian leadership.  CP Khalifa said that the 
President's statement on settlements and right of return 
had put the UAE and other U.S. allies "in a very difficult 
position."  End summary. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Media Not Playing A Helpful Role 
-------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Foreign Minister Rashid Abdullah noted to Dep Sec 
that the Arab media have been particularly unhelpful to the 
situation in Iraq.  MbZ also said that he disagreed with 
the way Washington had handled media coverage of its 
broader initiatives in the region, and noted that Al 
Jazeera and Al Arabiyya were very dangerous media outlets, 
in particular. 
 
4.  (C) MbZ admitted that his 16-year old son was 
influenced by the misinformation on Al Jazeera.  He said 
that his son is intelligent -- a "straight A student" -- 
but recently had voiced some anti-Western opinions, which 
MbZ believed were a result of watching too much Al Jazeera. 
"If [Al Jazeera] can affect the grandson of a moderate 
leader like Shaykh Zayed this way, imagine what it can do 
to the uneducated or the lower classes." 
 
5.  (C) MbZ believes that Al Jazeera is the mouthpiece of 
Al Qaida and that Al Arabiyya reflects the views of the 
Muslim Brotherhood.  He noted that the local security 
service recently had discovered an armed wing of the 
Brotherhood in the UAE (to be reported septel).  He made 
particular mention of the fact that an Al Jazeera crew was 
allowed to film the ongoing battle in Fallujah and 
resultant civilian casualties, and distorted events on the 
ground. 
 
-------------------- 
Suggestions For Iraq 
-------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Foreign Minister Rashid Abdullah said that Iraq 
always has been a problem for its neighbors -- Iraqi people 
are fiercely nationalistic and often resort to violence as 
a force for change.  He said that the Gulf states are 
reluctant to get involved in the forming of an Iraqi 
Government because of the Iraqi people's resistance to 
outside influence, including the Arab League.  Rashid 
Abdullah suggested that the USG try to harness the Iraqi 
national pride -- find a strong Iraqi personality to lead 
the country -- to surmount current religious and ethnic 
factiousness. 
 
7.  (C) The Foreign Minister also expressed concern about 
Iran's reported attempts to negotiate an agreement between 
U.S. forces and Al Sadr supporters in Fallujah, and said 
that the UAEG did not/not want Iran to play such a pivotal 
role.  He reiterated the UAEG's distrust toward Tehran, and 
labeled any Iranian involvement in Iraq as "unhelpful and 
very antagonistic." 
 
8.  (C) Referring specifically to the current U.S. 
offensive in Fallujah, CP Khalifa noted that the people of 
that town would resolve the stalemate on their own terms. 
He suggested that U.S. negotiators seek out the tribal 
leaders in Fallujah and reason with them to avoid more 
civilian casualties.  He was sure that the tribal leaders, 
especially the educated elite, could be convinced that the 
USG has good intentions in Iraq.  CP Khalifa also expressed 
his hope that the Iraqi people would listen to the wise 
leaders already among them, and mentioned long-time adviser 
to the Abu Dhabi ruling family, Adnan Pachachi, in 
particular. 
 
------------------------- 
Support For Iraq's Sunnis 
------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) Dep Sec asked his Emirati interlocutors if they 
would encourage publicly the participation of all Iraqis -- 
particularly the Sunni -- in the future political process 
of Iraq.  Foreign Minister Rashid Abdullah noted that the 
UAEG could make a public statement to that affect, but the 
United States would have to make sure that Sunnis really do 
play a larger role in the governing of Iraq.  CP Khalifa 
demurred and explained that the UAEG heretofore had been 
very careful not to be viewed as supporting the Sunni at 
the expense of the Shia in Iraq.  While he privately 
encouraged the appointment of more Sunni to key 
governmental positions, he said that they would consider 
carefully how to word a statement that could help without 
offending any of the parties.  (Note: The following day, a 
statement from CP Khalifa appeared in all the Arabic and 
English language dailies; quote, "All the people of Iraq 
should be viewed as a single integrated entity for the 
stake of stability and security, and to allow Iraqis to 
pool their resources toward the development of their 
country."  End note.) 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Al Rantissi Assassination An "Embarrassment" 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
10.  (C) CP Khalifa and MbZ privately told the Dep Sec of 
their dismay about the recent assassination of Dr. Abdul 
Aziz Al Rantissi.  MbZ said that UAEG considers the United 
States a friend and an ally, but the assassination on the 
heels of Sharon's visit to the White House "could not have 
been a worse scenario" for the United States and its 
allies.  CP Khalifa said, "it looked as though President 
Bush gave Sharon the green light."  Dep Sec told them that 
the USG did not and does not give "green lights."  CP 
Khalifa added that the President's statement on settlements 
and right of return just two days after President Mubarak's 
meetings in Texas was very damaging to Mubarak and put him 
and other moderate Arab leaders "in a very difficult 
position" domestically.  Such statements, according to CP 
Khalifa, "take us back, instead of moving us forward." 
 
11.  (U) This cable was coordinated with D's staff. 
 
12.  (U) CPA minimize considered. 
 
Wahba