US embassy cable - 04KUWAIT1380

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 001380 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/IR, NEA/NGA, NEA/ARP, T 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2014 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, IZ, KU 
SUBJECT: (C) PM ASSURES DEPUTY SECRETARY "WE'RE LONG-TERM 
ALLIES" 
 
 
Classified By: CDA FRANK URBANCIC; REASON 1.4 (B, D). 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah assured Deputy 
Secretary Armitage April 19 that "we are long-term allies." 
 
SIPDIS 
Shaykh Sabah urged the US to seek a new UNSC Resolution on 
Iraq, and to resolve the situation in Fallujah -- peacefully 
if possible, but if not, then above all quickly.  The PM 
advised the Coalition to stay away from holy places, and 
dismissed Muqtada al-Sadr as having little influence.  He 
spoke condescendingly of UN envoy Brahimi.  The PM reported 
that Russian National Security Advisor Ivanov had just told 
him Russia does not want the US to be defeated in Iraq, nor 
for it to withdraw its forces after the transfer of 
sovereignty. 
 
2.  (C) The Deputy Secretary briefed on developments in Iraq, 
from where he had just come.  He also expressed appreciation 
for Kuwait's AIK support and stressed the continued need for 
it, promising that we would not take advantage of the GOK's 
generosity.  He raised Article 98, and the PM replied that 
parliamentary ratification is not necessary.  END SUMMARY. 
 
3.  (U) Participants:  Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmed 
al-Jaber al-Sabah was accompanied by MFA Under Secretary 
Ambassador Khaled al-Jarallah, MFA Americas Department 
Director Ambassador Khaled al-Babtain, Babtain's Deputy Aiham 
al-Omar, and a notetaker from the PM's office.  The Deputy 
Secretary was accompanied by NEA A/S Burns, CDA, and 
 
SIPDIS 
ADCM/POL Chief (Notetaker). 
 
4.  (C) The PM greeted the Deputy Secretary and A/S Burns as 
old friends, emphasizing that "we are long-term allies, not 
short-term."  He expressed warm greetings to President Bush, 
Secretary Powell, and "all our friends in the White House." 
 
SIPDIS 
He appreciated the MNNA ceremony and the attention shown to 
his Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs during their 
recent visit to Washington.  He hoped the excellent state of 
the bilateral relationship would continue. 
 
5.  (S) The Deputy Secretary, having just come from Baghdad, 
sought the PM's advice on the way forward, especially on how 
to deal with the Sunnis.  Noting that we are at a turning 
point in Iraq, he briefed on latest developments: 
 
- In the South, Muqtada al-Sadr was at his strongest in Najaf 
and Karbala but his influence was not spreading, and locals 
were telling us they wanted him out.  We were being careful 
to stay away from holy places. 
 
- An Iranian delegation recently visited Baghdad to meet with 
the British, and the US sat in.  The meeting was 
straightforward, without heat.  Our message:  we do not 
welcome Iran meddling in the South, nor want it to mediate 
with Muqtada; we will judge Iran by its behavior. 
 
- In Fallujah, we have detained a significant number of 
foreigners; it is not clear how many of them belong to 
longstanding Yemeni and Syrian communities.  We believe 
Zarqawi is there.  There has not been one car-bomb since we 
surrounded Fallujah.  Ambassador Jones is heavily involved in 
negotiations with local leaders.  The first two days of talks 
went "95% very well."  Arrangements were made for food, water 
and medical supplies, but we rejected a request for an open 
road through town:  women and children are welcome to leave, 
but not men until they are identified and disarmed.  After a 
break yesterday, negotiations were to resume today.  We do 
not want Fallujah to become a rallying point for Sunnis, but 
we cannot allow those who killed our citizens so terribly to 
escape.  The Deputy Secretary warned that military action 
might be needed, but we want to show the world that we tried 
to achieve a political solution and are not against the 
Sunnis per se. 
 
- Sunni ex-generals with good reputations are being brought 
back into the Iraqi army under the Minister of Defense.  This 
is, among other things, a signal that Sunnis have a role to 
play in the future of Iraq. 
 
- The IGC had not been as helpful as it could have.  Sunni 
members threatened to resign in the event of heavy military 
action in Fallujah.  Shia members have not been courageous in 
condemning Muqtada's actions.  All IGC members fear their 
days in office are numbered because of the Brahimi plan. 
 
- The USG looks forward to UNSYG Annan's report on the proper 
way to proceed in Iraq.  UN envoy Brahimi has names in mind 
for a transitional government, but has not shared them with 
us.  He did also ask us for a list of respected citizens from 
all groups who could be included in a technocratic 
government.  Brahimi believes none of the IGC members are 
worth keeping, but we need to think carefully before 
excluding them. 
 
- We are carefully considering a new UNSCR on Iraq.  We need 
to know the UNSYG's thoughts first, but when the time is 
right, we intend to seek a Resolution, which should bolster 
the legitimacy of the transitional government, affirm the 
commitment of the UN, and provide an umbrella for 
international forces to contribute to the security of Iraq. 
- Plans by Spain and Honduras to leave the Coalition are an 
unhelpful development.  We have checked and do not see other 
key Coalition-members going wobbly.  We realize that a new 
UNSCR could help some countries by giving political cover. 
 
6.  (C) PM'S ADVICE:  Shaykh Sabah appreciated the briefing 
and offered the following comments: 
 
- The US should work on persuading Annan to support a new 
UNSCR.  With such a Resolution, other countries will "not 
feel shy" about contributing troops.  Sergio Vieira de Mello 
did "such good work," but his tragic death caused Annan to 
have reservations about involvement in Iraq. 
 
- The Coalition should stay away from holy places. 
 
- Muqtada al-Sadr has little influence, and only rose to 
prominence because of the absence of eminent figures.  The 
IGC leaders, especially Ahmed Chalabi, "don't know Iraq; they 
fled 20-30 years ago". 
 
- The US needs to resolve the situation in Fallujah quickly 
-- peacefully if possible, but above all quickly. 
 
- Most of the fighters in Fallujah are foreign.  Perhaps a 
thousand are Saudi; even some Kuwaitis have been reported 
killed there.  Car-bombs and such are mostly the work of 
foreigners. 
 
- The US should do something about the slanted, inciteful 
coverage by Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya satellite television 
stations. Laughing, Shaykh Sabah recounted that he had asked 
CJCS Gen. Myers if he had a spare missile that could go off 
course. 
 
- Brahimi was "a small employee" in the Arab League until 
Shaykh Sabah took him along when he mediated in Lebanon, and 
now he wishes he hadn't.  Annan's dependence on Brahimi is 
surprising, as there are many others better than he. 
 
- The IGC fills a gap until better people can be found.  The 
problem is, the Iraqis usually "accept nobody" (i.e. as 
leader).  "They are like our parliament:  each member is his 
own party." 
 
7.  (C) RUSSIAN VIEW:  Shaykh Sabah noted that he had just 
met with Russian National Security Advisor (ex-Foreign 
Minister) Igor Ivanov, who had told him Russia does not want 
the US to be defeated in Iraq, nor for it to withdraw its 
troops after the transfer of sovereignty.  Ivanov had spoken 
in favor of an international conference, but the PM had 
replied this would not lead to a rapid solution; rather, the 
solution lay with the UN, "which enjoys world respect." 
Certainly a strong international presence would be needed 
after the transfer of sovereignty, otherwise the Iraqis would 
be at each other's throats. 
 
8.  (C) AIK FUEL: The Deputy Secretary expressed the USG's 
deep gratitude for Kuwait's generous Assistance-In-Kind (AIK) 
support, especially fuel for the US military.  He stressed 
that the need for it still exists, and urged continued 
provision.  He promised the need would not last forever and 
we would not take advantage of Kuwait's generosity by drawing 
on this support longer than necessary.  The PM replied that 
there are two fuel issues: 
 
- Fuel products for the Iraqi market:  the GOK is perfectly 
willing to go on selling it to the designated company. 
 
- Fuel for the military:  the PM said this is between DOD and 
MOD.  (COMMENT:  Shaykh Sabah seemed to think this issue had 
been resolved in the recent Joint Military Commission; in 
fact, it was not discussed there at all, nor was it resolved 
in the Defense Minister's meetings with senior US officials 
in Washington.  END COMMENT.) 
 
9.  (C) ARTICLE 98:  The Deputy Secretary hoped we could 
bring the Article 98 agreement into force by a quiet exchange 
of notes, as we have done elsewhere.  The PM replied that 
there is no need for parliamentary ratification; an exchange 
of notes will suffice -- but we should not talk about it 
publicly.  (COMMENT:  The only thing needed for the agreement 
to enter into force is for the GOK to give us a diplomatic 
note confirming it has completed its domestic legal 
requirements; we already sent a similar note months ago. 
After the meeting, the MFA's al-Omar told ADCM/POL Chief he 
thought the GOK note would come quickly.  END COMMENT.) 
 
10. (U) The Deputy Secretary has cleared this message. 
 
11.  (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
URBANCIC