US embassy cable - 04ANKARA2341

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002341 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2014 
TAGS: CY, GR, PREL, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S WAY FORWARD ON CYPRUS 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman, E.O. 12958, 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Despite the wake of the GCs' "no," we need 
to move toward an eventual GC "yes" to the Burgenstock 
agreement.  On the Turkish side, we should help Ankara 
preserve the its delicate balance for Cyprus settlement; 
encourage the Erdogan government to continue its "one step 
ahead" policy; reach out to Turkish Cypriots; and engage the 
EU.  End Summary. 
 
 
Help Preserve the Balance in Ankara 
 
 
2.  (C) The Erdogan government and the MFA pieced together a 
tenuous Cyprus balance with the military, the President, the 
bureaucracy and Parliament that enabled them to move forward 
for the past four months.  The possibility of receiving a 
date in December to begin EU accession negotiations may help 
preserve the balance over the next few months.  However, this 
balance is not locked in:  it remains precarious and subject 
to the vagaries of Turkish politics. 
 
 
3.  (C) We must work preemptively to help maintain the 
balance in Ankara.  In the event the GCs ever bring 
themselves to endorse the basic terms of the Annan Plan, a 
settlement will still require Turkish Parliament's and 
President Sezer's formal approval.  While the military has no 
formal role, it still wields enough behind-the-scenes power 
to scuttle an agreement. 
 
 
4.  (C) Progress in two key areas will help maintain the 
balance: 
 
 
-- Primary law:  We should work with the UK to gain more 
specific guarantees that the terms of an ultimate settlement 
will become primary EU law.  This will help meet President 
Sezer's and the military's principal reservations and dampen 
the effect of domestic political critics. 
 
 
-- TCs' situation:  We must act on our promise to ameliorate 
the TCs' situation (more below).  This will strengthen the 
hand of pro-solution forces in the Turkish government and 
bureaucracy, allowing them to point to "progress" on the 
island stemming from Turkey's pro-settlement orientation. 
 
 
Encourage Turkey to Continue "One Step Ahead" 
 
 
5.  (C) Erdogan's Cyprus mantra has been to stay "one step 
ahead" of the GCs.  This has played well domestically and in 
Europe.  We should encourage its explicit continuation.  We 
expect the GOT to push back, arguing Turkey's efforts and TC 
referendum approval already put it one step ahead and now it 
is the GCs' turn.  Still, many Turks worry that, come 
December, the EU will have forgotten Turkey's achievements. 
We can effectively use this argument to urge continued steps 
ahead, albeit small ones.  In doing so, we need to be careful 
not to cross the line that would fuel expectations of 
re-opening negotiations; the specter of new negotiations will 
unravel Ankara's support for the agreement. 
 
 
6.  (C) For starters, we should again raise the idea of 
easing passport requirements for GCs.  Although Ziyal told us 
on April 20 this will not happen, "TRNC Interior Minister" 
Murat told Nicosia DCM on April 22 that discussion on this 
were still ongoing.  We can also press the Turks to complete 
unfinished technical work on the agreement. 
 
 
Speak Promptly, Act Concretely To Help Turkish Cypriots 
 
 
7.  (C) We need to speak out promptly and then act concretely 
on our promises not to leave TCs out in the cold.  While the 
EU reaction is key, we cannot be seen in Ankara to be merely 
the tail on an EU dog.  We should begin by announcing 
specific steps the U.S. plans to take, followed by their 
gradual implementation.  This will have the twin salutary 
effects of helping maintain Ankara's pro-settlement stance 
and demonstrating to GCs the cost of a continued "no."  At 
the same time, keeping in mind that the ultimate goal is a 
united Cyprus, we should take great care not to raise Turkish 
expectations of a divided island.  Some steps should include 
honoring "TRNC" export documentation; helping TCs gain 
economic assistance, including from the IMF, World Bank and 
EU; opening TDA and ExIm operations to the Turkish Cypriots, 
particularly in the tourism sector;  removing the ban on 
direct travel by USG officials to Cyprus via the north; 
offering technical assistance to build rule of law and to 
combat money laundering;  ending restrictions on flights to 
the north; a visit to Washington by Talat; upgrading the 
status of the "TRNC's" representation in Washington. 
 
 
Engage the EU 
 
 
8.  (C) The goal of getting a date to begin EU accession 
negotiations remains an effective, largely-accepted external 
discipline in Ankara.  We should encourage the EU to 
explicitly recognize Turkey's positive efforts on Cyprus in 
the months leading up to December.  This will reassure Turkey 
its efforts have not been in vain and will help 
pro-settlement forces hold the line in Ankara.  We should 
raise the idea of opening some channel for TCs to express 
themselves within the EU.  While staying out of technical 
details, we should keep reminding the EU of the importance of 
working to give Turkey the primary law guarantees it needs to 
keep President Sezer and the military on board. 
EDELMAN