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| Identifier: | 04ANKARA2330 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04ANKARA2330 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Ankara |
| Created: | 2004-04-26 07:27:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | CY GR PGOV PREL TU |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002330 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2014 TAGS: CY, GR, PGOV, PREL, TU SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CABINET CHIEF ATACANLI ON CYPRUS, GREATER MIDDLE EAST (U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (C) Summary: On April 21, President Sezer's Cabinet Chief (also Senior Foreign Policy Adviser and Spokesman) Atacanli told Ambassador that Sezer remains concerned with making a Cyprus agreement primary EU law, and with implementation of the agreement's property arrangements. In the event of a TC "yes" and GC "no" in the referendum, Atacanli urged concrete steps to help TCs and "in the other direction" for the GCs. Ambassador urged restraint in GOT statements in the event of a "yes/no." Ambassador explained that Turkey is not a "target" of the Greater Middle East Initiative (GME); it is up to Turkey to decide the role it wishes to play. Atacanli emphasized the need for close U.S.-Turkey consultation as GME moves forward. End Summary. President Sezer's Concerns on Cyprus 2. (C) On Cyprus, Ambassador Edelman emphasized that President Bush and Secretary Powell have been deeply engaged with all parties and a number of other leaders. The U.S. shares President Sezer's core concern that the agreement have some mechanism to prevent it from being picked apart in the European Court of Justice. The Ambassador asked Atacanli's insights on what President Sezer thinks necessary for the agreement to be legally secure and whether Sezer has other concerns about the agreement. 3. (C) Atacanli acknowledged different viewpoints within the GOT on "modalities" of a Cyprus settlement but, with the referendum three days away, claimed the GOT is "past that stage." Atacanli said Sezer is concerned about implementation of the agreement's property arrangements. This could open a Pandora's Box if property disputes escalate to threaten peace and stability. Atacanli said there is still a valid question whether efforts to provide primary law guarantees are sufficient and this remains very important. He noted that in reaching the agreement, TCs accepted much GC legislation, some of it "anti-Turkish" (NFI), he added. 4. (C) (FYI: We note that, in an April 20 meeting with Ambassador Edelman, MFA U/S Ziyal said Sezer has given the MFA "no clue" about his views on the agreement. Ziyal noted with concern that Sezer's office has not replied to a recent MFA invitation to discuss the legal aspects of the agreement; this is the first time Sezer's office has not responded to the MFA on a Cyprus-related matter. End FYI.) Thinking Ahead to "Yes/No" 5. (C) In the event of a TC "yes" and GC "no" to the referendum, Atacanli urged concrete positive steps toward the TCs and steps "in the other direction" for the GCs. He worries that GCs will withstand initial pressure after a "no" and that pressure from the international community will fade after a few months. The Ambassador noted EU High Rep Solana's recent statements when meeting with Secretary Powell as an example that the EU and others are beginning to think about next steps in the event of a "yes/no." 6. (C) The Ambassador also encouraged the GOT to react publicly with restraint in the event of a TC "yes" and GC "no." The Ambassador advised letting the EU carry the burden of strong criticism, in order not to take the focus off GC rejection of the agreement. Atacanli said he understood the point of modulating GOT reaction in the event of a GC "no." Greater Middle East 7. (C) The Ambassador noted that some parts of President Sezer's April 13 speech at the Istanbul War Academies appeared to be partially directed at Secretary Powell's later-corrected comment that Turkey is an "Islamic republic." Atacanli interrupted to remark that the Sezer's comments were directed at others as well. The Ambassador reiterated that there is no change in the long-standing U.S. view of Turkey as a secular democratic republic. 8. (C) Noting that Sezer's speech rejected the idea of Turkey as a GME "target," Ambassador Edelman emphasized the USG does not consider Turkey a target. It is up to Turkey to decide what role it wishes to play in GME. The Ambassador laid out regional economic, educational and political reforms that GME aims to support. Turkey offers a powerful example of a successful Muslim-majority nation integrating into international institutions. 9. (C) Atacanli acknowledged the Secretary's correction of his comment but added that Sezer had come under fire for not responding quickly to the misstatement. The secular nature of the Turkish state is the single most important issue for Sezer. On GME, Atacanli emphasized the need for close consultation between the U.S. and Turkey. He said Sezer's remarks were intended to state for the record the importance of keeping regional developments "under control." Atacanli said he would convey the Ambassador's explanation to Sezer. EDELMAN
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