US embassy cable - 04KUWAIT1346

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 001346 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2014 
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, KISL, SOCI, KU 
SUBJECT: (SBU) PM MOVES TO NIP SECTARIANISM IN THE BUD 
 
Classified By: CDA JOHN MORAN; REASON 1.4 (D) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  The liberation of Iraq,s Shiite majority 
has increased the assertiveness of Kuwaiti Shiites (about 
one-third of Kuwaitis), who were already making progress 
against institutionalized discrimination.  They now have 
their own family-law court, more building permits for 
mosques, approval for their own Waqf, and markedly increased 
religious freedom.  This year, for the first time in memory, 
they were allowed to stage a public reenactment of the Battle 
of Karbala during Ashoura.  The vast majority of Shiites here 
stress they are Kuwaiti first and Shiite second; when the 
young militant Yasser al-Habib fell afoul of the law for 
insulting Sunni beliefs, the Shia establishment condemned the 
provocation while quietly lobbying for clemency. 
Predictably, Sunni extremists have become more stridently 
hostile towards Shiite practices.  Prime Minister Shaykh 
Sabah al-Ahmed has met separately with the various religious 
and political groupings in an attempt to nip sectarianism in 
the bud.  End Summary. 
 
Shia/Sunni relations 
-------------------- 
2. (S) Nearly all of our Shiite interlocutors profess loyalty 
to the State of Kuwait and attempt to downplay any sectarian 
differences.  But scratch a bit deeper and many Shia can also 
tell you how they or their family members have been affected 
by a system that limits their employment in certain sectors 
and denies them full religious freedom.  The prosperity of 
Kuwaiti society makes it easier to tolerate the 
institutionalized discrimination (as a Shiite lawyer told 
Poloff, Shia in Kuwait are &much better off than anywhere 
else8), but it's there:  the Faculty of Sharia offers no 
courses from a Shiite perspective; the disproportion in 
mosques is glaring; it is very difficult for a Shiite to 
become a diplomat or enter certain branches of the security 
forces (KSS, the State Security service, has no/no Shiites). 
 
 
3. (SBU) Although the GOK does not publish exact figures, it 
is generally estimated that Shiite citizens number roughly 
300,000 ) 350,000, i.e. about a third of the approximately 
900,000 Kuwaitis living here.  As would be expected, the 
Shiite minority traces its roots mainly to Iraq and Iran.  It 
has played an integral role in the economic development of 
the country, and many of the leading commercial families are 
Shiites (Behbehani, Dashti, Bukhamseen, Marafie, Qabazard) 
who have benefited from family ties to neighboring states. 
Throughout most of Kuwait,s history, Sunnis and Shiites have 
lived side by side with little  conflict. 
 
4. (SBU) The nadir of Sunni-Shiite relations came in the 
heady days of the Iranian Revolution; the GOK reacted to a 
perceived threat by silencing and expelling Shiite radicals. 
During this period, which included the 1983 bombings of the 
US and French Embassies, purportedly by an Iran-based Shiite 
group, our interlocutors tell us Shiites faced open hostility 
from a Sunni majority that questioned their loyalty.  One 
Shiite activist recalled schoolyard taunts from Sunni 
children who referred to him as &Khomeini.8 
 
5. (SBU) The 1990 Iraqi invasion strengthened all citizens' 
sense of Kuwaitiness and allowed Shia to prove their loyalty, 
according to our contacts.  Shiites played a large role in 
the Kuwaiti resistance, and were heavily represented among 
Kuwait,s war dead.  By then, of course, the bloom was off 
the Iran Revolution's rose.  Relations between Sunnis and 
Shia have been steadily improving since liberation in 1991. 
 
Shiite Strides Over The Past Year 
--------------------------------- 
6. (SBU) Since the fall of Saddam Hussein,s regime, Shiite 
MPs and other Shi'a leaders have approached the GOK on a 
number of long-standing requests for reform, and have made 
some headway: 
 
- Waqf: The establishment of a Ja,afari Waqf, i.e. an agency 
to administer religious endowments according to the Shiite 
Ja,afari school of jurisprudence, has long been a demand of 
Kuwait,s Shi'a population.  The government has approved its 
creation and it is in the process of being established. 
 
- Family-law court: Family law in Kuwait is handled by 
religious courts.  Shi'a now have their own courts of first 
instance and appeal, though still no court of cassation 
(supreme court). Shi'a have formally requested a Ja'afari 
court of cassation and an increase in the number of Shi'a 
Ja'afari judges to handle Shi'a personal status and family 
law cases. In late 2003, the government approved their 
requests. The court has not yet been established, however, as 
there are no Ja'afari judges for this level of prosecution. 
 
- Approval of Shiite mosques: There are approximately 30 
Shi'a mosques and approximately 1,200 Sunni mosques in 
Kuwait. Since 2000, the government has granted licenses for 
and has approved the construction of 4 new Shi'a mosques. All 
4 mosques are reportedly still under construction. 
 
- This year for the first time, Kuwaiti Shi'a publicly staged 
a historical play during Ashoura depicting the martyrdom of 
Imam Hussein, the Prophet Mohammed's grandson. 
 
7.  (SBU) There can be little doubt that events in Iraq have 
stimulated a more assertive stance by Kuwaiti Shiites.  For 
the first time in memory, Kuwait TV ran programs on Ashoura 
and the authorities allowed a public reenactment of the 
Battle of Karbala.  At least one  young Shiite militant, 
21-year-old Yasser al-Habib, went beyond what the GOK was 
prepared to tolerate when he distributed an audiocassette 
last December that was deemed insulting to Sunnis.  He was 
tried, convicted and sentenced, then released -- apparently 
by mistake -- as part of the Amiri Pardon on the occasion of 
National Day in February.  A warrant for his arrest was 
issued, but at last report he remained at large.  The Shia 
establishment publicly distanced itself from the offending 
cassette and condemned any attempt to foment sectarianism, 
but influential Shiites quietly asked Prime Minister Shaykh 
Sabah to show clemency to al-Habib. 
 
Reaction From Sunnis 
-------------------- 
8.  (SBU) The vast majority of Kuwaitis, both Sunni and Shia, 
are keen to preserve peaceful, friendly co-existence, but the 
most hardline Sunnis have reacted badly, e.g. distributing 
scurrilous anti-Shia leaflets outside Sunni mosques.  The 
fact that the Information Minister (longtime UN PermRep 
Mohammed Abulhassan)is both a Shiite and a liberal has made 
him a prime target for Salafi members of parliament.  They 
keep threatening to "grill" him (a longstanding procedure 
that can lead a vote of no-confidence which, if successful, 
would force the minister from office).  Some of what they 
criticize Abulhassan for has more to do with his being a 
liberal than with his being a Shiite, e.g.  licensing 
entertainment they consider immoral, such as "Arab Super 
Star" and "Star Academy." 
 
9.  (SBU) Recent events in Iraq have incensed Sunni 
hardliners.  In the April 12 newspapers, the spokesman for 
the Salafi Movement (aka Scientific Salafis - the most 
radical overt Islamist current) condemned the US for "savage" 
attacks on Falluja, and called for moral and material support 
to defeat the American "enemy" whose military presence in the 
region "is no longer justified" (now that Saddam's regime has 
been eliminated).  The next day, the Salafi Movement 
participated in a meeting to launch a "parliamentary and 
popular committee to assist the Iraqi people"; about twenty 
people, including two Members of Parliament, attended; 
virtually all wore typical Salafi garb.  Our Salafi contacts 
regularly insist that Shiites are a minority in Iraq (and 
only about 15 percent of Kuwaitis); they perceive that the US 
is siding with Iraq's Shiites (and Kurds) against Sunni Arabs. 
 
10. (SBU) The GOK maintains a strong public commitment to 
tolerance:  Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmed was quoted 
in the local media April 14 as saying the Shia are a key 
category in Kuwaiti society and should be given their full 
rights.  Notwithstanding opposition from Sunni Islamists, he 
has also been quoted as promising that popular entertainment 
shows will continue.  But he clearly sees cause for concern: 
over the past several days, he has held a series of meetings 
with all the political and religious currents, as well as 
tribal leaders.  To all, the message was clear:  sectarianism 
will not be tolerated in Kuwait.  While Kuwaitis 
overwhelmingly support that message, some fault the PM for 
implicitly validating incipient notions of sectarian identity 
by meeting separately with groups according to their 
religious affiliation (Shiites, Sunnis associated with the 
Muslim Brotherhood, Salafis); these critics say he would have 
reinforced the sense of national unity if he had either 
brought them all together or held meetings on a geographic 
basis (neighborhoods or governorates). 
 
11.  (C) COMMENT:  We expect the Shiite community to remain 
peaceful and loyal.  More telling will be the trajectory of 
Sunni radicalism, and the regime's reaction to it.  So far 
the Government has been unwilling to take on the Sunni 
radicals as strongly as it has Shia radicalism.  Until 
recently, Kuwait's Islamists have differed from those in 
other countries by recognizing the need for, and reality of, 
US protection from an Arab Muslim enemy -- Saddam Hussein. 
Now that Saddam and his regime have been removed, some no 
longer feel the need to maintain that exception to reflexive 
enmity towards the US.  But the line of thinking articulated 
by the Scientific Salafis runs counter to obvious Kuwaiti 
interests:  most people in this small country understand 
perfectly well that they cannot afford a US military pullout 
while Iraq remains insecure; most also understand that the 
perpetrators of atrocities in Falluja, though they may be 
Sunni Arabs, need to be brought to heel -- and are in any 
event hostile to the independent existence of Kuwait, let 
alone a democratic Iraq. 
 
12.  (C) COMMENT CONTINUED:  The Scientific Salafis' stated 
position need not imply an endorsement of violence against 
Americans inside Kuwait:  they recognize their regime as 
legitimate and Islamic, acknowledge that US forces are its 
guests, and affirm the religious duty to ensure the safety of 
such guests.  Still, some young hothead with little aptitude 
for nuance could feel authorized to attack Americans here. 
And it is no stretch at all to interpret their call as 
out-and-out incitement to kill Americans in Iraq or elsewhere 
outside Kuwait. 
MORAN