US embassy cable - 04CARACAS1368

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 001368 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, VE 
SUBJECT: JULIO BORGES LEANS TOWARDS ACCEPTING 
 
 
Classified By: DCM STEPHEN G. MCFARLAND FOR REASONS 1.4 (d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1. (C) Julio Borges told DCM and PolOff April 21 that Primero 
Justicia would decide whether to participate in the signature 
verification process once the National Electoral Council 
released details of the plan on April 23 or 24, with an 
opposition decision likely 24 hours later.  He seemed to be 
leaning towards participating in the process, which the DCM 
encouraged.  Borges stressed the need for the international 
community's support. He said the opposition had less than a 
50% chance of verifying enough signatures to activate the 
referendum. 
 
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Need more information 
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2.  (C) Julio Borges, the President of Primero Justicia (PJ), 
Deputy in the National Assembly, and one of the leaders of 
the opposition coalition Democratic Coordinator (CD), met 
with DCM and PolOff on April 21.  Reacting to the National 
Electoral Council's (CNE) announcement the night before of 
the regulations for the signature verification (reparo) 
process, Borges insisted that PJ needed two more pieces of 
information before it could take a decision.  One was the 
number of tables there would be at each center.  Borges is 
worried that if there are not sufficient tables, some people 
may have to wait up to 7 hours, according to PJ's 
calculation.  The second point is just which signatures would 
have to be verified, and in what areas.  According to Borges, 
the CNE has already changed the numbers 5 times, and seems to 
be blatantly manipulating them.  He said that the first 
report from the CNE indicated that 50,000 signatures in 
opposition controlled Baruta, which is part of greater 
Caracas, had to be verified.  The figure in the latest report 
is 6,000.  The signatures to be verified are being 
transferred to Chavista controlled states, making it much 
harder, and more dangerous, for the opposition to mobilize 
people.  It also leads Borges to suspect the entire process 
is a massive fraud by the CNE.  For this reason, Borges wants 
to see the final number before agreeing to anything.  Jorge 
Rodriguez, one of the directors of the CNE, told Borges the 
information would be ready by April 23 or 24.  Borges said he 
thought the opposition would come to a decision within 24 
hours of getting the information.  He said to forget about 
trying to get a referendum before August 19th, because the 
GOV will never let it happen. 
 
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Unity of opposition key 
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3.  (C) Borges declared that the unity of the opposition was 
of utmost importance at this time.  He said he suspected that 
the GOV's real intention with the reparos was to split the 
opposition.  He saw Proyecto Venezuela (PV), led by Henrique 
Salas Romer, as the greatest threat to that unity at this 
time.  PV has made its opposition to the reparo process well 
known.  Borges stated that any help the USG could give in 
that regard would be very useful to the CD.  Borges said that 
if the opposition decides to accept the challenge of the 
reparos, then it will be the opposition's last chance to stop 
Chavez, and the CD must present it that way to the public, 
and not as one more attempt to get rid of him.  He said he 
believed the people wanted to go to reparos, despite the bad 
odds, rather than refusing to participate, and challenging 
the legitimacy of the CNE. 
 
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Odds not good 
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4.  (C) Borges stated that the opposition's odds of getting 
the needed signatures were not good.  Under the best of 
circumstances, with no disruption whatsoever from the 
Chavistas, he thought the opposition had a 50% chance of 
getting the signatures.  Even relatively mild interference, 
like sending pro-GOV people to wait on line and check if they 
were on the lists, could bring that down.  Violence and fear 
would make it even more difficult. 
 
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DCM encourages participation 
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5.  (C) The DCM told Borges that A/S Noriega had expressed 
great interest in the decision facing the opposition.  The 
decision was the opposition's to make, but it represented a 
very important opportunity and needed to be assessed 
carefully.  He said the international community would 
participate as observers if the opposition agreed.  The DCM 
indicated that the decision by the Electoral Chamber of the 
Supreme Court, that the signatures should be accepted, was 
not very useful outside Venezuela, where the objections of 
the Constitutional Chamber and potentially the full Supreme 
Court tended to nullify the effect of the Electoral 
decision. 
 
 
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International observers 
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6.  (C) Borges said that the opposition was essentially 
jumping into a swimming pool without water by going to 
reparos.  He supported it because the people wanted to, and 
to split the opposition would be worse.  He insisted, 
however, that it was up to the international community to 
tell the world "who took the water out of the pool."  In this 
regard, Borges declared himself satisfied with the attitude 
of the OAS, but thought that the Carter Center, and 
especially Francisco Diez, were too wishy-washy in 
criticizing the GOV, and too eager to be liked by everyone. 
 
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COMMENT 
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7.  (C) Borges is clearly leaning towards accepting the 
reparos. While he made the case for pursuing more favorable 
terms through the court system, he agreed with us that the 
judicial route would be long and ultimately fruitless. He is, 
however, very nervous that the opposition will lose the 
reparos, and thus legitimize the CNE and GOV by accepting 
their manipulation of the process. He does not want to be the 
one that splits the CD, though, and so will tend to accept a 
bad deal, depending upon what more information/rules the CNE 
provides the CD on April 23/24. 
SHAPIRO 
 
 
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      2004CARACA01368 - CONFIDENTIAL