US embassy cable - 04TELAVIV2360

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 002360 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2013 
TAGS: PREL, KWBG, IS, GAZA DISENGAGEMENT, ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS 
SUBJECT: EU ENVOY'S THOUGHTS ON WITHDRAWAL, INTERNATIONALS' 
ROLES 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
. 
 
1.  (C) EU Special Envoy Marc Otte told Ambassador Kurtzer 
April 23 that European officials are beginning efforts to 
identify steps that will allow the Palestinians to succeed 
following an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.  He agreed that 
the international community can identify appropriate roles 
and work up a terrific plan, but the effort needs a committed 
Palestinian partner.  Beyond that, the community needs to be 
able to call on PM Sharon to remove identified roadblocks to 
its efforts on economic and security enhancement, the two 
inseparable pillars on which Gaza's success depends.  Otte 
said he had told PA PM Abu Ala'a that the Palestinians have 
international sympathy, but that sympathy is limited by the 
impact of attacks in Madrid and elsewhere.  In addition, the 
PA needs to identify one empowered interlocutor, not five. 
Abu Ala'a, and, separately, Saeb Erekat and Salam Fayyad, all 
agreed that a strategy with a positive agenda is necessary to 
make Gaza succeed after withdrawal, he said. 
 
2.  (C) In general discussion of internationals' roles, 
Ambassador Kurtzer gently noted Israel's firm opposition to 
any role for internationals on security -- what he termed 
"almost a showstoppper for Israel."  Otte noted the "real 
problems" with the Palestinian security services at this 
time, and suggested that the Palestinians will need to be 
persuaded that this is what they want to do.  In the coming 
months, he said, the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee can develop a 
"bag of goodies to make it work."  Asked about possible roles 
for Egypt, Ambassador Kurtzer said he thought the Israelis' 
idea of any Egyptian role is inflated.  He also noted that 
some initial thought had been given to a role for the 
Multinational Force and Observers, but the idea needed 
considerable fleshing out. 
 
3.  (C) Ambassador Kurtzer pointed out that Israel's 
commitments to the President, as outlined in the Weissglas 
letter to NSA Rice, will not go away, and form a key part of 
the overall package.  With that, he saw no reason not to 
share as much information as possible between the Europeans 
and the USG on monitoring, as the sides did during last 
summer's Roadmap monitoring mission.  He acknowledged that 
the prohibition on travel of USG personnel to Gaza leaves the 
Embassy dependent on long distance contacts and information 
from others. 
 
4.  (C) Otte said he would be seeking Palestinian assurances 
that PA security forces would seek to prevent Gazan actions 
that would trigger IDF reprisals, and Israeli assurances that 
IDf actions would not target international projects.  He 
offered as one possiblity for mitigating such incidents the 
establishment of a joint situation room manned by Israelis, 
Palestinians and internationals. 
 
5.  (C) Otte noted that the UNRWA emergency appeal has 
secured only about half of its stated need because of donor 
reallocations to Iraq.  Beyond aid, though, he said that 
trade, access, job creation and standard of living had to be 
improved to the extent that Gazans wold be able to say "life 
is not so bad here."  The Ambassador noted that at the time 
of Oslo, the sides hoped that expatriate Palestinian 
businessmen would invest in Gaza, but they never got the 
necessary cooperation from the Palestinian leadership. 
Nonetheless, he added, Gaza and the West Bank have a capable 
business communities. 
 
6.  (C) On the political scene, Otte and the Ambassador 
agreed that Abu Ala'a must be pressed to act like a real 
prime minister, and, if he does, the international community 
can support him.  On the Israeli side, the picture should be 
clearer by the end of June, by which time it will be clear 
whether the current coalition of another constellation will 
be in place.  After that, Israel will need three to six 
months to pass necessary legislation to facilitate the 
withdrawal.  The international community should use that time 
to plan its own moves.  One key, Otte said, is "convince 
Israel that we really want this to work. 
 
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KURTZER