US embassy cable - 04AMMAN3148

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 003148 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2014 
TAGS: PREL, ASEC, KISL, KPAL, IS, JO 
SUBJECT: KING'S DECISION TO POSTPONE D.C. VISIT LOWERS 
JORDAN'S TEMPERATURE 
 
REF: A. AMMAN 2882 
     B. AMMAN 2957 
     C. AMMAN 3075 
 
Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.5 (b and d) 
 
1. (C)  Summary.  Activists have continued to express the 
anger and sympathy felt in Jordan after the Rantissi 
assassination and President Bush,s assurances to Sharon. 
The GOJ has aligned itself with public opinion, denouncing 
the Israelis' "heinous crime" in the killing and postponing 
an Abdullah-Bush meeting whose timing had become politically 
inconvenient.  Both steps have helped contain political 
emotions, although Friday prayers are likely to occasion more 
rhetoric.  Anti-Israeli sentiment has taken on anti-U.S. 
flavors.  For example, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) called 
on the Jordanian government to cut contact with the U.S. for 
its "aggressive" regional policies, and the press union has 
called for a boycott of American Embassy activities and 
contact (this has had no practical impact).  In the 
background, U.S. military action in Iraq, particularly 
Fallujah, continues to provoke outrage and fear of 
"imperialist" designs.  In this atmosphere, the King's 
postponement of a meeting with President Bush has blunted 
criticism of the King's policies, but there is skepticism 
that he can deliver the sort of assurances Jordanians would 
seek in a rescheduled meeting.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU)  Political activists continued to exploit the 
anti-Israeli and anti-U.S. mood generated by recent events, 
principally the Yassin and Rantissi assassinations and recent 
U.S. assurances to Israel touching on final status issues 
(refs a and b).  The widespread public perception is of a 
U.S. "green light" for the targeted killings and of a U.S. 
move to foreclose the possibility of a viable Palestinian 
state.  The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and IAF have taken the 
lead in organizing street protests, and rallies are expected 
to follow Friday prayers on April 23 throughout Jordan. 
Security officials told us an MB-sponsored demonstration on 
April 18 attracted nearly 7,000 participants, including 
members of Parliament and political activists.  The 
Professional Associations organized a rally at its 
headquarters in Amman that evening as well.  Other large 
protests occurred in Irbid, Zarqa and university campuses 
throughout Jordan.  These and other demonstrations in 
Amman-area Palestinian refugee camps were largely peaceful. 
On April 17 a rally at the Baq,a camp got a little out of 
hand.  Angry crowds, mostly of young men, pushed out onto the 
main Amman-Irbid highway, burning tires and throwing stones. 
 
3. (C)  Its instincts for self-preservation activated, the 
government aligned itself firmly with public opinion.  The 
King denounced the Israelis for their "heinous crimes" 
against Rantissi.  Prime Minister Faisal al-Fayez, who had 
returned early from the U.S. "in light of regional events," 
on April 20 paid condolences to Rantissi's extended family 
(including three brothers) as well as at the IAF,s 
headquarters.  The government had plucked one of Rantissi's 
brothers out of a no man,s land camp at the Iraqi border 
(where he and 400 other Palestinians from Iraq have 
languished for the past year) and brought him to Amman to 
receive condolences.  But in a very Jordanian twist, it was 
made clear he would have to return to no man,s land after 
his seven-day celebrity turn, to the upset of UNHCR.  The 
government drew another fine line in its commentary on 
Israeli threats against HAMAS, Damascus-based Khalid 
Mish'al, who was expelled from Jordan in 1999.  The 
government spokeswoman condemned Israel for issuing death 
sentences outside the rule of law, but dialed back a cabinet 
colleague,s statement by insisting that Mish,al,s return 
to Jordan is not up for debate: "HAMAS is a Palestinian 
movement on Palestinian soil," she maintained. 
 
4. (U)  Heavy public criticism of U.S. support for Israel and 
its occupation of Iraq has been a staple of opposition 
rhetoric, but anti-U.S. sentiment has increased to a degree 
of anger we have not seen recently.  After Rantissi's death, 
the IAF publicized a "fatwa" calling on Jordanians to battle 
physically the American Administration and to stop all forms 
of cooperation with the U.S., including official visits, 
because of objectionable American policy.  The Jordan Press 
Association, along with other professional associations and 
several political parties, called for a unified Arab stand 
against Israel's "terrorism" at the upcoming Arab summit and 
for a nationwide boycott of U.S. products to protest U.S. 
support of Israel.  Journalists were also called upon to 
refrain from contacts with the American Embassy, although 
with no discernible impact. 
 
5. (C)  The King,s U.S. trip coincided with this agitated 
political atmosphere.  There was a perception afoot that the 
King was either complicit in Israeli actions and U.S. 
statements or at a minimum having his interests ignored. 
Public jitters still are high over the uncovered al-Qaeda 
plot and unsubstantiated statements that the plot entailed a 
massive chemical agent attack, a threat seen by some as a 
by-product of Jordan,s pro-U.S. stand.  In the background, 
U.S. military action in Iraq, particularly Fallujah, 
continues to provoke outrage and fear of "imperialist" 
designs. 
 
6.  (C)  The postponement of the Abdullah-Bush meeting, 
therefore, came as something of a relief to Amman,s 
political circles.  A locally generated government press 
statement, apparently uncoordinated with the traveling party 
and citing the need for clarification in the U.S. position on 
final status issues before a summit meeting, achieved its 
desired effect domestically.  Editorials and commentaries 
lauded the King's "wise" and "bold" decision to postpone the 
meeting (ref c).  Embassy contacts stressed that the decision 
helped lower the political temperature, which had reached 
boiling point.  Jordan's Higher Coordination Committee of 
Opposition Parties -- a distinctly uncoordinated gathering of 
14 tiny, fragmented, secular opposition parties -- issued a 
statement of praise for a stand it found to be "in harmony 
with the inclinations of the Jordanian people" and hoping the 
next step would be the closure of the Israeli embassy. 
Another government critic, former Prime Minister Taher 
al-Masri, told an interviewer that the postponement was the 
right step pending receipt of a U.S. letter of assurances, 
similar to that given to Israel, on final status issues. 
Secretary Powell,s April 20 comments, addressing Jordanian 
 
SIPDIS 
concerns on the peace process, received favorable coverage 
and contributed to a lessening in political tension. 
Nonetheless, anti-U.S. sentiment remains strong, as ordinary 
Jordanians seem convinced that U.S. and Israeli policy are 
now one and the same and that the rules of the game have been 
changed to Arab disadvantage.  Also, Jordanian public opinion 
is increasingly equating U.S. military action in Iraq with 
Israeli practices.  There was a particularly angry reaction 
to what was portrayed locally by the media as a "massacre" in 
Fallujah. 
 
7.  (C)  Comment:  The recent train of events and resulting 
public uproar in Jordan gave the government few options but 
to try to absorb the public mood.  However, the government 
made clear it has not abandoned policies which are pillars of 
national security, including keeping HAMAS out of Jordan, 
promoting implementation of the roadmap and a two-state 
solution, and defending the peace treaty with Israel as 
something that is out of bounds for political debate. 
Postponement of the Abdullah-Bush meeting blunted domestic 
criticism of the King's policies, but only temporarily. 
Judgments are being held in suspense, but there is skepticism 
that the King can receive from the U.S. the sort of peace 
process assurances which, in local eyes, would justify a 
visit to Washington in the current overheated atmosphere. 
 
Visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman or access the site 
through the State Department's SIPRNET home page. 
HALE