US embassy cable - 04TELAVIV2327

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 002327 
 
SIPDIS 
 
UNVIE FOR IAEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2009 
TAGS: KNNP, MNUC, PGOV, PHUM, PREL, IS, U.S.-ISRAEL RELATIONS, GOI INTERNAL 
SUBJECT: VANUNU, UPON RELEASE, CLAIMS U.S. AGENT LURED HIM 
TO 1986 CAPTURE 
 
 
Classified By: Pol/C Norm Olsen for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: Immediately upon his April 21 
release from prison, "nuclear spy" Mordechai Vanunu charged 
that the woman who lured him into a Mossad trap in 1986 
worked for the CIA or FBI.  Nevertheless, Vanunu told the 
press that he would like to emigrate to the U.S.  The head of 
the Israel Atomic Energy Commission, Gideon Frank, defended 
the GOI's restrictions on Vanunu's liberty in an April 20 
discussion with visiting U/S Bolton, charging that Vanunu is 
out to "destroy" the Dimona nuclear facility.  In an earlier 
discussion with the Ambassador, however, Frank's deputy 
accused the head of the MOD internal security service of 
acting like a Communist security apparatchik in his campaign 
against Vanunu.  Recent articles have maintained that the 
security establishment is motivated by a desire to conceal 
its own bumbling in failing to prevent the original Vanunu 
leaks, although an Israeli journalist speculated that 
Vanunu's lawyers were peddling this story.  In placing 
onerous restrictions on Vanunu's liberty, the GOI appears to 
be elevating Vanunu's international cult status rather than 
protecting its nuclear program or national security.  END 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
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Vanunu Drags the U.S. Into It 
----------------------------- 
 
2. (U) Mordechai Vanunu, the former low-level technician at 
Israel's Dimona reactor who revealed details of Israel's 
nuclear program to the Sunday Times of London in 1986, 
claimed, upon his April 21 release from 18 years in prison, 
that the woman who lured him into a Mossad kidnapping trap in 
Rome in 1986 was an agent of the CIA or FBI, not the Mossad. 
Nevertheless, he told Israel Radio -- in English, because he 
is refusing to speak Hebrew -- that he would like to emigrate 
to the United States, marry, and study and teach history. 
Leaving little doubt that he intended to remain a nuisance 
for the GOI, Vanunu told a crowd of supporters, opponents and 
journalists outside the gates of the Shikma prison in 
Ashkelon that he had been mistreated in prison because of his 
conversion to Christianity.  He also called for opening 
Dimona to international inspections. 
 
3. (U) Vanunu's hope to leave Israel will be blocked, at 
least for now, by a GOI decision to deny Vanunu a passport. 
Vanunu has also been barred from communicating with 
foreigners, entering embassies, approaching an airport or 
other point of international egress, or talking with anyone 
about his experiences at Dimona.  He will not be allowed to 
leave the city in which he chooses to live, reportedly the 
Jaffa section of Tel Aviv-Jaffa, without authorization. 
Vanunu reportedly intends to challenge these restrictions in 
court. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Top Nuclear Bureaucrats Split on Handling Vanunu 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
4. (C) In an April 20 discussion with visiting Under 
Secretary John Bolton, the head of the Israel Atomic Energy 
 
SIPDIS 
Commission, Gideon Frank, defended the restrictions on 
Vanunu, while acknowledging that they may prove 
unenforceable.  Frank charged that Vanunu "acted like a spy" 
during his last months as an employee at Dimona and that he 
clearly still intended to "destroy Dimona."  Frank noted that 
Vanunu, as a low-level technician, had not had access to a 
lot of sensitive information about Dimona, but worried that 
Vanunu would simply invent and spread lies.  Moreover, Frank 
added, not all the information that Vanunu leaked to the 
Times had made it into print. 
 
5. (C) Frank's deputy, Eli Levite, expressed a very different 
view of the GOI restrictions on Vanunu in a March 3 
conversation with the Ambassador.  He said that Yehiel Horev, 
the head of the MOD internal security department (MALMAB), 
whose responsibilities include Dimona, was the driving force 
behind the GOI campaign to restrict Vanunu's liberty and had 
argued for keeping Vanunu in administrative or home 
detention.  Noting that Horev had held the same position 
since the period of the Vanunu leaks, Levite commented that 
Horev had come to resemble "those who held similar positions 
for 18 years in former Communist countries."  Israel is a 
democracy, Levite said, and should therefore leave Vanunu 
alone now that he has paid his debt to society. 
 
--------------------- 
Security Service CYA? 
--------------------- 
 
6. (C) Recent articles in Ha'aretz and Yedioth Ahronoth 
suggested that Horev and other members of the GOI security 
establishment sought to restrict Vanunu in order to prevent 
revelation of their lapses in not stopping Vanunu before he 
leaked to the Times.  In a discussion with emboffs, an 
Israeli journalist not involved in either of the reports cast 
doubts on this version of events.  The fact that two 
newspapers ran the story suggested, he said, that Vanunu's 
lawyers had been peddling the story. 
 
7. (C) COMMENT: The GOI is only contributing to the 
international cult around Vanunu in its continuing campaign 
against him.  Vanunu's revelations in 1986 did nothing to set 
back Israel's nuclear program, and we have difficulty 
imagining that anything he says or does today could harm the 
program or otherwise damage Israeli national security.  As 
Ha'aretz defense commentator Reuven Pedatzur wrote, Vanunu is 
"a strange man with strange ideas who committed a very 
serious crime for which he was tried and imprisoned for a 
lengthy period....  Leave Vanunu alone.  Simply ignore him. 
Don't turn him into a cultural hero." 
 
8. (U) U/S Bolton did not have an opportunity to clear this 
message. 
 
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