US embassy cable - 04RANGOON509

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000509 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, BM 
SUBJECT: BURMA'S NATIONAL UNITY PARTY: NIGHT OF THE LIVING 
IDEOLOGUES 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Leaders of the pro-regime National Unity 
Party (NUP) reveal an outlook on Burma and the world 
reminiscent of the bygone days of Ne Win and his "Burmese Way 
to Socialism" ideology, which viewed the international 
community, and domestic dissenters, as enemies of the state. 
The NUP stands firmly behind the current military regime, 
which has a similar view of the world but lacks any ideology 
or real intellect, thus allowing the party to maintain a 
flimsy, but national, political operation.  However, we see 
little evidence the SPDC has identified the NUP as its 
vehicle for any future electoral process.  A more likely 
vehicle is the regime's mass member organization, the USDA, 
which is capable of mobilizing millions of obedient 
"volunteers" on short notice.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) P/E chief recently met with leaders of the National 
Unity Party (NUP), the pro-regime political party that in 
1988 succeeded former dictator Ne Win's Burma Socialist 
Program Party (BSPP).  The senior member among the NUP 
leaders was U Khin Maung Gyi, a member of the party's Central 
Executive Committee and a former Minister of Commerce under 
Ne Win. 
 
3. (C) Khin Maung Gyi claimed that his NUP party had changed 
its philosophical outlook over the past 16 years since the 
BSPP and Ne Win were ousted from power.  Given Burma's 
transformation from a planned economy to a mixed market 
economy, he said, the NUP no longer advocated a purely 
socialist approach to governance.  However, he added hastily, 
the NUP's major themes remained the same: "We work for the 
people and seek an equitable distribution of income." 
 
4. (C) NUP leaders claim that their party has 500,000 "card 
carrying" official members throughout Burma and another 2.5 
million "sympathizers and associate members."  Khin Maung Kyi 
said that the party had lost about half of its membership 
after GOB officials, with NUP support, instituted regulations 
that bar civil servants from joining political parties. 
Furthermore, the Electoral Commission has placed a moratorium 
on new membership in all parties, "in order," he said 
sympathetically, "to preserve national stability." 
Nonetheless, he added, the NUP has over 300 functioning 
offices in Burma, "in every township, except those east of 
the Salween River (in ethnic minority areas of Shan State)." 
 
5. (C) Khin Maung Gyi said that the NUP had encouraged the 
GOB to reconvene the National Convention and declared that 
his party would "absolutely" attend in order to "say what is 
on our minds."  When pressed on the NUP's objectives, he said 
the NUP would seek to "bridge gaps" between political 
parties, but insisted that the 1993-1996 Convention had 
already covered the basic sections and fundamental principles 
for a new constitution.  "We have just a few minor details to 
address," he said, "and the constitution will be complete." 
 
6. (C) When queried about the role of the NLD and Aung San 
Suu Kyi, Khin Maung Gyi was dismissive and referred to the 
NLD as "undercover communists."  He claimed that Burma had 
only two truly "national" political parties (the NUP and the 
NLD), and the NUP was clearly "the largest and most widely 
represented."  He claimed that the NUP had garnered half of 
the popular vote in 1990 elections and said the NLD no longer 
had a national presence.  (Note: the NUP came in fourth place 
behind the NLD, the SNLD and the ALD and won only ten of 485 
seats in Parliament.  End Note)  We observed that, given the 
GOB's closure of NLD offices and persecution of NLD leaders 
and members, it was irresponsible to conclude the NLD did not 
have a national operations.  Khin Maung Gyi replied that the 
closure of NLD offices was "superficial" and that NLD members 
had ample opportunity to "be active (underground)." 
 
7. (C) Although Khin Maung Kyi allowed that "all political 
parties must be at the National Convention, including the 
NLD," he said there was no room to be "partisan."  The 
Convention, he said, "will decide the future of the country 
for the next two decades and this is not an opportunity for 
disagreement -- we must think of the national interest."  We 
noted that ASSK remained under house arrest less than a 
quarter mile from NUP headquarters and questioned how this 
could constitute participation in the process.  "NLD leaders 
are under arrest," he replied, "because they refuse to leave 
home." He added that, while the NLD has a certain courage in 
dissenting from SPDC policies, "we, the NUP, follow the rules 
and stay in bounds, because these are not normal times." 
 
8. (C) Comment: Khin Maung Kyi and his NUP colleagues were 
full of fire and brimstone, eerily reminiscent of the bygone 
days of Ne Win and his "Burmese Way to Socialism" ideology, 
which viewed the international community, and domestic 
dissenters, as enemies of the state.  The NUP, ironically, 
appears quite comfortable under the thumb of their new 
masters, the SPDC military regime, which has a similar view 
of the world, but lacks any fundamental political ideology or 
intellectual approach to governance.  The NUP stands firmly 
behind the regime and thus enjoys ample patronage and 
resources to maintain a flimsy, but national, network. 
However, we see little evidence the SPDC has identified the 
NUP as its vehicle for any future electoral process.  A more 
likely vehicle is the regime's mass member organization, the 
Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), which is 
capable of mobilizing millions of obedient "volunteers" on 
short notice.  End Comment. 
Martinez