US embassy cable - 04RANGOON501

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000501 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EAP/CM, EB 
COMMERCE FOR ITA JEAN KELLY 
TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2014 
TAGS: PREL, ECON, PGOV, BM, CH, ASSK, Economy, National Convention 
SUBJECT: BURMA:  CHINESE VISIT A "BIG EVENT" FOR PRC-SPDC 
RELATIONS 
 
REF: A. BEIJING 5802 
 
     B. RANGOON 417 
     C. RANGOON 232 
 
Classified By: COM CARMEN MARTINEZ FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D) 
 
 1.  (C)  Summary:  The Chinese ambassador to Burma 
characterized the recent visit by Vice Premier Wu Yi as a 
"big event" for bilateral relations, noting 21 agreements had 
been signed and commenting that China had selected areas of 
cooperation that would be of import not only to the current 
regime but to any future Burmese government.  Ambassador Li 
stated his view that ASSK would be released prior to May 17th 
and that recent movement on the National Convention 
demonstrated a compromise had been reached between the 
government and the NLD.  Li had a positive view of the 
Bangkok Process and urged that all international participants 
behave (read: be non-confrontational) so that this window on 
Burma would remain open.  End Summary. 
 
Outcome of Vice Premier Visit:  Agreements and MOU's 
 
2.  (C) During a April 6 meeting between COM and the Chinese 
ambassador to Burma, Li Jinjun, Ambassador Li provided an 
overview of Vice Premier Wu Yi's March visit (refs A and B), 
describing it as a "big event" for bilateral relations. 
Noting that trade between Burma and China has been developing 
smoothly, Ambassador Li said the purpose of the recent visit 
was to explore and deepen bilateral cooperation in five 
mutually agreed upon spheres:  agriculture, infrastructure, 
natural resources, manufacturing, and human resource 
development.  In addition, China offered to provide increased 
funding via development assistance, preferential loans, and 
export credits.  Ambassador Li commented that China had 
selected areas that would be of import not only to the 
current regime but to any future Burmese government.  While 
noting that 21 agreements had been signed, Li did not mention 
an accord to reschedule around $120 million in unpaid Burmese 
debt to Chinese firms (ref B). 
 
3.  (C) Ambassador Li acknowledged that formal bilateral 
trade heavily favors China and that China is making efforts 
to improve the trade balance by helping Burma to export its 
natural resources.  When asked by COM whether Wu Yi had used 
her meetings with regime leaders Than Shwe, Maung Aye, and 
Khin Nyunt to initiate discussion on the need for significant 
economic and financial reforms, Ambassador Li explained that 
it would not have been appropriate for her to do so because 
such topics are considered sensitive by the current regime 
and, in any event, China does not interfere in the internal 
affairs of sovereign nations.  Ambassador Li conceded, 
however, that the speed of reform depends on the current 
leaders and that if they don't "open their minds," it doesn't 
matter how fast China is willing to move forward on assisting 
with economic reform.  (Note:  In 2003, senior GOB leaders 
elected to completely ignore a comprehensive economic reform 
framework compiled at great expense by the Japanese 
government. End Note.) 
 
The National Convention and the Bangkok Process 
 
4. (C) Ambassador Li blithely offered that the release of 
Aung San Suu Kyi was not a problem and that the SPDC and NLD 
merely needed to "agree on timing," later stating that ASSK 
definitely would be released prior to the start of the 
National Convention on 17 May.  He also said that SPDC 
Chairman Than Shwe had told Wu Yi that the military 
government did not intend to "stay on stage" forever and 
wanted to hand over power to an "appropriate" group. 
Ambassador Li assessed that recent efforts such as the 
Bangkok Process and the announcement of the date for 
reconvening the National Convention demonstrated the 
government's increased confidence.  Ambassador Li said that 
the announcement strongly indicated that a compromise must 
have been reached between the government and the NLD. 
 
5. (C) When pressed by COM on whether Vice Premier Wu Yi had 
raised the National Convention process, Ambassador Li 
reaffirmed that China does not interfere in this type of 
internal affair and said that "the details were not 
important."  Without any trace of irony, Ambassador Li then 
explained that the key issue in regard to the National 
Convention was creating a cooperative atmosphere.  COM urged 
the PRC, given its significant influence in Burma, to tell 
the GOB that the road map process had to be inclusive, as the 
GOB was likely to take such advice to heart.  Demurring on 
this point, Ambassador Li agreed, however, that the process 
of a transition to democracy needed to be inclusive and that 
the NLD had to be involved. 
 
6. (SBU) Ambassador Li opined that the Bangkok Process was 
valuable because it provided the international community with 
a window into the current situation in Burma and the Burmese 
government with a view of the "real attitude" of the 
international community.  As a result, the international 
community must not make any mistakes that would result in the 
Burmese government closing this window and should strive to 
make positive remarks so that the Burmese government will 
continue to move forward.  In an aside, Ambassador Li 
commented, again without irony, that perhaps the best 
approach to take with the current regime is to treat it in 
the same way one would treat a child, e.g., encourage good 
behavior with appropriate rewards.  COM countered that 
pressure was necessary and that the GOB would not have taken 
any steps had pressure not been exerted. 
 
7. (C) Comment:  China continues to increase its economic 
investment in Burma while maintaining its hands-off approach 
on internal political issues, as evidenced by Ambassador's 
Li's continued reluctance to meet with opposition figures, 
despite approaches by the NLD (ref C).  Ambassador's Li's 
recognition that a cooperative, trusting atmosphere is a 
necessary prerequisite for eventual democratic transition 
notwithstanding, he appears to have little interest in 
playing a role or even advocating concrete measures to 
achieve this aim.  Quite the contrary, China's continued 
diplomatic and economic support for the current regime helps 
immunize it to U.S. and international pressure.  End comment. 
Martinez