US embassy cable - 04ANKARA2291

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002291 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S GREYING WOLVES: RIGHTIST-NATIONALIST MHP 
 
 
REF: ANKARA 2204 
 
 
(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter. 
Reason: 1.4 (b,d). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: Leaders of rightist-nationalist MHP are 
spinning March 28 municipal election results as a victory. 
According to at least one MHP official, however, the party 
had expected a better showing.  Although MHP leaders profess 
a desire to bring the party into the mainstream, party 
policies on core issues -- Cyprus, Iraq, and the EU -- have 
not changed since the party's electoral defeat in 2002 
general election.  MHP officials hope to exploit any 
perceived missteps by ruling AKP on these issues to build on 
momentum they claim they have after March 28. End summary. 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
Election Results Good But Not Great 
----------------------------------- 
 
 
2. (C) Winning or holding onto four provinces in March 28 
municipal elections, Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) has 
recouped some of the sharp fall in popular support the party 
experienced in the 2002 national elections.  In recent 
meetings, senior MHP officials told us that the party's 
10-percent showing in provincial councils -- the best proxy 
for a national vote -- has restored some confidence among the 
party's grassroots.  Faruk Bal, MHP vice chairman for 
election affairs, averred to us April 9 that March 28 was a 
success and in part demonstrated that the party's base has 
gotten over its defeat in 2002.  Bal contended that MHP did 
well despite receiving almost no positive media coverage in 
the run-up to municipal elections. 
 
 
3. (C) Bal and other MHP officials nevertheless acknowledge 
that the party leadership still faces challenges in 
recapturing the momentum from 1999 national elections, when 
MHP soared to 18%.  Both Bal and Murat Sevkatli -- head of 
MHP's political academy -- claimed party chairman Devlet 
Bahceli is committed to moving MHP more toward the 
"mainstream", but neither could explain what that might mean. 
 In an April 15 conversation with us, Sevkatli admitted that 
MHP leaders had hoped for an even better showing on March 28, 
given the media's focus on Cyprus, which, as a perceived 
national cause, had in the past galvanized MHPers of all 
stripes. 
 
 
4. (C) MHP intellectual and long-time Embassy contact Riza 
Muftuoglu, who unlike most of his party colleagues is usually 
a free thinker, offered to us April 20 a more even-handed 
analysis of the party's performance.  Muftuoglu explained 
that MHP leaders can spin the results as a "victory" by 
noting that the party finished third in votes for provincial 
councils and that this is a tacit blessing of the party's 
general direction.  On the other hand, Muftuoglu argued that 
after factoring in the thirty percent of Turks who did not 
vote March 28, MHP's showing is much less impressive.  "If 
these had been national elections, we still would not have 
entered Parliament," he asserted. 
 
 
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Nothing's Changed 
----------------- 
 
 
5. (C) Our conversations revealed that MHP has not changed 
its basic policies on core foreign policy issues.  On Cyprus, 
Bal and Sevkatli underscored MHP's strong opposition to a 
settlement as envisioned in the Annan Plan.  Both asserted 
that a settlement will lead to inter-communal violence and 
eventually the total take over of the North by Greek 
Cypriots.  In this regard, Bal even claimed that, "since the 
EU won't take Turkey anyway," the EU is purposefully seeking 
a solution that will remove the presence of any Muslims 
within its borders. 
 
 
6. (C) Despite MHP's strong objections to a settlement, 
neither Bal nor Sevkatli believes that a meaningful number of 
ruling AKP M.P.s with MHP resumes will defect and vote 
against the Annan Plan should it come to Parliament.  Indeed, 
Sevkatli admitted that an MHP-led "March to Cyprus," which 
will culminate on Cyprus on April 23 with an anti-settlement 
speech by Bahceli, is merely meant to cement the party's 
base.  In this way, the party hopes to give itself political 
cover regardless of the outcome.  If the referendum is 
successful and passes Parliament, the MHP base will not be 
able to accuse the party leadership of inaction.  Moreover, 
Sevkatli asserted that when the inevitable (in the MHP mind) 
violence breaks out, MHP will be well positioned to say, "We 
told you so." 
 
 
7. (C) Our three contacts also expressed dismay with USG Iraq 
policy, claiming that our cooperation with "those tribes" in 
northern Iraq (read Kurds) will lead to disaster for the U.S. 
and Turkey.  Bal asserted that Kurds "have been stabbing 
their allies in the back for centuries."  For his part, 
Sevkatli claimed that USG Iraq policy has created a de facto 
Kurdish state, which will fuel nationalist ambitions of 
Turkey's own Kurds.  As a result, Sevkatli averred, 
anti-American sentiment in Turkey is on the rise.  He added 
that EU-related reforms -- e.g. allowing Kurdish language 
schools -- will unify the fractious Kurdish tribes in 
Turkey's Southeast, which will encourage greater demands for 
autonomy and lead to the eventual dismemberment of the 
Turkish State. 
 
 
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MHP Prospects 
------------- 
 
 
8. (C) Our contacts tell us that MHP's relative success on 
March 28 was due to: 1) the return to the fold of disaffected 
MHP voters who had supported the xenophobic Genc Party in 
2002; and 2) developments on Cyprus and in Iraq, which they 
claimed have stoked nationalist flames over the last several 
weeks.  In the latter regard, clearly MHP hopes to use 
Cyprus, Iraq, and the EU to exploit fears of an AKP sellout 
of Turkish interests.  Whether or not MHP will be able to 
exploit nationalist paranoia to undermine support for AKP and 
position itself for the next national election remains an 
open question.  Muftuoglu, for one, expressed doubt: "Under 
Devlet Bahceli, the party won't go anywhere." 
 
 
---------------- 
Eyes on the Army 
---------------- 
 
 
9. (C) In the context of our Cyprus discussions, both 
Sevkatli and Muftuoglu independently offered their analysis 
of Chief of the General Staff (TGS) Ozkok's April 13 press 
briefing on Cyprus and the military's role in society. 
Sevkatli, who had earlier criticized Ozkok for being "soft" 
on Cyprus and ruling AKP's domestic policy, assessed Ozkok's 
statements as much more in line with "what a TGS chief is 
supposed to say."  Muftuoglu asserted that the speech was 
primarily directed against Ozkok's opponents within TGS but 
added that his remarks were also a warning to the GOT. 
Expressing his frustration with ruling AKP policy on a host 
of issues -- and Ozkok's more moderate approach to the GOT -- 
Muftuoglu said, "If I were TGS chief, I would have led a coup 
already!" 
 
 
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Comment 
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10. (C) MHP has a core eight percent of the vote but has no 
new ideas and relies on circumstantial developments on 
"national issues" to boost its vote.  In any event, we do not 
see MHP in its current greying state as capable of playing a 
major national role under the leadership of ultra-fastidious 
leader Bahceli. 
EDELMAN