US embassy cable - 04ABUJA685

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 000685 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, NI 
SUBJECT: IMPLICATIONS OF CONTINUING MALAISE 
 
REF: A. ABUJA 586 
 
     B. ABUJA 582 
     C. ABUJA 581 
     D. 03 ABUJA 2205 
     E. 03 ABUJA 1385 
     F. ABUJA 588 
 
Classified By: CDA RICK ROBERTS FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
1. (S/NF) SUMMARY:  Recent coup rumors (Ref A) and political 
assassinations (Refs B and C) have added fuel to a fire that 
has been on slow burn among Nigeria's political class and 
Nigerians as a whole (Ref D) since last August (Ref E), but 
there seems little likelihood of a real coup in the next few 
months.  Indeed Nigerian newspapers contend, and many 
Nigerians believe, that the recent Ref B "Mustapha coup 
attempt" was staged by Obasanjo to cover his political 
failures.  Most Nigerians continue to be alienated from their 
society as well as their government, especiallly in the 
north.  Virtually none see positives of the Obasanjo 
administration -- from transparency to the new NEEDS economic 
reform program -- as benefitting them or theirs personally. 
There has not been a military coup in large part because of 
Obasanjo's success in re-fashioning senior ranks into his own 
image, Christian/southern and believing in civilian rule. 
That could end up as the catalyst for a coup, if Buhari's 
suit overturns Obasanjo's 2003 election and Obasanjo ignores 
such a court decision, but Nigeria is more likely to muddle 
on through the muck toward whatever positives Obasanjo ends 
up producing before the next election in 2007. 
 
2. (S/NF) SUMMARY CONTINUED:  Nigerians widely associate the 
U.S. with Obasanjo's administration, although the USG has 
done little to support Obasanjo's second administration, or 
to distance ourselves from its failures and continuing 
problems, or to push for correction of those problems outside 
what the GON is already doing.  Washington did not support 
Obasanjo publicly on removing subsidies on gasoline, for 
example, and is perceived as critical of Nigeria's taking 
Charles Taylor from Nigeria.  The USG is seen by Nigerians as 
having supported the flawed 2003 election, and when northern 
or Muslim Nigerians feel they are being ruled by "others," 
they lump the USG in with the GON, southerners, Christians 
and the West among those "others."  Post analyzed Nigerians' 
mood at length in Ref D; this cable analyzes the long-term 
consequences for U.S. interests -- both regime stability and 
perceptions of the U.S. -- and what we can do about them. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------- 
OBASANJO'S PROBLEMS... 
---------------------- 
 
3. (C) Since President Obasanjo came to power in 1999, the 
average Nigerian has seen little if any improvement in the 
quality of his life or in his ability to influence his 
government.  Rampant unemployment plagues Nigeria's working 
class and most of those eligible for government pensions 
receive only empty promises.  There have been few results 
from the GON's widely publicized transparency efforts, and 
many Obasanjo administration figures are widely thought to be 
involved in corruption, political assassinations, resource 
waste, budgetary fraud and general mismanagement.  Those who 
are seen as clean and earnestly working for change are also 
seen as powerless to make fundamental changes in the Obasanjo 
administration, let alone Nigeria's future.  As a result, 
Nigerian and foreign investment outside of the energy sector 
is minimal and unlikely to grow at rates necessary for 
fundamental change to come from economic progress. 
 
4. (C) The average Nigerian's view of his/her government is 
just as bleak as his/her economic prospects.  Most Nigerians 
believe the 2003 federal and state elections were rife with 
fraud and, according to the influential Lagos Daily "The 
Guardian," fully 91 per cent of those it surveyed believed 
the latest 2004 local elections were rigged.  Nigerians still 
favor democracy; we are far from the level Sudan reached in 
1989, where Sudanese welcomed Islamic dictatorship turning 
out the crony-democracy of Sadiq al-Mahdi.  But most 
Nigerians have gone beyond debating whether election results 
were manipulated, to questioning whether Nigeria is any more 
democratic today than it was at the beginning of Obasanjo's 
first term.  With more than 70 percent of Nigerians living in 
poverty on less than one dollar per day, and with a GON that 
Nigerians tend to see as an enemy unless it is giving him or 
her money directly, it is little wonder that most Nigerians 
feel alienated from their government as well as their society. 
 
5. (C) The mood in the country, the President's widening rift 
with his chosen members of the National Assembly and 
conflicts with some PDP governors make continued infighting 
likely within the ruling party.  Obasanjo has been taking 
actions for several months that hurt the interests of his 
Vice President, Atiku Abubakar, and many believe the 
President's supporters will get Atiku indicted for corruption 
within the coming weeks.  Maybe not, as Atiku would be 
motivated to use his insider knowledge to attack Obasanjo and 
his family, and whatever Obasanjo or his supporters have on 
Atiku could keep them out of jail if Atiku succeeded 
Obasanjo.  But Atiku's recent moves have reduced his 
political viability for 2007 (Ref F), even above whatever 
Obasanjo does.  ANPP Presidential candidate Muhammadu Buhari 
is still waiting on the outside for the courts to overturn 
the 2003 results and order new elections, and an Atiku 
supporter on the inside of the Administration showed POLOFF 
what he claimed the "real" 2003 results -- Buhari winning 53 
percent of the vote nationwide. 
 
6. (S/NF) If Buhari wins his court case, Obasanjo will have a 
difficult choice to make.  He could stretch out the matter in 
the Supreme Court, to which the Appeals Court's decision will 
be appealed no matter who wins, or let the "Independent 
National Electoral Commission" (INEC) dawdle so long 
organizing new elections that another court will judge the 
case moot.  But Obasanjo is just as likely to disregard an 
adverse election tribunal ruling and insist that he serve out 
his term of office "for the good of the country," depending 
on a military he does not trust to keep the peace and, more 
importantly, protect his government.  He has done everything 
possible to remake the senior officer corps into his own 
self-image -- Christian/southern and committed to civilian 
rule -- and keep it loyal by a tight budgetary leash, but 
these could be his undoing.  The overwhelming majority of the 
Nigerian officer corps remains committed to civilian rule, 
not their civilian ruler.  A growing minority of these 
financially marginalized officers question whether the 
current regime is in fact a democracy.  That minority could 
achieve critical mass if forced to choose between Obasanjo 
and civil strife on one side, or supporting rule of law and 
getting paid on the other. 
 
7. (S/NF) The recent "security breach" (Ref A) highlights a 
continuing concern among Nigerians: that Obasanjo is inclined 
to see foreign affirmation as more important for his 
political survival than serious reforms in either the 
political or economic arenas.  According to a family member, 
Obasanjo has little faith in the Brigade of Guards which 
garrisons Abuja, or in the military leadership in general. 
One Obasanjo relative showed POLOFF a text message calling 
for "all politicians" to come to the President's Ota farm for 
Easter services to show "solidarity and pray for the 
survival" of the regime.  The Personal Assistant to Chief 
Alex Ekwueme, Obasanjo's rival for the 2003 PDP nomination 
and a prominent Igbo politician, told POLOFF that Ekwueme had 
been "ordered" to Ota for that gathering.  The Assistant said 
Ekwueme "would go along because he is afraid for his safety," 
but another politician who attended told POLOFF that less 
than twenty people gathered for the Easter services.  Even 
many of Obasanjo's own relatives did not show. 
 
--------------------------- 
...HAVE BECOME OUR PROBLEMS 
--------------------------- 
 
8.  (S/NF) While the economy burns and and lack of trust in 
public institutions is the smoke, President Obasanjo is busy 
playing to the international community.  Opposition 
politicians and much of the public question the legitimacy of 
Obasanjo's mandate and await the result of Buhari's legal 
battle.  The President continues to seek foreign affirmation, 
which he receives for his economic team's nascent program if 
for little else, but it is unclear whether Obasanjo plans to 
take the difficult and, sometimes painful, decisions 
necessary to put Nigeria's economy on the right track.  Some 
of the Embassy's Nigerian contacts speculate that the 
President's economic advisors will be sacked when there 
international community starts asking tough questions about 
performance rather than just accepting the GON's statements 
at face value.  It does not help that Nigeria's publicly 
announced economic statistics for estimated 2003 GDP growth 
vary by several percentage points and are not reliable. 
Obasanjo privately has expressed frustration that his 
economic reform program has not received more public support, 
nor understanding from western governments.  To shore up what 
he perceives as weak or non-existent support, Obasanjo has 
taken the unusual step of arranging for his economic team to 
address the foreign intelligence community. 
 
9.  (C) This is a critical time in U.S.-Nigerian relations. 
The USG is widely seen as the sponsor of Nigeria's 
"democratic" process and is widely accused of supporting 
Obasanjo and the past flawed elections against the will of 
the Nigerian people.  The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and 
the global war on terrorism as a whole are seen by many of 
Nigeria's 60 million or more Muslims as a war against Islam, 
and feed their more important feelings that the USG is part 
of an "other" ruling them that includes the GON, southerners, 
Christians and the West more generally.  Faced with these two 
realities of Nigerian public sentiment, U.S. policy should 
play more to the polity than to the elites. 
10.  (C) Our long-term interests are in Nigeria achieving a 
transparent and accountable political process, and a 
transparent and robustly growing economy, as well as 
continuing common approaches to regional energy and security 
issues.  Our policy should reflect the first two aspirations 
as much as the latter two already achieved, even more reason 
to favor the polity over any specific politicians.  Helping 
Nigerians build long-term national stability is the only way 
to maintain our current benefits.  While this is not greatly 
different from our current professed policy, the change is in 
emphasis.  In the past, we did not plan for and work toward 
progress, but rather hoped for it.  Pursuing this policy 
would require becoming more proactive in the pursuit of our 
goals rather than passively offering money and allowing the 
mistakes to continue. 
 
---------------------- 
STARTING TO SOLVE THEM 
---------------------- 
 
11. (S/NF) Six years is long enough that the current system 
should have begun producing measurable results.  On the 
political side, our ignoring the shortcomings of the 1999 
elections, ignoring the warning signals that INEC would fail 
a second time (in the interest that 2003 elections be on 
time) and then ignoring the flaws of 2003 election, have 
spent a lot of money but not produced more democracy in 2004. 
 There are not many positive results on the economic side 
yet, either.  We must address Nigeria in a clear fashion, 
increasing our public comment on both successes and failures. 
 Where the "successes" are belied by reality, we need to say 
so.  Even so, it is important to remember that influencing 
Nigeria requires that we balance strong but private criticism 
with unequivocal public comments that do not force a negative 
reaction from Nigerian institutions naturally averse to 
outside criticism. 
 
12. (C) In the Nigerian domestic arena, we need to focus on 
good governance and transparency both economically and 
politically.  Since we cannot be sure how the Nigerian 
situation will evolve over the next few months, we need to 
emphasize a mantra:  "It is the process, not the person." 
Depersonalizing our approach will allow us to maintain 
relations with all the players in the process.  In 
emphasizing our commitment to transparency and good 
governance, we should hold out for real progress, and not 
settle for paper commitments.  Any assistance provided to the 
Nigerian government should come with an appropriately strong 
level of Nigerian public oversight and access to the 
processes (not to be confused with oversight and access by 
implementing partner NGOs, which are part of the system and 
often not Nigerian).  These actions should serve to improve 
the USG's image with the general public and to convince the 
increasingly alienated citizens of Nigeria that they have a 
stake in the process. 
 
13. (U) Our principle targets should be: 
 
-- supporting civilian rule, including a continuing demand 
for INEC transparency and independence; 
 
-- strongly, but with a critical eye, supporting the NEEDS 
economic development and reform program; 
 
-- demanding rule of law and supporting the federal 
judiciary, judicial independence and reform; 
 
-- strengthening checks and balances among the three branches 
of government in politics and economics; and 
 
-- demanding and promoting anti-corruption efforts, including 
strong political and program support for the ICPC and EFCC to 
be independent, unbiased and effective. 
 
14. (C) We should also continue and strengthen our outreach 
to Nigeria's Muslims and manage our negative international 
image.  To do so, we will need a message to deliver, not 
merely a prettier or more expensive envelope.  This effort is 
one best coordinated with our global efforts to convince 
Muslims that our foreign policy is not naturally anti-Muslim, 
although success in Nigeria will not outpace our successes 
with Muslims worldwide, nor entirely remove our 
identification in Nigerian Muslims' thinking with being part 
of the "other."  The bridge to overcome being seen as part of 
their opponents is in our support for real democracy in 
Nigeria. 
 
---------------------------- 
NIGERIA IS NOT A BASKET CASE 
---------------------------- 
 
15. (S/NF) There is much to build on.  Most Nigerians may not 
be benefitting yet, but the economy is statistically growing 
and there is much potential in the NEEDS development and 
reform program.  President Obasanjo's Economic Team is trying 
to make headway on the anti-corruption and transparency 
front, perhaps as Obasanjo's legacy, and is already setting 
out economic policies that could have a very positive impact 
in the future.  Conversations with private sector risk 
assessors indicate that the Obasanjo regime's intentions on 
economic reform are considered credible.  Extraordinary 
efforts by the Finance Minister to pay outstanding debt have 
resonated particularly well recently with the foreign 
investment community. 
 
16. (S/NF) The USG needs to be more active.  When the 
Obasanjo administration takes good steps, we need to give 
more public support for those steps.  When the Obasanjo 
administration fails to take important steps -- such as not 
submitting huge All-Africa Games contracts to its own 
internal "Due Process" review, or stuffing the "Independent 
National Election Commission" with non-independent 
commissioners -- we need to make ourselves heard on those, 
too.  We need to position ourselves as simultaneously the 
GON's best friend and most persistent critic. 
ROBERTS