US embassy cable - 04ROME1527

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 001527 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2024 
TAGS: IT, IZ, MARR, MOPS, OPDC, PREL, IRAQI FREEDOM 
SUBJECT: ITALY/IRAQ; FIRM ON TROOPS; WORKING ON HOSTAGES 
 
REF: STATE 86313 
 
Classified By: POL MC THOMAS COUNTRYMAN, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: Italian authorities expressed their strong 
agreement with points in reftel demarche; they are determined 
to stay the course with the Italian military deployment in 
Iraq.  With the Italian public still shocked by the brutal 
murder of an Italian citizen taken hostage, the government is 
also devoting efforts to secure release of three remaining 
hostages.  This topic will probably be raised during FM 
Frattini's meetings at the White House and State Department 
April 20.  END SUMMARY 
 
2. (C) Ambassador presented reftel demarche April 19 to 
Defense Minister Martino, who enthusiastically agreed with 
the logic of the demarche.  (See Rome 1526 for full report). 
PolMC also presented the points April 19 to Paolo Dionisi, 
assistant diplomatic adviser to PM Berlusconi, and Claudio 
Bisogniero, deputy Political Director at the MFA.  Dionisi 
confirmed that the Spanish decision will not shake 
Berlusconi's determination to help build a secure Iraq. 
Having just listened in on NSA Rice's conference call with 
his boss, Amb. Castellaneta, Dionisi said Italy completely 
agreed that we must deal with the Spanish gap in a practical 
manner without overreacting.  Both Dionisi and Bisogniero 
said that an additional Security Council resolution, 
expanding the role of the UN, would assist Italy in managing 
public opinion and ease a Parliamentary vote in June-July on 
renewing financing for Italian participation.  Bisogniero 
emphasized that the GOI considers UNSCR 1511 as legally 
sufficient for the continued Italian presence; a new 
resolution would improve the political cover. 
 
3. (C) Dionisi described at length Berlusconi's efforts to 
secure release of the three Italian hostages in Iraq. 
Dionisi said that the issue is being worked intensively on 
the ground in Iraq, through an interlocutor who (they 
believe) has contact with the kidnappers.  He expressed 
appreciation for USG assistance on the ground in this effort. 
 The Italians believe that the three hostages have been 
"taken over" from the original kidnappers by another group of 
"more sophisticated criminals".  Dionisi said that Berlusconi 
would like to see the cease-fire in Falluja maintained as 
long as possible, and the humanitarian corridor kept open, 
because it would bolster the chances of securing the 
hostages' release.  In order to ensure that all avenues for 
their release were being explored, Berlusconi dispatched his 
Diplomatic Adviser Gianni Castellaneta (accompanied by 
Dionisi) to Doha, Tehran and Damascus April 16-18.  (Italian 
press reports that Italy has also contacted Russia, Libya and 
the Palestinian Authority to ask for any help they may be 
able to offer on the hostages). 
 
4. (C) In Doha, Castellaneta first went to the headquarters 
of al-Jazeera, which was in possession of the videotape 
showing the execution of the first Italian hostage.  Dionisi 
said that al-Jazeera had not broadcast the video clip (which 
he and Castellaneta viewed several times) because it showed a 
cold-blooded murder of a man not afraid to die: al-Jazeera 
only shows Arabs being murdered, not acting as murderers. 
Nor would al-Jazeera agree to give Castellaneta a copy of the 
tape to assist in the Italian criminal investigation. 
Castellaneta then pressed the Qatari FM to press al-Jazeera 
for a copy, and the GOI was continuing to press.  Dionisi 
described the Qataris as very cooperative, and eager to be 
more positively involved in Iraq as security conditions 
permit. 
 
5. (C) In Tehran, Castellaneta (a former Ambassador to Iran) 
met with FM Kharazzi and Deputy FM Ali Ahani.  He also used 
some of his previous contacts to convey parallel messages to 
Rafsanjani.  The Italian appeal for assistance in freeing 
their hostages was couched only in humanitarian terms, not 
political, and the Iranians responded in the same vein. 
According to Dionisi, they instructed their officials in Iraq 
to be of help where possible.  On the broader situation in 
Iraq, Kharazzi described al-Sadr as a 'radical extremist' 
without a substantial following among Iraqi Shi'a.  Blaming 
the Coalition (though without 'excessive rhetoric') for 
mistakes in handling al-Sadr, Kharazzi said Iran is trying to 
calm down the situation.  The delegation it has sent to Iraq 
is trying to reach al-Najaf and help arrange for a ceasefire 
and stand-down of forces, including through direct contact 
with al-Sadr. 
 
6. (C) PolMC noted that the Iranians were denying Italian 
press reports that Iran had asked Italy to help "mediate" 
with the US, and asked if the US was even discussed in 
Tehran.  Dionisi said that there was no Iranian request nor 
Italian offer of intermediation between the US and Iran.  The 
only point that Kharazzi said he "hoped the US would 
understand" was that it would be a grave mistake for the 
Coalition to bomb or shell al-Najaf.  Dionisi said that 
Castellaneta had already conveyed this point to Washington. 
PolMC asked if there was any discussion of Iran's nuclear 
program and the IAEA.  Dionisi said that Kharazzi mentioned 
it briefly, and that Castellaneta only replied that Tehran 
must cooperate fully with el-Baradei.  PolMC asked if there 
were any developments between the April 16 meeting with 
Kharazzi in Tehran, and Kharazzi's April 18 meeting with 
Berlusconi in Rome.  Dionisi said no, the second meeting was 
a virtual replay of the first. 
 
7. (C) In Damascus, Castellaneta's team got the full red 
carpet and was received by President al-Asad, alone, in his 
private apartment.  They found al-Asad eager to talk, 
forward-looking and (almost) free of rhetoric.  (Al-Asad did 
not even mention the just completed Israeli elimination of 
Hamas leader al-Rantisi).  He recalled his opposition to the 
war in Iraq, but expressed his desire to see Iraq stable and 
secure, with an expanded UN mandate as the first step.  He 
stated emphatically that Syria is not involved with or 
encouraging the escalation of violence in Iraq.  He was very 
happy with the letter from Secretary Powell.  According to 
Dionisi, al-Asad accepted the Italian request "as a 
humanitarian mission".  Within hours, official Syrians in 
Baghdad had contacted the Italians to offer their assistance. 
 
8. Minimize considered 
 
Visit Rome's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/rome/index.cf m 
 
SEMBLER 
 
 
NNNN 
 2004ROME01527 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL