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| Identifier: | 04BRASILIA935 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04BRASILIA935 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Brasilia |
| Created: | 2004-04-19 11:51:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED |
| Tags: | ECON EFIN PGOV PREL EINV SOCI BR Macroeconomics |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000935 SIPDIS RIO FOR TREASURY DELEGATION - STEPHANIE SEGAL NSC FOR DEMPSEY TREASURY FOR OASIA PLS PASS FED BOARD OF GOVERNORS FOR ROBATAILLE USDA FOR FAS/FAA/TERPSTRA USDOC FOR 4322/ITA/IEP/WH/OLAC-SC E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON, EFIN, PGOV, PREL, EINV, SOCI, BR, Macroeconomics & Financial SUBJECT: GOB'S FINANCIAL-MARKET HONEYMOON FINALLY COOLING? 1. Top front-page story in most national media Friday April 16 was JP Morgan's scaling-back of its recommendation for Brazil bonds from overweight to market-weight, and the sharp market reaction. News accounts generally headlined the JPM report's unease over the direction of GoB fiscal policy, and its judgment that the GoB is showing itself to be lax with regard to outlays for public-sector workers and pensioners. The report also listed concerns about the GoB's putative goal of exempting infrastructure investment from future primary-budget surplus calculations, as well as about increased potential for negative exogenous events such as early U.S. interest-rate hikes or a disturbance of China's commodity demand. 2. The JPM analysts see recent developments as threatening Brazil's long-term debt/GDP trend. Their report characterized January-February fiscal results as below expectations and, without openly so stating, insinuated that this year's GoB budget-surplus target is at risk. Its summary of the political status quo was that "the government has lost an important opportunity to launch a more positive reform agenda...". 3. Reaction: by Thursday evening, Brazil's country risk was up over 10% to 618, highest since last October (in January 2004 it briefly dipped below 400.) The benchmark C-bond was down 2.6% to 93% of face value. Commentators quickly pointed out the extra difficulty this would mean for the GoB's plans to raise a further USD 2.5 billion on international markets for debt-service needs in 2004. The BOVESPA likewise dropped over 2.5%. The foreign-exchange rate showed greater steadiness. The Real closed down by a mere percent, at 2.918 per USD, even on a day when USD 5.1 billion in public-debt payment -- by far the largest of this year -- fell due, and in the immediate wake of the Central Bank's latest quarter-point cut of the SELIC interest rate last Wednesday (as expected.) 4. Seemingly surprised as well as stung by these developments, Planning Minister Mantega was quickly quoted as disparaging any implication that the 4.25% budget-surplus target for 2004 might not be met. Public-sector pay agreements, he stressed, are being held in tight, fiscally responsible reins. Fortuitously, Mantega was able to point to just-released first-quarter revenue figures including a record collection for March as providing more than enough margin to fund public-servant wage agreements arrived at to date. Also by happy coincidence, the GoB had just forwarded to Congress both its 2003-2007 Pluriannual Plan and its budget outline (LDO in Portuguese acronym), in which the notion of counter-cyclical budget spending has been officially dropped. (Mantega said counter- cyclical novelties at Brazil's current juncture would risk confusion.) Both the LDO and the PPA re-confirmed that the budget-surplus target for 2005 remains 4.25%. 5. In the aftermath, various market voices have opined that sellers' nerves were unduly taut and that the JP Morgan report contained little news and was overblown. True, a day later Citibank also lowered its Brazil-bond recommendation, and Merrill Lynch issued a more general recommendation to move assets from Brazilian stocks towards Mexican instruments. Citibank's well-known analyst, however, attributed his shift purely to external considerations, explicitly asserting that he had no reservations about GoB policies. Meanwhile, other banks (ABN Amro, West LB) reaffirmed their strong Brazilian "buy." 6. The JP Morgan report came in for relaxed roasting at the April 16 blue-ribbon Businessmen's Seminar in Bahia, attended inter alia by former president Cardoso as well as Finance Minister Palocci. Comments ran along the lines that the report must have been composed by a junior analyst who got out of bed in a bad mood. In the process, Palocci went out of his way to be quoted admitting that his policies have been a continuation of FHC's, and that he is proudly ready to continue doing so for ten years more. Friday April 16 market results walked back much of Thursday's damage. 7. NOTE: The episode seems to be an amusing case of "rational" markets' logic. In descending from "over-market" to "market-weight" (i.e., 23% of the world emerging-market index, reportedly) for its Brazil-bond recommendation, JPM was literally just endorsing the general market assessment of Brazil bonds' profitability, in place of its previous second- guessing of the general market assessment. But its very endorsement caused that assessment to adjust itself downwards. END NOTE. COMMENT ------- 8. This episode does have its frivolous aspect. Not least, JPM raised its recommendation to "above-market" just six weeks ago, on the premise that damage to the GoB from the Dirceu scandal had been exaggerated. Yet the more sober view of Brazil's longer-term prospects meshes with opinions we heard from the chief economist of another top Brazil-based U.S. bank in Sao Paulo last month. After a protracted honeymoon during which, in our assessment, an eager market made more of Lula's first-year reforms and policy than the latter's material benefits objectively warranted, are we at an inflection point in the market's rosy-tinted view of Brazilian Treasuries? The big profits have already been made, and the benign external environment may indeed be due for a change of weather. Many would agree the GoB has failed to make the most of its first year in terms of reforms, and there is less and less trust that first-quarter GDP data will be reassuring when released in May. 9. Where we, and apparently most of the rest of the market players, see the JP Morgan report as dead wrong is its notion that the GoB is starting to fall off the fiscal-control wagon. For us, Lula and his team have demonstrated by any reasonable criteria that the opposite is true, even as pressure for fiscal relaxation has swollen across Brazil's socio-political spectrum. The various new GoB programs for housing, industrial stimulus, land-reform, etc. that have admittedly been announced of late, when examined, prove to be reasonably circumscribed in fiscal practice. (Septel on "Brazil's 2004 Budget Blues".) Lula's latest litmus test in this sphere will be the GoB decision, due any day now, over this year's increase in the minimum wage (Septel.) HRINAK
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