US embassy cable - 04ANKARA2206

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002206 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
 
NSC FOR DEPUTY NSA HADLEY 
SECDEF FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ 
STATE FOR UNDER SECRETARY GROSSMAN AND EUR A/S JONES 
JOINT STAFF FOR VCJCS PACE 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2029 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: TURKEY AND NORTHERN IRAQ: KONGRA GEL (KGK) 
MITIGATION STRATEGY 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 315 
 
 
1. (U) Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman.  Reasons: 
1.4 (b), (c) and (d). 
 
 
2. (S) Summary:  We agree with CPA that Turkish troops in 
northern Iraq could become a problem after the June 30 
transfer of sovereignty, but Embassy Ankara does not believe 
the approach recommended in reftel will work with the Turks. 
Even if the Turks withdraw, as a result of a proposal like 
this one or on their own, we still leave the President 
vulnerable to Turkish complaints during his late June visit 
to Ankara that we have not honored the President's commitment 
to eliminated the PKK/KGK threat to Turkey in Iraq.  Some 
action--closing urban offices, an IGC statement, a token 
military step--will be necessary to deter such criticism. 
End summary. 
 
 
3. (C) Embassy Ankara agrees with CPA (reftel) about the 
desirability of dealing with the Turkish troop presence in 
northern Iraq before the June 30 transfer of sovereignty.  We 
see an added benefit of addressing Turkish concerns about the 
PKK/KGK presence in Iraq before the President's visit here in 
late June at the time of the NATO Istanbul Summit.  If we 
don't, we can expect -- at a minimum -- President Sezer, 
Prime Mininster Erdogan and the Turkish media to remind POTUS 
of PM Erdogan's January meeting in the White House and the 
promise he received that Iraq would not be a haven for 
terrorists of any kind, including the PKK/KGK.  For this 
reason, we do not believe the proposal outlined reftel will 
have the desired effects with the Turks.  (We defer to CPA on 
the merits of the proposal in dealing with the peshmerga and 
the Transition and Reintegration program.) 
 
 
4. (C) Turkey has had long and difficult relations with the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK).  Turks believe that the KDP and the PUK are 
sympathetic to and to some degree actually assist the PKK/KGK 
in northern Iraq.  Thus, they do not trust the peshmerga to 
contain the threat.  This is why the Turkish General Staff 
(TGS) perceives a need for independent intelligence 
collection and limited special operation capabilities in 
northern Iraq.  The Turks will likely see the absorption of 
the peshmerga into the border security force as simply giving 
them new uniforms, but not changing their sympathetic outlook 
toward the PKK/KGK, nor their allegance to their parties of 
origin.  They would also see it as confirming their suspicion 
that the Kurds are over-represented in Iraq's security 
forces, and their belief that the US favors Kurds over other 
groups in Iraq.  The presence of foreign advisors, as CPA 
suggests, would help mitigate these concerns, but only if 
they were American.  The Turks, like Iraqis, have long 
memories and will object strenuously to a British presence on 
their border. 
 
 
5. (C) But even if the Turks could be convinced that a beefed 
up, Baghdad-controlled border security force made up of 
peshmerga would prevent the PKK/KGK from infiltrating across 
the Turkey-Iraq border, that would not be enough to prevent 
PKK/KHK movement into Turkey.  The PKK/KGK controls a section 
of the Iran-Iraq border and they often move between Turkey 
and Iraq via Iran.  To convince the Turks that we have the 
PKK/KGK threat in northern Iraq bottled up, we would need to 
take control of this border as well.  We expect military 
action would be necessary, given the PKK/KGK actually 
attacked an Iraqi Border Service patrol last fall that 
threatened to interfere with the group's movements. 
 
 
6. (C) Reftel suggests blocking KGK efforts to set up front 
groups and to hold "political" meetings might enhance the 
credibility of its proposal with the Turks.  But the KGK 
already has a front group, the Democratic Solution Party of 
Kurdistan, with functioning offices in a number of locations 
in northern Iraq and Baghdad.  If existing offices aren't 
closed, no promise to prevent political activity will have 
any credibility with the Turks. 
 
 
7. (S/NF) Even if we could convince the Turks that the 
PKK/KHK threat has been effectively bottled up, they might 
still balk at a request to withdraw their forces.  Doing so 
would remove Turkey's eyes and ears on the ground.  Publicly 
and officially, TGS asserts that their troops will remain in 
northern Iraq as long as the PKK/KGK threat does.  They heard 
from senior USG officials that the US understands and accepts 
this.  A proposal from us to do otherwise would surprise and 
offend them.  However, there are indications that TGS may be 
reevaluating the intelligence value of these troops in 
anticipation of an Iraqi request:  sensitive reporting 
suggests that the generals are beginning to think about a 
unilateral withdrawal of Turkish troops.  They recognize the 
newly sovereign Iraqi government and the Kurdistan Regional 
Government, legitimated by the TAL, could object to Turkish 
troops' continued presence.  In time, they could decide to 
avoid this eventuality by withdrawing before June 30 of their 
own accord.  However, for all the reasons outlined above, the 
Embassy does not believe CPA's proposal will convince the 
Turks to withdraw their forces and could even prevent a 
unilateral decision to implement contingency planning in that 
direction. 
 
 
8. (S/NF) Regardless of whether the Turks withdraw from Iraq, 
there will still be the question of how the President might 
handle the issue of the continued PKK/KGK presence in Iraq 
when he visits here in June.  Turkish intelligence suggests 
that hardliners in Kandil Mountain are currently considering 
terrorist acts against Turkey by terrorist elements some of 
whom are already in Turkey.  In conversations with the 
Ambassador and a number of senior US military officials, 
including VCJCS Gen Pace during a March visit to Washington, 
TGS Deputy CHOD Gen Basbug has urged the US to demonstrate 
the "political will" to eliminate eventually with this 
terrorist presence through some token military action. 
Basbug clearly believes that a demonstration of U.S. attitude 
would hasten the fragmentation of the terror group.  Moving 
to secure that portion of the Iraq-Iran border controlled by 
the terrorists, if visible and effective, would also be a 
step in that direction, too.  Such actions would relieve the 
domestic pressure on Turkey's politicians to press this issue 
with the President. 
 
 
9. (U) Minimize considered. 
EDELMAN