US embassy cable - 04BOGOTA3872

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 003872 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PINR, ASEC, SNAR, PTER, CO 
SUBJECT: A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF COLOMBIA'S SECURITY SITUATION 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, reasons 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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1.(C) With USG assistance, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe 
has made great strides in fighting drug trafficking and 
terrorism.  Uribe's hard-nosed security polices have 
eliminated the National Liberation Army (ELN) as a military 
threat, put the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
on the defensive, and continued to pressure the United 
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and other paramilitary 
groups in the midst of an on-going peace process.  The 
security forces have captured or killed key FARC leaders, 
initiated a multi-phased, nationwide campaign to attack the 
FARC in its rural strongholds, and reestablished a presence 
in all the country's 1,098 municipalities.  Inter-service and 
civil-military cooperation, although imperfect, are growing. 
Colombia's human rights situation is still poor, but has been 
improving for the past several years.  Three U.S. citizens 
have been held hostage by the FARC for over a year now. 
Their safe recovery continues to be one of our top 
priorities.  End Summary. 
 
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U.S. ASSISTANCE TO COLOMBIA 
--------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Colombian Minister of Defense (MOD) Jorge Alberto 
Uribe has characterized U.S. assistance as key to the GOC's 
"Democratic Security Policy" and acknowledges the U.S. as 
Colombia's most important ally.  Assistance to Colombia is 
premised on combating the interrelated issues of drug 
trafficking and terrorism and includes training, material 
aid, and guidance to the security forces and other 
institutions.  For example, we provided guidance when the 
Uribe administration developed Colombia's first-ever national 
security strategy.  We enjoy a close working relationship 
with the Colombian security forces, especially with the MOD, 
Armed Forces Commander General Carlos Alberto Ospina, Navy 
Commander Admiral Mauricio Soto, Air Force Commander General 
Edgardo Lesmez, and National Police Commander General Jorge 
Daniel Castro. 
 
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Uribe is Showing Results 
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3. (SBU) Nearly 21 months into his four-year term, Colombian 
President Alvaro Uribe has made the country safer and more 
stable economically.  Uribe's hard-nosed security policies 
have put the FARC on the defensive, reduced the ELN to a 
terrorist -- rather than a military -- threat, and continued 
to militarily confront illegal paramilitaries in the midst of 
an on-going peace process.  Colombian military pressure has 
cut terrorist attacks on vital infrastructure by nearly 25 
percent, is depriving illegal armed groups of important drug 
trafficking revenue (coca cultivation was down 21 percent in 
2003), and is leading to a growing number of desertions from 
all three terrorist groups.  The military has enjoyed over 75 
percent approval ratings since 2001 and Uribe himself enjoys 
nearly 80 percent approval, which is higher than any other 
Latin American leader. 
 
4. (C) In late 2003, Uribe named a new military high command 
and Defense Minister with an eye toward improving 
civil-military and inter-service cooperation and rewarding 
officers with a solid record of operational accomplishments. 
Recently, the security forces have achieved some notable 
successes: 
 
-- Plan Patriota Moving Forward: The military's multi-phased 
campaign to re-establish control over national territory and 
cripple the FARC has entered its second major stage (2B), an 
approximately 18 to 24 month-long phase to target 
FARC-dominated regions in southeastern Colombia.  General 
Ospina is personally involved in Phase 2B operations. 
Preparation, reconnaissance, and other important operations 
have already begun.  Nine mobile brigades, two infantry 
divisions, two riverine task forces, two Air Combat Commands 
(CACOM), and at least two brigade-equivalent special forces 
units are devoted to this offensive phase.  Progress is slow, 
however, given the vastness of guerrilla-controlled 
territory, the difficulty of the terrain, and the shortage of 
air and water transport, plus the conservative fighting 
tradition of the Colombian Armed Forces.  Much of this area 
has had little or no state presence for decades.  During the 
campaign's first phase (2A) in 2003, the military dealt the 
FARC heavy blows in Cundinamarca department, which surrounds 
Bogota, killing many important mid-level commanders and 
destroying the FARC's 22nd Front and several special mobile 
columns. 
 
-- Key FARC Leaders Captured: On February 10, the Army 
captured Nayibe Rojas (alias "Sonia"), chief of finances and 
logistics for the FARC's Southern Bloc, who was wanted in 
Colombia on drug trafficking charges and is under active 
investigation by U.S. authorities.  In early January, 
Ecuadorian law enforcement authorities, in collaboration with 
Colombian counterparts, arrested senior FARC commander 
Ricardo Palmera (alias "Simon Trinidad") in Quito.  Palmera 
and Rojas are the two most senior FARC leaders ever to be 
captured.  Other important operations have been launched 
against top FARC commanders, including Jorge Briceno (alias 
"Mono Jojoy") and Tomas Medina (alias "Negro Acacio") -- in 
the largest airborne operations ever conducted by the 
Colombian military.  Although these operations missed their 
targets, they served as confidence builders for units using 
intelligence-based plans to conduct operations deep in 
FARC-controlled territory. 
 
-- State Presence Established Nationwide: Upon taking office, 
Uribe pledged to establish a permanent security force 
presence in the 158 municipalities (equivalent to U.S. 
counties) that lacked a military or police garrison.  As of 
January 4, all 1,098 municipalities had a police presence. 
The USG facilitated this effort by training numerous police 
units and building hardened police stations.  The Uribe 
administration will need to follow up this achievement with 
social services in isolated communities. 
 
-- In late 2002, the GOC initiated negotiations to demobilize 
Colombia's largest illegal paramilitary organizations, 
including the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) 
and Central Bolivar Bloc (BCB).  In late 2003, over 1,000 
paramilitaries demobilized and began reinserting into 
civilian life in two mass demobilizations.  Several larger 
demobilizations are expected this year.  We have urged the 
GOC to establish clear roles for all agencies involved in the 
demobilization process, including the Ministry of Defense, 
which will be responsible for security in demobilization 
zones and areas formerly controlled by paramilitaries, as 
well as other aspects of the reinsertion process. 
Paramilitary groups have not perfectly obeyed the requisite 
cease-fire.  For this reason, the security forces have 
continued to confront paramilitaries militarily.  At least 11 
paramilitary field commanders have been captured since July. 
 
5. (C) President Uribe, the MOD, and the High Command have 
emphasized that inter-service and civil-military cooperation 
and intelligence-based operations are key to success. 
General Ospina has taken significant decisions to move the 
Colombian military towards more joint operations, and Plan 
Patriota's task force composition is a clear example of 
jointness.  Nevertheless, long-standing institutional 
rivalries are an on-going challenge.  Recently, two events 
further dampened Police-Military relations and highlighted 
communication problems: in March, an Army unit in Narino 
Department killed several police officers.  It remains 
unclear what actually happened, and accusations have surfaced 
that the police, military, or both may have been involved in 
illegal activities and/or tried to manipulate evidence during 
the ongoing investigation.  In February, the FARC attempted 
to commit a complex mass kidnapping in Neiva, Huila 
department, that included a diversionary attack on an 
isolated military outpost that left at least 12 soldiers 
dead.  A quick police response prevented most of the 
kidnappings, but the Army failed to respond to either the 
kidnappings or the five-hour siege of the military outpost. 
 
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GOC Generally Attuned to Human Rights 
------------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) The GOC maintains an active human rights dialogue with 
international and national NGOs, as well as the United 
Nations and foreign governments.  Human rights training is 
mandatory for all members of the military and police, and the 
Embassy vets units that receive USG assistance.  The State 
Department 2003 Human Rights Report on Colombia (published in 
March 2004) gave Colombia an overall rating of "poor," but 
noted that GOC efforts to improve security had led to major 
improvements in key human rights and violence indicators. 
For example, homicides fell by 20 percent, kidnappings by 30 
percent, and forced displacements by 49 percent in 2003. 
Less than 2 percent of human rights violations are 
attributable to government security forces.  However, most 
Colombian NGOs -- which generally lean to the left -- remain 
severely critical of the GOC.  Recent missteps by the armed 
forces, such as the aforementioned police-military clash in 
Narino and an accidental killing of a family of five by the 
Army on April 10th, show there is still a need for further 
improvement in respect for human rights by the security 
forces. 
 
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FARC Continues to Hold U.S. Citizens Hostage 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) In February 2002, a DOD plane carrying four USG 
contractors and a Colombian military representative crashed 
in FARC-controlled territory in southern Colombia.  The FARC 
killed one of the U.S. contractors and the Colombian and took 
the other three U.S. citizens hostage.  We believe they are 
being held in a remote, heavily forested region the FARC has 
long controlled and to which the Colombian military has 
little or no access.  Since the contractors were kidnapped, 
we have worked closely with the GOC to track all leads that 
could reveal their location.  President Uribe has personally 
pledged complete GOC cooperation and support in any effort to 
rescue the hostages.  As part of our efforts to secure their 
recovery, we recently initiated the Rewards for Justice 
Program, which offers up to USD five million in exchange for 
information leading to the capture of FARC commanders or 
other individuals involved in the kidnapping. 
WOOD