US embassy cable - 04ANKARA2204

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TURKISH CHOD OZKOK GIVES DELPHIC MESSAGE ON CYPRUS, WARNS GOT ON CORE TENETS OF ATATURK LEGACY

Identifier: 04ANKARA2204
Wikileaks: View 04ANKARA2204 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2004-04-16 16:37:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV PINS MARR TU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002204 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, MARR, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKISH CHOD OZKOK GIVES DELPHIC MESSAGE ON 
CYPRUS, WARNS GOT ON CORE TENETS OF ATATURK LEGACY 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: 1.4 
(b,d). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: Most Turkish commentators interpreted CHOD 
Ozkok's careful April 13 remarks on Cyprus as a signal the 
Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) will not oppose Turkish Cypriot or 
Turkish parliamentary acceptance of the draft Cyprus 
settlement.  A number of observers, however, taking into 
account President Sezer's similar comments on Cyprus April 
14, think Ozkok is banking on a Greek Cypriot "no" to render 
the point moot or leaving the possibility open for TSK to 
manipulate the Turkish parliament to vote against.  These 
observers, looking at Ozkok's briefing as a whole, see the 
press briefing as a strong warning to PM Erdogan and his AKP 
government not to cross TSK red lines regarding core 
principles of the Republic.  Some AKP M.P.s and opposition 
politicians tell us they see the briefing as a signal the TSK 
has given up on trying to work with Erdogan.  End summary. 
 
 
2. (C) It is rare for CHOD Ozkok to brief the press, and his 
April 13 briefing was thus keenly followed.  He used the 
occasion to tread a careful line on the draft Cyprus 
settlement.  He also laid down strong markers on other 
subjects: preservation of the Republic's core Ataturk 
principles, the role of the TSK, and rejection of 
insinuations that he has adopted a reasonable approach in 
return for a promise from the AKP government of high public 
office. 
 
 
------ 
CYPRUS 
------ 
 
 
3. (C) Most commentators, e.g., Mehmet Ali Birand on CNN-Turk 
immediately following the briefing, interpreted Ozkok's 
measured words on Cyprus, refusal to say yes or no, and 
firmly stated belief that the Turkish Cypriots and Turkish 
parliament will take "the most correct decision" as a signal 
that the TSK could live with approval of the settlement.  In 
support of this interpretation some also pointed to Ozkok's 
answer when Sedat Ergin, a senior establishmentarian 
commentator for mass-circulation "Hurriyet", asked for an 
elaboration of the settlement's positive aspects in addition 
to the negative aspects Ozkok zeroed in on in his prepared 
remarks.  The general assumption is that Ergin's question was 
planted.   Listing several positive elements of the 
settlement, Ozkok answered that no one should be worried by 
the negative factors, which are "surmountable", with the TSK 
doing "everything possible to this end." 
 
 
4. (C) However, other observers noted Ozkok's repeated 
signals of deep disagreement over Cyprus with PM Erdogan and 
the AKP government.  Among several signals, Ozkok underscored 
that the approach adopted deviated from what the NSC had 
agreed to at its Jan. 23, 2004 meeting (an assessment 
reiterated by President Sezer in an April 14 speech).  Ozkok 
mentioned neither Erdogan nor the government by name during 
his remarks.  Contacts note that omitting mention of a name 
is a well-established TSK way of showing contempt. 
 
 
5. (C) TSK has an obligation even beyond that of the Republic 
of Turkey ("the obligation given to the Republic of Turkey 
and to the TSK...") to guarantee the security of the Turkish 
Cypriots and Cyprus has a strategic role in Turkey's 
security, Ozkok emphasized.  The TSK believes "in its heart" 
that its responsibilities continue in these two regards.  For 
the first time concerning a question of national security, 
"two different views have crystallized."  The TSK has laid 
out its views "in every legal and constitutional forum", 
i.e., in weekly meetings with Erdogan and President Sezer and 
in bi-monthly NSC meetings, in an "open...and objective" way 
(the sub-text being that no one can claim the TSK wasn't 
clear in its objections).  The most important of several 
deficiencies in the settlement is the lack of EU commitment 
that the settlement derogations from EU practice will be 
considered primary law, a sine qua non for TSK acceptance, 
Ozkok emphasized.  "The final decision rests with the Turkish 
parliament" (while many commentators call this comment a 
reaffirmation of Ozkok's support for democracy, leading 
national security analyst Faruk Demir and "Aksam" Ankara 
bureau chief Nuray Basaran see the remark as a clear signal 
Ozkok is going over Erdogan's head and serving notice to the 
parliament that it will have to weigh its ratification vote 
carefully if the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots approve 
the settlement). 
------------------------------------------ 
DEFENSE OF CORE PRINCIPLES OF THE REPUBLIC 
------------------------------------------ 
 
 
6. (U) In extensively criticizing attempts to change the 
nature of the State or to force TSK to adopt a more prominent 
role in politics, and in rebuffing "unjust" attacks on TSK, 
Ozkok directed his warnings to all points of the compass: the 
GOT (again, without referring to Erdogan or the government by 
name), the movement of controversial Islamist thinker 
Fethullah Gulen, ultra-Kemalists, and right-wing racists. 
 
 
7. (C) Ozkok asserted that history teaches that only a strong 
state (i.e., a strong centralized state apparatus) can 
survive in Anatolia.  Within that state, powerful armed 
forces are linked also to a strong economy.  The Republic has 
a "deeply-rooted, deeply experienced" state structure; if, in 
fact, it is true that the structure needs changes, such 
changes should be carried out taking account of the State's 
experience and based on consensus with affected institutions 
and all sectors of society.  Numerous contacts agree this 
statement was a stern warning against AKP's pressing for 
reform of public administration, for decentralization of 
government, or for changing the constitution in ways 
affecting the powers of, among others, the TSK. 
 
 
8. (U) In quoting Ataturk's phrase that the army is 
parliament's, and in underlining that the army has 
constitutional and legal obligations, Ozkok again reiterated 
for many audiences (his hardliners, AKP) TSK's role as 
defender and arbiter of Ataturk's legacy of a "secular" 
republic.  He put everyone on notice that there are 
consequences to actions.  In this regard, Basaran noted that 
AKP M.P. Mahmut Kocak had called her immediately after the 
briefing to ask "eagerly" whether Ozkok was signaling TSK's 
intention to move, albeit indirectly, against Erdogan and the 
AKP government. 
 
 
9. (C) According to some oft-expressed domestic and foreign 
views, Ozkok continued, TSK's defense of the Ataturk national 
concept and secularism is the greatest barrier to Turkey's 
development and the only solution is to remove TSK's 
influence and weaken it.  "Who," he asked, "benefits from 
destroying such a powerful institution?"  In part, "murky 
Internet sites" which "knowingly or unknowingly" (meaning 
"knowingly", as our Turkish contacts immediately noted) serve 
these views. 
 
 
10. (U) Campaigns against the religious beliefs of members of 
TSK or others (a reference to discrimination against 
 
SIPDIS 
heterodox Muslim Alevis or unreligious people on the part of 
Sunnis) are absolutely unacceptable, Ozkok declared.  TSK 
will not shut its eyes to efforts to divert the nation from 
its attachment to Ataturk nationalism, "which is not based on 
ethnic identity" (a rejection of the Turkish racism of 
right-wing nationalists, including retired CHOD Huseyin 
Kivrikoglu and his followers who are still in the General 
Staff). 
 
 
11. (U) It is wrong and dangerous to try to drag TSK into 
politics, Ozkok admonished in a warning which all our 
contacts understand as aimed at ultra-Kemalists, who insist 
that TSK pronounce a deterrent view on every subject. 
 
 
12. (C) Ozkok reproached those who "knowingly or unknowingly" 
misinterpret his "responsible, moderate, constructive, 
unifying, and careful" approach : "I command a generation of 
soldiers who give priority to rationality rather than the 
luxuriant sound of their own voice" (seen by all our contacts 
as a slam at retired generals such as Kemal Yavuz, who has 
adopted a hard anti-Ozkok, anti-NATO, pro-Eurasianist line; 
former NSC secretary general Tuncer Kilinc, who espouses 
identical views; Kivrikoglu; and those approaching retirement 
such as Land Forces Commander Aytac Yalman who have tried to 
undermine Ozkok).  Ozkok bluntly rejected insinuations (which 
Yavuz has spread in his newspaper column) that he has adopted 
a moderate approach in return for a GOT promise to get him 
appointed to high office. 
 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
13. (C) So far, most of the media have interpreted Ozkok as 
saying that TSK will not stand in the way of TC and Turkish 
parliamentary approval of the Cyprus settlement.  Most 
commentators initially chose to see nothing new in the 
remainder of Ozkok's remarks.  However, at least a few AKP 
M.P.s such as Mahmut Kocak and Mehmet Cicek indicate to us 
they are now uncertain and sense that maneuvering against 
Erdogan and AKP will accelerate.  Husamettin Ozkan, deputy PM 
under Ecevit and a man with ties to Ozkok and renewed 
national ambitions, told us the same. 
 
 
14. (C) For all his seeming soft-spokenness, Ozkok 
underscored that he is in command of TSK.  He emphasized as 
well that TSK will fully protect what it continues broadly to 
define as its constitutional and legal obligations, although 
the manner in which TSK expresses itself publicly may be more 
"post-post-modern" than in the past. 
EDELMAN 

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