US embassy cable - 04BRUSSELS1655

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 BRUSSELS 001655 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR PRM/AFR; EUR/ERA; AF/C; DEPARTMENT PLEASE 
PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OFDA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF, EAID, PHUM, PGOV, BU, TZ, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: JOINT U.S.-EC MONITORING TRIP IMPROVES DONOR 
COORDINATION, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN BURUNDI AND 
TANZANIA 
 
REF: STATE 52528 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  In order to improve donor coordination and 
to bring international attention to the humanitarian needs in 
Burundi, the U.S. and the European Commission (EC) undertook 
a joint monitoring mission from March 29-April 2 to assess 
post-conflict needs and to monitor the work of implementing 
partners.  The overall deterioration of the social system in 
Burundi will require years of humanitarian assistance to 
bring living standards up to minimum levels.  Nonetheless, 
the Government of Burundi (GoB) is more interested in gaining 
direct access to development funds in order to accommodate 
the needs of returnees and other vulnerable people.  The 
steady, manageable stream of refugees from camps in Tanzania 
is likely to continue, although UNHCR also has contingency 
plans for a sudden massive inflow.  The major success of the 
joint monitoring team was bringing together different 
agencies from both the U.S. and EC that represented a 
comprehensive assistance mandate and which will facilitate 
the link between relief and reconstruction.  EC funds greatly 
exceed USG assistance for Burundi.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------ 
Pilot Joint-Monitoring Mission:  Strengthening Donor 
Coordination 
------------------------ 
 
2. (U) In order to take transatlantic donor coordination one 
step further, the U.S. and EC conducted, for the first time 
ever, a joint monitoring trip to one of the world's regions 
emerging from civil conflict.  In order to underscore the 
fact that many of our largest humanitarian projects are in 
Africa, and that a number of regional conflicts on that 
continent are entering a resolution phase when refugees begin 
returning home, the top two humanitarian donors chose Burundi 
for this pilot mission.  Apart from the transatlantic nature 
of the pilot, each side brought together an interagency 
delegation. 
 
3. (U) Participants for the EC were:  Dietmar Krissler (DG 
Development Burundi desk officer); Gabriela Koehler-Raue (DG 
Development Tanzania desk officer); Marc Stalmans (EuropeAid 
post conflict programs manager); Susanne Martin (ECHO Burundi 
desk officer); Angela Pollitzer (ECHO Tanzania desk officer); 
Yorgos Kapranis (ECHO/Bujumbura); and Yves Horent (ECHO/Dar 
es Salaam).  USG participants were:  Shane Hough (PRM/AFR); 
Marc Meznar (USEU/PRM); Matthew McKeever (Kampala/PRM 
Refcoord); Denise Gordon (Bujumbura/OFDA) and Robert Marks 
(Bujumbura/POL-ECON). 
 
------------------------ 
Mission Objectives and Results 
------------------------ 
 
4. (SBU) The stated objectives of the joint mission were 
accomplished as follows: 
 
a) Increase transatlantic cooperation between the U.S. and 
the EC in coordination of humanitarian assistance and 
longer-term development needs (both at headquarters and field 
levels) 
 
-- From planning the mission to traveling to remote sites 
together, a spirit of camaraderie was created that will 
certainly facilitate direct communication between program 
officers as they draft and decide on funding priorities in 
the coming years.  USG participants gained a better insight 
into the various funding pots the EC draws from, including 
limitations associated with each of these.  Understanding the 
parameters of the EC's 25 million euro, multi-year grant to 
UNHCR via EuropeAid was particularly important, since PRM 
frequently encourages the EC to channel more of its 
assistance through international organizations. 
 
-- Field staff also worked closely together in Bujumbura, 
with the U.S. taking the lead in arranging meetings in the 
capital while the EC organized the logistics for the field 
trip to the Burundi-Tanzania border region.  Transatlantic 
cooperation in the field was strengthened through the joint 
planning and travel. 
 
b) Observe and exchange information on best practices in 
monitoring/evaluation in the field 
 
-- By listening to questions posed to the implementing 
partners, both sides gained a better understanding of what 
the funding agency considered appropriate and effective use 
of donor funds.  For example, the EC noted the USG practice 
of asking governmental authorities about their working 
relationships with implementing partners.  Overall, 
monitoring and evaluation techniques used by both sides were 
remarkably similar. 
 
c) Promote coordination in linking relief to rehabilitation 
and reconstruction 
 
-- The interagency composition of each delegation was perhaps 
the most important lesson learned from the mission, 
particularly because it involved planning a multi-year 
strategy to link the immediate humanitarian needs with 
longer-term development assistance.  This mission marked the 
first time the three funding entities of the EC had ever 
traveled together. 
 
-- The joint mission marked one of the first times that EC 
desk officers responsible for neighboring countries in 
different geographic regions (i.e., Great Lakes versus 
southern Africa) had traveled jointly. 
 
-- In the case of Burundi, the humanitarian needs are 
overwhelming because 99% of the population lives below the 
poverty line; humanitarian assistance will be needed long 
after reconstruction has begun. 
d) Assess the competing needs in terms of social and economic 
rehabilitation and reintegration in Burundi of returning 
refugees, internally displaced, and demobilized soldiers 
 
-- In almost every meeting with international implementing 
partners, the need to "de-label" those requiring assistance 
was emphasized.  According to many interlocutors, labeling 
and providing different levels of assistance based on whether 
individuals were refugees, internally displaced or former 
combatants would be counter-productive in the long run. 
Because the infrastructure in Burundi is so degraded, many 
felt the best approach to humanitarian assistance would be to 
focus on infrastructure upgrades to schools, health clinics, 
etc. for the benefit of all, particularly in areas of return. 
 
 
-- Of the three groups of vulnerable people considered, the 
problem of demobilizing combatants was viewed as the most 
complex because their possession of weapons gave them 
leverage to demand greater assistance.  Furthermore, the 
psychosocial support to this category of vulnerable people, 
particularly child soldiers, was deemed most critical. 
Failure to provide schooling might make them vulnerable to 
re-recruitment by rebel fighters and thus perpetuate the 
cycle of violence. 
 
e) Assess the accuracy of pre-departure information and 
expectations in camps before returns begin 
 
-- In general, refugees in the camps were well aware of the 
degraded social services that currently exist in Burundi and 
frequently cited this situation as a reason for remaining in 
Tanzania.  Some seemed to erroneously think that if a border 
crossing had not yet been opened to their province of origin 
(many were from Makamba province) they were not allowed to 
return home voluntarily.  Another major reason for not 
returning was the fear of renewed ethnic violence, 
particularly in a post-electoral period.  Some refugee 
leaders said that they would return only when the Burundian 
security sector is reformed.  Radio seemed to be the primary 
venue for hearing news about developments in Burundi. 
 
f) Monitor and verify procedures and numbers of returning 
refugees at the Tanzania/Burundi border and conditions in 
reception areas 
 
-- On successive days, the joint delegation monitored the 
Gisuru reception and transit center in Ruyigi.  Overall, 
UNHCR's organization and coordination with the various 
entities working within the center was exceptional.  Of the 
registered refugees in the Tanzania camps, a total of 63,384 
are from Ruyigi province; another 30,000 or so will also 
transit through Gisuru to provinces neighboring Ruyigi.  The 
joint team found the actual number of returnees per convoy 
(350) was a little lower than the estimated number per convoy 
(500), the number UNHCR is working with when projecting its 
workload for 2004.  WFP has seemingly solved much of its 
logistics problem in providing return packages / food rations 
in support of returning refugees.  The capacity of the Gisuru 
reception and transit center was estimated by WFP as 3,000 
returnees per week. 
 
-- The transfer of health data from IRC (the NGO in charge 
for health in the Kibondo, TZ camps) to AHA (health NGO 
working with returnees at the transit center) is an area of 
the operation that could use some revamping.  The story of 
the death of a diabetic young woman upon returning home to 
Ruyigi because of inadequate medical oversight highlighted 
the lack of cross-border coordination between UNHCR country 
offices and health NGOs. 
 
g) Assess programs in place to return displaced people to 
regions of origin or newly established villages, as well as 
rehabilitation and reintegration efforts 
 
-- The GoB's idea to create villages was received with mixed 
feelings by the displaced.  Some, particularly women, 
indicated that if conditions equaled those in the Tanzania 
refugee camps they would consider relocating to a village. 
Others insisted they would only return to their own land. 
 
-- Conditions at a temporary settlement site for both 
returning refugees and internally displaced persons in 
Kabuyenge visited by the joint mission were extremely 
primitive.  However, returnees seemed to be upbeat even 
though they expressed some safety concerns related to 
bandits.  A primary school that had been gutted was partially 
restored allowing some education.  Some expressed a wish to 
settle permanently in Kabuyenge. 
 
h) Assess government and UNHCR policies to facilitate 
rehabilitation & reintegration of the above mentioned target 
groups 
 
-- Some officials and implementing partners argued that three 
months worth of food for returnees was not enough to 
facilitate reintegration, particularly got those who returned 
during the dry season when planting could not begin 
immediately.  However, saddling refugees with even more food 
items would not be tenable since the GoB was not fulfilling 
its responsibility to transport returnees from UNHCR drop-off 
points to final destinations.  A solution, albeit 
impractical, would be to provide the reintegration kits at 
destination.  As is, refugees sell off, at below market 
value, food and NFI supplies -- something that minimizes 
donor contributions and also negatively affects the local 
market. 
 
-- MSF/Belgium presented the results of an in-depth study 
about the effect on child mortality from a GoB plan to 
recover medical expenses by charging vulnerable populations 
based on a sliding scale.  In general, those made to pay half 
of the overall expenses fared worse than those required to 
pay just for the extras, like lab tests and medication. 
Mortality rates of those who received free health care were a 
fraction of the other two categories. 
 
i) Assess institutional capacities of government and UNHCR to 
deal with the load of returning refugees 
 
-- The transitional government does not appear to be able to 
meet the needs of returnees, even though official policy is 
to encourage them to return.  GoB officials visit camps in 
Tanzania, describe conditions in the country and promise to 
improve the infrastructure. 
 
-- Overlap and competition between the Ministry for 
Reintegration and Rehabilitation of Displaced and Affected 
and the National Committee for the Reinsertion of Vulnerable 
Populations needs to be resolved.  The government would 
prefer ending humanitarian assistance (which is channeled 
through international implementing partners) in order to 
receive direct infusions of development aid for rebuilding 
the infrastructure. 
 
-- UNHCR staffing in Burundi, particularly in the 
sub-regional offices it intends to open, needs to be 
strengthened.  Neither the chief of mission in Bujumbura or 
the officer setting up the sub-office in Ruyigi seemed firmly 
in control of details or transmitted an urgency in moving the 
agenda forward.  By contrast, the head of Kibondo 
sub-regional office in Tanzania portrayed an effective 
management style, although she lamented that for long 
stretches only one of a total of five international positions 
were filled. 
 
-- EC officers suggested tapping into unused resources from 
Burundi accounts to fund repatriation efforts from Tanzania, 
instead of UNHCR's current practices of cutting care and 
maintenance for refugee camps to fund the logistics of the 
return from the Tanzania account.  During the Tanzania 
portion of the trip delegation members saw the direct impact 
of the redirection of "care and maintenance" funds to 
repatriation:  UNHCR has begun exploring once monthly food 
distributions vice biweekly (which has a significant effect 
on household economy leading to more food selling and less 
food security). 
 
j) Underscore importance of effectively managing 
post-conflict developments in Burundi by the joint trip of 
the top two donors 
 
-- The joint mission met with top GoB officials dealing with 
refugee issues including Francoise Ngendahayo, the Minister 
for Reintegration and Rehabilitation of Displaced and 
Affected people, and Frederick Banvuginyumvira, the President 
of the National Committee for the Reinsertion of Vulnerable 
Populations.  At a dinner hosted by the EC ambassador, the 
delegation was also able to discuss with the Minister of 
Finance issues of concern (such as the policy change 
requiring health officials to recover medical expenses with 
returnees).  In Ruyigi, the joint delegation met with the 
provincial governor. 
 
-- Furthermore, the joint mission had the opportunity to 
brief the top Geneva-based UNHCR officer for Africa, 
Assistant High Commissioner Kamel Morjane, following their 
field trip and convey impressions and recommendations.  By 
meeting and expressing concerns jointly to top governmental 
and IO officials, the strength of the message had a 
multiplying effect. 
 
------------------------ 
GoB: Unable to meet needs 
------------------------ 
 
5. (SBU) In a meeting with Ngendahayo on April 2, the 
minister stated that life in Burundi may not be as good as 
the refugees have it in Tanzania, "but at least they're free 
and not herded into camps like animals."   As proof she 
pointed to the large numbers who are spontaneously and 
voluntarily voting with their feet, even walking for three 
days to reach home.  She noted that while many humanitarian 
organizations are in place, the infrastructure to help 
returnees reintegrate into society is missing.  Ngendahayo 
stated that the government could not compete with NGOs and 
churches in providing and rehabilitating shelter, but she 
expressed concern that no uniform standards were being 
followed by these organizations.  She indicated this could 
lead to future resentment.  The minister briefly touched on 
the idea of model villages as a solution to this problem. 
 
6. (SBU) She also mentioned a fluctuating security situation, 
which discourages returns.  Ngendahayo stated that an 
important objective of her ministry was to build the capacity 
of "welcoming committees" in order to promote reconciliation 
and peaceful coexistence.  She lamented that many of those 
born and/or reared in the politicized camps are fed a 
continuous diet of hate, which she emphasized by breaking 
into English and terming it "brain washing".  She also 
briefly touched on refugee resettlement activities out of the 
camps, cautioning against criminals and others perpetrating 
fraud (by claiming they are orphans, etc.). Regarding 
elections and violence, Ngendahayo minimized the connection 
between the two by explaining that the violence was connected 
to change (i.e., independence in 1961, abolition of the 
monarchy in 1965, end of a single-party political system in 
1972, etc., and the subsequent settling of accounts in 1993), 
not elections per se.  She also minimized the effect that 
refugees would have on the upcoming elections, noting that 
those eligible to vote from the camps would only be about 3% 
of Burundi's electoral population. 
7. (SBU) Regarding relations with UNHCR, she said that after 
a rocky start with disagreements over security in certain 
regions, cooperation had greatly improved.  She highlighted 
the problem that UNHCR caused by describing how those 
returning spontaneously were forced to ask military 
commanders for food because UNHCR was not providing 
assistance in phase four areas. 
 
8. (SBU) In a separate meeting with the National Committee 
for the Reinsertion of Vulnerable Populations, Bavuginyumvira 
emphasized that in Burundi, creating a distinction between 
humanitarian work and development was artificial because the 
whole social infrastructure needed rehabilitation.  He 
suggested that the medical centers could be privatized to 
improve services.  Because returnees generally lacked housing 
in their places of origin, he recommended that construction 
tools and supplies such as nails and roofing be included in 
reintegration kits.  He also promoted the creation of model 
villages, particularly for demobilized combatants arguing 
"Who could refuse them?" 
 
9. (SBU) Bavuginyumvira stated that 2,000 refugees were 
returning each week to Ruyigi province, and that the total 
number of returnees per week to Burundi was about 3,000.  He 
ventured that opening Makamba crossing on April 20 might 
trigger a massive return.  When asked about UNHCR, 
Bavuginyumvira said that the agency needed more human 
resources and material supplies.  He also noted a problem 
with payment of salaries, that Geneva was not sending funds 
to pay its staff in-country. 
 
------------------------ 
UNHCR: Responsive to Suggestions 
------------------------ 
 
10. (SBU) On April 1, the joint mission met with UNHCR's 
Assistant High Commissioner Kamel Morjane to brief him on 
their field visit and relay preliminary impressions.  Major 
points made by the EC and USG representatives included: 
 
a) Obstacles to repatriation: 
-- lingering ethnic divisions (with some refugees demanding a 
50/50 ethnic composition of the armed forces); 
-- fears that the elections might be the prelude to renewed 
ethnic-based violence; 
-- generalized banditry; 
-- political pressure from rebel factions to not return (or 
on the other hand, to do so -- one scenario for a massive 
uncontrolled return) and; 
-- lower levels of basic social services and education: 
 
The joint delegation emphasized, nonetheless, there was a 
general will to return, and those who were in sub-standard 
returnee settlements still seemed to be satisfied they had 
made the right decision in returning. 
 
b) Repatriation logistics: 
-- GoB is not transporting returnees from UNHCR drop off 
points to places of origin as originally planned; 
-- There may be a need to revisit composition of both food 
and NFI return packets (as many need to walk up to 15 miles 
to finally reach home) if transportation all the way to 
returnees, homes cannot be realized; 
-- There is an insufficient budget for repatriation in 
Tanzania (which results in cut backs to care and maintenance 
in the camps); 
-- Benchmarks must be defined or made more explicit before 
promoting returns, and; 
-- A systematic plan to utilize the acquired skills of 
returnees in rebuilding Burundi would be highly useful and 
productive in the long run.  Plugging in skilled returnees is 
difficult because of their general reluctance to be made 
known to local government officials in their areas of origin. 
 
The joint delegation stated UNHCR deserved high marks for the 
orderly return operation to date. 
 
c) Staffing issues: 
-- A serious need exists to improve coordination between 
UNHCR staff in Tanzania and Burundi (including use of EC 
funds for Burundi to pay for the repatriation logistics 
instead of borrowing from the camp budgets); 
-- Sub-regional offices in the provinces must be fully 
staffed and made operational  (for example, Ruyigi only had a 
few temporary staff in place although its plan calls for a 
dozen international officers and 30 local hires); 
-- UNHCR must avoid bringing staff from other critical 
regions with human resource deficits (one of the Ruyigi staff 
on mission had come from Guinea), and; 
-- UNHCR should set an example by having an ethnically 
balanced local staff (all those employed by UNHCR in Ruyigi 
were Tutsis). 
 
11. (SBU) Morjane was receptive to all these points and said 
they contained no surprises.  He noted that because it was 
unclear whether returns would continue at a slow, steady pace 
or suddenly burst into a massive return, UNHCR would release 
a supplemental budget for 2004/2005.  Regarding promoting 
returns, he said that there was no need to do so if the 
current flows continued, that local authorities were not able 
to absorb higher numbers of returnees.  Morjane stated, "All 
Burundi needs humanitarian assistance," and that need would 
continue for the next ten years at least.  He acknowledged 
the benefits of a diversified staff but mentioned problems of 
finding Hutus with necessary professional skills.  McKeever 
urged UNHCR to consider the skills acquired by refugees in 
the camp when hiring local staff and devision community 
programs in return areas. 
 
12. (SBU) Stalmans mentioned that EuropeAid has not been 
happy with the results of its pilot pledge of 25 million 
euros for UNHCR for the repatriation and reintegration of 
returnees.  He said that not enough work was done to prepare 
for the repatriation effort before people started 
spontaneously and voluntarily returning and that UNHCR had 
not provided adequate reports as to how the money was being 
spent.  (He noted that things were not much different in the 
other pilot refugee program for Eritrea.)  Morjane 
acknowledged initial differences of opinion about the 
security situation in the country, which led to a more 
cautious approach by UNHCR than other parties had hoped for. 
Morjane said that over half of the 11 million euros had 
already been programmed and that the balance would be used 
before the end of the year.  He said that although UNHCR had 
strengthened its dialogue with ECHO, it was evident that 
similar measures needed to be taken with EuropeAid since it 
had become a major funding partner of UNHCR. 
 
13. (U) Morjane said he would be visiting many of the same 
camps, resettlement sites and reception areas monitored by 
the U.S.-EU joint mission.  He hoped 2004 would be the year 
for solutions in Africa, not just in Burundi, but also in 
Angola, DRC, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sudan.  He 
called the evolving refugee situation in Chad "the" emergency 
for UNHCR at this time. 
 
------------------------ 
ECHO Funding: Meeting Humanitarian Needs 
------------------------ 
 
14. (U) ECHO's global plan for Burundi notes that the country 
ranks 171 out of 175 on UNDP's human development index and 
that over two-thirds of its citizens are undernourished. 
Life expectancy has fallen from 53.8 years in 1992 to 40.9 
years in 2001.  Other indicators -- such as the number of 
IDPs per total population, number of refugees to GDP per 
capita, ODA/per capita (calculated by the OECD), children 
under weight per age and child mortality rate (calculated by 
UNICEF) -- predict that general humanitarian assistance will 
be required for at least the next ten years in Burundi. 
Thus, all envelopes coming from ECHO, EuropeAid and DG 
Development will focus on bringing the country up to minimum 
standards.  The joint U.S.-EU monitoring trip also marked the 
first time these three EC agencies traveled together and 
should prove effective in encouraging a more systematic 
application of EC funds so that the link between emergency 
relief and longer-term goals are in place. 
 
15. (U) ECHO,s latest funding decision of 15 million euros 
for Burundi will cover an 18 month period beginning in 
February 2004 and will be targeted to the following sectors: 
food (33.3%), health (27.6%), water and sanitation (19.6%), 
emergency relief and non-food items (6%), protection and 
coordination (4%), psychosocial assistance (3%), and the 
balance on other activities.  These ECHO funds have been 
earmarked as follows: 
 
-- 11.85 million euros to assist with the reintegration of 
returnees (both IDPs and refugees) and will be channeled 
through ICRC, FAO, UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR, OCHA, WHO and other 
NGO implementing partners; 
-- 3 million euros to help international organizations like 
ICRC, OCHA, UNICEF and WHO carry out their specific mandates; 
and, 
-- 150,000 euros in technical assistance to facilitate 
monitoring and evaluation by field staff. 
 
16. (U) A separate decision by ECHO to support the refugee 
camps in Tanzania provides 15 million euros for funding: 
 
-- to operate and maintain 280 four wheel drive vehicles and 
70 light trucks in order to improve access to the camps; 
-- to improve the infrastructure in the camps, which includes 
the registration of refugees, environmental protection, 
community services, shelter and other non-food items; 
-- to provide care and maintenance of the refugees, such as 
health, nutrition and hygiene (especially vulnerable groups 
such as children, breast-feeding mothers and HIV/AIDS 
patients). 
 
------------------------ 
EuropeAid Funding:  Preparing for Repatriation and 
Reintegration 
------------------------ 
 
17. (U) Although ECHO funding for Burundi has fallen over the 
past years -- down from 20 million euros in 2001 to 17.5 
million euros in 2002 and 15 million euros in 2003 -- the EC 
has made a political commitment to bolster the peace process 
in the country by designating 25 million euros to prepare for 
the repatriation, return and reintegration of refugees in the 
region.  Using development accounts administered by EuropeAid 
(taken from the 7th and 8th European Development Funds), 
UNHCR has been given a multi-year grant covering the period 
2002-2004.  UNHCR has used some of this money to rehabilitate 
roads for the repatriation effort, as well as schools and 
other infrastructure in refugee return areas.  The remaining 
11 million euros should be spent by UNHCR this year. 
 
------------------------ 
DG DEV Funding:  Linking Relief to Reconstruction 
------------------------ 
 
18. (U) On September 9, 2003, the European Commission and GoB 
signed the 9th European Development Fund, which is divided 
into two envelopes: 
 
-- 115 million euros in envelope A to be spent on rural 
development (49%), good governance (15%) and macroeconomic 
assistance (27%); and, 
-- 57 million euros in envelope B for emerging needs, of 
which 25 million euros has already been pledged to support 
the Africa Mission in Burundi (AMIB) peacekeeping operation 
coordinated by the AU.  The AMIB mission will also help begin 
the disarming, demobilization and reintegration of former 
combatants, another "at risk" group with special needs. 
 
19. (U) Because the general degradation of social services is 
so widespread throughout the country, these EDF funds 
programmed by DG Development will also be used in large part 
to meet the needs of the returnees. 
 
------------------------ 
Member State Funding: Supplementing EC efforts 
------------------------ 
 
20. (U) In addition to EC funding, various EU Member States 
maintain bilateral aid programs that provide significant 
funds to help meet Burundi's needs.  In 2003, EU Member 
States contributed the following euro amounts: 
 
-- Belgium:  3,260,417 
-- Sweden:  1,830,000 
-- Netherlands:  1,161,000 
-- Germany:  1,607,000 
-- Denmark:  390,765 
-- France:  232,986 
-- United Kingdom:  171,112 
-- Spain:  150,000 
 
------------------------ 
Comment 
------------------------ 
 
21. (U) As a pilot endeavor, the joint monitoring trip to 
Burundi and Tanzania was overwhelmingly positive -- both 
substantively by addressing humanitarian needs and 
politically by enhancing the transatlantic relationship. 
Through joint travel to the field, relations between agencies 
were strengthened and donor coordination improved. 
Implementing partners also appreciated briefing multiple 
agencies simultaneously, thus economizing on time and 
resources which five separate visits would have required. 
Before the joint mission had ended, the EC already suggested 
a follow-on activity, either in the same region or a 
different part of the world.  ECHO and USEU have since 
featured the joint trip on their websites. 
 
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED 
 
SCHNABEL