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| Identifier: | 04ANKARA2195 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04ANKARA2195 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Ankara |
| Created: | 2004-04-16 11:11:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY |
| Tags: | EFIN EINV BEXP PREL TU |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002195 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR E, EUR/SE, EB/CBA AND EB/IFD TREASURY FOR OASIA - MMILLS AND RADKINS NSC FOR MBRYZA AND TMCKIBBEN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EFIN, EINV, BEXP, PREL, TU SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ECONOMY MINISTER BABACAN'S WASHINGTON MEETINGS 1. (Sbu) Summary: Economy Minister Ali Babacan comes to Washington after the IMF's Seventh Review and several months of better-than-expected macroeconomic performance. Senior USG interlocutors could usefully use the meetings to praise GOT accomplishments while warning against complacency, reiterate the need for tangible action on U.S. investment disputes, and urge the GOT to make its airplane purchase based on the merits of the proposals. End Summary. Economic Reform: --------------- 2. (Sbu) With the IMF's Seventh Review board vote April 16 and a run of better-than-expected macroeconomic performance in recent months, Babacan is likely to come to Washington full of confidence and optimism. Full year 2003 GDP growth came in at 5.8 percent, well above the 5 percent target or the market consensus. Thanks to the strong lira and the independent Central Bank's disciplined disinflation policy, year-on-year inflation (11.8 percent as of March 31 on a CPI basis) is already below the full-year 2004 target of 12 percent. Though final 2003 fiscal data show the GOT did not quite meet the ambitious 6.5 percent primary surplus target, it came very close, and has continued to maintain fiscal austerity in 2004, though there was an unseemly scramble for compensatory fiscal measures to close the gap opened by the Prime Minister's January minimum wage and pension payment increases. 3. (Sbu) While the GOT deserves praise for broadly adhering to fiscal austerity and working with the IMF to sustain economic reform, Babacan and his GOT colleagues, judging by their statements, give themselves too much credit for the improved macro performance and give every impression of being complacent about the Turkish economy's continuing vulnerabilities. An exogenous shock could still send Turkey's skittish financial markets into a tailspin, with spiking interest rates and a falling lira reinforcing each other and throwing the GOT's projections out of whack. A small touch of that happened this week as the markets demonstrated nervousness over the Cyprus referendum. Senior USG officials could usefully reinforce the need for the GOT to take advantage of current favorable conditions to push through additional reforms to prolong the positive momentum in financial markets and prepare the basis for several years of sustained economic growth. USG officials could urge more aggressive action on structural reforms such as privatization and improving the investment climate. 4. (Sbu) Privatization in general, and state bank privatization in particular, are two notable areas of weakness. In the past year, only two of Turkey's many large state companies (the alcohol side of Tekel, and the oil refiner Tupras) have been successfully privatized (and the Tupras deal isn't finalized yet). There have also been some high-profile failures, such as the tobacco side of Tekel and the petrochemical firm, Petkim. Other large companies' planned privatizations move forward only at a snail's pace, with delays such as for the Turk Telekom tender. Though Finance Minister Unakitan has the lead on the privatization program, Babacan has the lead on the IMF program and investment issues, and therefore plays a role on this issue. Babacan has been the IMF and World Bank's interlocutor on a revived strategy to privatize Turkey's three large state banks, whose executives' recent actions and comments suggest they are out of sync with the World Bank's stategy of shrinking-to-privatize. 5. (Sbu) With the IMF's current Standby facility due to come to an end this year, the Fund's post-2004 role in Turkey is an open question. Babacan's public line is that the GOT, in consultation with the IMF, will decide this issue this summer. The IMF's rules require at least a post-program monitoring arrangement. USG officials could point out the usefulness of the IMF's continued expertise and market credibility, whatever form its future role takes. In particular, senior GOT officials' public comments other than on the time frame of the decision-making process, serve only to rattle markets and are counterproductive. Investment: ---------- 6. (Sbu) Although Turkey has reformed its legal regime to encourage FDI in recent years, FDI continues to be discouraged by a number of factors, including excessive bureaucracy, frequent changes in the legal regime, weaknesses in the judicial system and serious gaps in intellectual property protection (including lack of data exclusivity protection for confidential pharmaceuticals test data). The fact that existing foreign investors are engaged in a series of high-profile disputes with the GOT and with Turkish partners does not help. Issues range from Cargill,s zoning problems to harassment of small businesses, as in the Bedoian case. Babacan and his ministerial colleagues say all the right things about encouraging foreign investment, and devote considerable time and effort to meetings with foreign investors such as the recent Investors Advisory Council in Istanbul. However, despite sustained USG pressure--during the Prime Minister's Washington meetings, at the EPC, and by Post--we are not seeing tangible GOT action to resolve US investors problems in Turkey. Post recommends that US officials press Minister Babacan to take the lead in resolving at least some U.S. company problems so that Turkey can attract badly-needed FDI. U/S Larson may also want to point out that IPR problems may cause Turkey to be elevated to the Special 301 Priority Watch List. Encouraging Business Partnerships: --------------------------------- 7. (Sbu) At the State Department, Babacan may raise the question of funding for a Chamber of Commerce proposal to encourage Turkish-U.S. business partnerships. U/S Larson may want to note that the U.S. Government cannot fund this proposal, but review the Department,s efforts to encourage private sector funding. Boeing/Turkish Airlines: ----------------------- 8. (Sbu) In the coming weeks the GOT is expected to decide on whether state-owned Turkish Airlines (THY) will purchase a fleet of Boeing or Airbus aircraft. Boeing has submitted a proposal to supply thirty-six addtional Boeing 737NG and five Boeing 777 aircraft to THY. State, Commerce, the Embassy and Eximbank have all actively supported the Boeing proposal, including letters from Secretary Evans to Finance Minister Unakitan and Transport Minister Yildirim. USG support of the project, one of Boeing's largest this year, is crucial. Though Unakitan and Yildirim, rather than Babacan, have the lead on the procurement decision, USG officials could usefully press the message to Babacan that the GOT should make its decision based only on the merits of the proposals. U.S. Financial Agreement: ------------------------ 9. (Sbu) Bilateral discussions on a possible amendment to the $8.5 billion Financial Agreement continue to move very slowly, with post having passed MFA U/S Ziyal the U.S.'s latest proposal in late March. With no pressing need for the money right now, and the domestic political sensitivity of the political/military conditionality, the GOT seems to be in no hurry on this issue. Post recommends USG officials not press Babacan on this issue, to avoid appearing to be urging the GOT to take our money. Recommended Talking Points: -------------------------- --Congratulations on the Seventh Review and your recent macroeconomic success. Urge you to avoid complacency and use the opportunity to move aggressively on reforms. --Privatization in general, and state bank privatization, in particular, seem to be moving slowly. A "positive surprise" to the markets on this issue could generate growth and spur Foreign Direct Investment. --Whatever you decide about the post-2004 IMF role, their expertise and credibility with markets could help Turkey's reform program. In particular, there is a risk that senior officials' public statements about the IMF could be counterproductive, by rattling markets. --While applauding your Government's high-profile encouragement of Foreign Investment, we cannot help noting that there has been no tangible action on the many U.S. business problem cases. Fixing some of these cases is the best way to change the perception in the U.S. business community about Turkey. --Understand that Boeing has submitted a proposal to THY to supply up to thirty-six Boeing 737NG and up to five Boeing 7877 aircraft. These U.S.-manufactured aircraft are well known for their superior technical and commercial value, state-of-the-art technology and unparalleled reliability. This is an important issue for us and I encourage the Turkish government to make its procurement decision based upon the merits of the competing proposals. If asked: --Given that the conditionality in the Financial Agreement is in the law, the U.S. Administration is not in a position to alter the substance of the conditions. We hope the latest language we offered Undersecretary Ziyal is a formula that the GOT will find acceptable. EDELMAN
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