US embassy cable - 04TEGUCIGALPA874

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HONDURAS SEEKS BETTER INFORMATION SHARING AS TREPIDATION RISES AMID ONGOING VIOLENCE IN IRAQ

Identifier: 04TEGUCIGALPA874
Wikileaks: View 04TEGUCIGALPA874 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Tegucigalpa
Created: 2004-04-16 03:10:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PREL MOPS MARR IZ HO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 000874 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA, WHA/PPC, AND WHA/CEN 
STATE FOR PM, PM/RSAT, AND PM/PMAT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2014 
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, IZ, HO 
SUBJECT: HONDURAS SEEKS BETTER INFORMATION SHARING AS 
TREPIDATION RISES AMID ONGOING VIOLENCE IN IRAQ 
 
REF: A. USDAO TEGUCIGALPA IIR 68419867 04 
     B. TEGUCIGALPA 858 
     C. SECSTATE 83947 
     D. SECSTATE 80156 
     E. SECSTATE 79427 
     F. WARSAW 1011 
     G. TEGUCIGALPA 804 
     H. SECSTATE 74537 
     I. TEGUCIGALPA 782 
     J. TEGUCIGALPA 642 (ALL NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Francisco Palmieri; 
reasons 1.4 (a), (b), and (d). 
 
1. (U) This is an action request; please see paragraph 9. 
 
2. (S) Summary:  Trepidation in Honduras continues to rise 
amid press reports that U.S. troops are preparing an assault 
on the city of Najaf, Iraq, to arrest and/or kill Muqtaba al 
Sadr and put an end to the armed uprising by his militia. 
The 369 Honduran troops that make up Task Force Xatruch 
remain primarily confined to their immediate surroundings on 
the outskirts of Najaf.  The Government of Honduras has 
stated that they will not/not participate in any type of 
offensive combat operations.  On April 14, Honduran Minister 
of Defense (MOD) Federico Breve announced publicly that 
Honduran troops would be withdrawn from Iraq if the situation 
becomes intolerable, but that for now Honduras would stay the 
course.  He stated that essential information regarding 
events in Iraq is not reaching the GOH.  Please see paragraph 
9 for action request from MOD Breve.  End Summary 
 
3. (C) Trepidation with the Government of Honduras (GOH) and 
the Honduran populace continues to rise amid reports that 
U.S. troops remain poised to strike Najaf in an effort to 
kill and/or arrest Muqtaba al Sadr and end the armed uprising 
by his militia.  While the GOH announced that Honduran troops 
will not participate in any offensive combat missions, the 
GOH remains nervous about the prospect of Honduran 
casualties, particularly since polls consistently indicate 
that over 70 percent of the general public remains 
substantially opposed to Honduras' participation in Operation 
Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  MOD Breve also stated on April 14, that 
Honduras would withdrawal its troops from Iraq if the 
situation becomes intolerable, but reiterated that for now 
Honduras would stay the course. (Comment:  Any significant 
Honduran casualties related to a U.S. offensive in Najaf 
would probably result in widespread domestic calls for an 
immediate withdrawal of Honduran troops from Iraq, placing 
intense political pressure on President Ricardo Maduro. End 
Comment.) 
 
4. (SBU) At the request of the National Congress, during the 
week of April 19, MOD Breve is scheduled to deliver a brief 
on the events unfolding in Iraq to the legislative body. 
President of the National Congress, Porfirio "Pepe" Lobo, has 
generally been supportive of the troop deployment, but since 
violence erupted around Najaf, he has begun to back away 
publicly from his previous stance.  Embassy expects MOD Breve 
to assure Congress, in keeping with the congressional 
authorization to participate in OIF, that Honduran forces 
will not participate in offensive combat operations and that 
the GOH's mission in Iraq will remain limited to humanitarian 
and reconstruction operations.  In keeping with this 
commitment, Honduran troops currently remain confined to 
patrolling their immediate surroundings.  (Comment:  On 
numerous occasions the GOH has indicated that Honduras would 
not participate in offensive combat operations.  Honduran 
troops are neither trained nor equipped for a combat role. 
End Comment.) 
 
5. (C) MOD Breve privately stated to EmbOffs serious 
reservations regarding unfolding events in the Najaf area. 
He indicated that although Honduran forces in Iraq have tried 
to get information regarding upcoming U.S. operations in the 
Najaf area through the regular chain of command, essential 
tactical information regarding planned operations has not/not 
been shared with the Honduran Armed Forces (HOAF).  MOD Breve 
is concerned that Honduran troops near Najaf do not have 
sufficient force protection and are vulnerable, particularly 
should U.S. forces launch offensive operations there.  He 
added that Honduran troops lack sufficient force protection 
material to construct an adequate defensive perimeter.  MOD 
Breve had phoned DCM several times during the Holy Week 
holidays for updates on the situation in Najaf, following 
local press report of a U.S. withdrawal from the city.  DCM 
related the most recent information he had received from 
CENTCOM. 
 
6. (C) MOD Breve also informed EmbOffs that while he 
understands that the anticipated June 30 handover of power to 
the Iraqi Governing Coalition is a sensitive diplomatic 
issue, the GOH has no idea how that will effect Honduras' 
role in Iraq.  He mentioned that President Maduro has sought 
information from him on this transition phase, but to date, 
has been unable to generate any answers.  MOD Breve 
reiterated to PolCouns that he is not looking for a detailed 
roadmap, but that he would like a sense of the U.S.'s 
strategic approach on the issue in order to adequately 
prepare for a change in Honduran policy toward Iraq, should 
that become necessary. 
 
7. (C) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Jose 
Isaias Barahona told EmbOffs that if Honduras were to further 
participate in OIF, a decision would have to be made by May 1 
in order to allow sufficient time to adequately prepare for a 
third deployment.  He also noted to PolCouns that Honduras 
has yet to be approached formally by the U.S. as to whether 
the U.S. wants Honduras' continued participation in OIF. 
(Comment:  Although the HOAF has indicated an initial 
willingness to continue in Iraq (refs F & I), recent unrest 
in the Najaf area has somewhat dampened this interest (ref A). 
 
8. (U) The Honduran press has reported that Task Force 
Xatruch's compound near Najaf has come under six different 
mortar attacks, but, so far, no injuries or damage has been 
sustained.  In remarks to the press, the Honduran commander 
in Iraq, Colonel Wilfredo Calderon Canales, has stated that 
contrary to some local press reports, only one Honduran has 
been injured in the latest outbreak of violence and none have 
been taken hostage.  He also told the press that the 
situation around Najaf was returning to normal. 
 
9. (S) Action Request for WHA/PM:  Embassy requests guidance 
on how to respond to the following issues raised by MOD 
Breve: (a) what are U.S. strategic designs for Task Force 
Xatruch and Battalion Plus Ultra in the run up to, and after, 
the June 30 transfer of power; (b) what role does the U.S. 
anticipate for Honduran forces in Najaf if different from the 
current mission; and, (c) should the Embassy seek an 
extension of Honduran participation in OIF?  Embassy notes 
that refs C, D, E, H address security conditions and violence 
in Iraq, but requests that more detailed information be 
provided to further inform the GOH of events directly 
affecting their troops in Najaf. 
 
10. (C) Comment: Embassy notes that Honduras has more troops 
in Iraq than NATO allies such as Norway, Portugal, and the 
Czech Republic and that the GOH has steadfastly supported 
U.S. efforts in Iraq.  While President Maduro remains deeply 
concerned about the political ramifications of Honduran 
casualties in Iraq (ref B), and it appears unlikely the GOH 
will seek Congressional authorization for a third deployment, 
a window of opportunity continues to exist if the U.S. is 
prepared to act quickly.  The passage April 15 of the 
Honduran-drafted UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) 
resolution on Cuba gives the GOH a victory and is a setback 
to President Maduro's political opponents in the short-term. 
End Comment 
 
11. (U) Minimize considered. 
PALMER 

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