US embassy cable - 04AMMAN2881

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 002881 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2014 
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, IS, US, JO 
SUBJECT: MUASHER SEEKS CLARIFICATION ON POINTS FROM 
PRESIDENT'S EXCHANGE WITH SHARON ON GAZA 
 
REF: STATE 84066 
 
Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.5 (b) (d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (S)  Foreign Minister Muasher told the Charge April 15 
that the President's April 14 statement with Israeli PM 
Sharon on the Gaza disengagement plan in essence closes off 
negotiations on return of refugees, kills the Arab peace 
initiative, attempts to change the status of the West Bank 
and Gaza from occupied to disputed territory, and prejudges 
the boundaries of a future Palestinian state.  Muasher asked 
for public clarification from the U.S. on these points. 
Muasher was upset that the President's exchange with Sharon 
did not take into account the key points Jordanians made 
during recent consultations with the U.S., particularly on 
the need for only "minor" adjustments to the 1967 cease-fire 
line as a future border.  END SUMMARY 
 
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CHARGE:  GAZA DISENGAGEMENT AN OPPORTUNITY 
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2.  (S)  Charge and PolCouns delivered to Foreign Minister 
Marwan Muasher April 15 ref points on Israel's Gaza 
disengagement plan and the exchange of letters between the 
President and PM Sharon.  Charge emphasized that an Israeli 
withdrawal from Gaza and some West Bank settlements 
represents a strategic opportunity to leverage progress 
toward the President's vision of a two-state solution via the 
roadmap.  The President also had made clear that final status 
issues were for the parties to negotiate, but that certain 
realities would have to be taken into account. 
 
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MUASHER:  "IT'S TERRIBLE" 
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3.  (S)  Muasher said he had read the exchange of letters 
between the President and Sharon very carefully, and was 
still upset.  "You say that you are not prejudging the 
outcome (of final status negotiations), but you are," he 
declared.  Muasher said that it would be impossible for him 
or other moderate Arabs to defend this policy either with the 
Arab street or in the Arab Summit meeting.  Jordan, he said, 
had issued a mild statement -- "neither positive nor 
negative" -- only because the King is due in Washington next 
week.  The exchange of letters, he argued, closes off 
negotiations on refugees, rejects the Arab Beirut Summit 
initiative, asserts that the West Bank and Gaza are "disputed 
territories," and prejudges the borders of a future 
Palestinian state. 
 
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NEED CLARIFICATION 
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4.  (S)  Addressing the specifics of the letters, Muasher 
said that the U.S. reference to the 1949 armistice lines -- 
rather than the 1967 cease-fire line -- endorsed the Israeli 
assertion that the West Bank and Gaza are "disputed" not 
"occupied" territories.  He asked that the U.S. publicly 
clarify this point.  Jordan received in 1991, Muasher stated, 
a letter from then-Secretary of State James Baker stating 
that the USG considered the West Bank and Gaza to be occupied 
territories, and that the U.S. would not prejudge the outcome 
of final status negotiations.  "Is this now obsolete?  Do 
American commitments have time limits?" 
 
5.  (S)  Muasher said the sentence in the President's letter 
pledging the U.S. to "do its utmost to prevent any attempt by 
anyone to impose any other plan" kills the Beirut Summit 
initiative.  Muasher said that, before the April 14 White 
House statements, there had been agreement to hold an Arab 
League Summit in Tunis May 8-9, "but I'm not sure there will 
be a Summit now."  The Charge responded that the sentence in 
the President's letter referred not to the Arab initiative, 
which is completely consistent with the roadmap, but to any 
attempt to impose a plan other than the President's two-state 
solution.  Muasher said that, if the sentence is not meant to 
discourage the Arab initiative, the U.S. needed to make an 
explicit public statement to that effect to counter 
misperception. 
 
6.  (S)  Muasher argued that the U.S. also needs to define 
exactly what territorial concessions it anticipates in the 
West Bank.  "We need to know that you will not accept a 
Palestinian state on 50 percent of the West Bank."  Such a 
rump state would be untenable, and would kill any possibility 
of a viable two-state solution.  He said he feared that 
Sharon had just won a diplomatic coup, achieving with the 
President's assurances two statements he had made to King 
Abdullah at their last meeting in Israel:  "no to the Arab 
initiative, and no to the roadmap." 
COMMENT 
7.  (S)  Muasher was agitated by the substance of the 
exchange of letters and seemed to be overreaching -- 
especially with his fear that the letters eclipsed the Arab 
initiative.  He was also upset that Jordanian efforts had not 
led to more significant textual changes -- particularly the 
insertion of the words "limited" or "minor" in references to 
deviations from the 1967 line.  Despite Muasher's initial 
negative reaction, he and King Abdullah can be expected to 
try to put the best spin possible from their perspective on 
the President's exchange with Sharon during the King's U.S. 
trip next week. 
 
Visit Embassy Amman's classified website at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/ 
 
or access the site through the State Department's SIPRNET 
home page. 
HALE