US embassy cable - 04CARACAS1270

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CHAVEZ LOSING SUPPORT AMIDST SHIFT IN VOTER MOOD.

Identifier: 04CARACAS1270
Wikileaks: View 04CARACAS1270 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Caracas
Created: 2004-04-15 12:17:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PHUM KDEM VE
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 001270 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, VE 
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ LOSING SUPPORT AMIDST SHIFT IN VOTER MOOD. 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ABELARDO A. ARIAS FOR REASONS 1.4 (D 
) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (SBU) A poll and a focus group study on Venezuelan 
politics published at the end of March highlighted President 
Hugo Chavez' job approval rating falling from 44% to 36%. The 
poll suggests that the National Electoral Council,s handling 
of the signature verification process for the Presidential 
recall referendum may be costing Chavez support. The focus 
group study shows growing frustration with the opposition 
leaders, and a desire on all sides for a more inclusive 
politics, aimed at forging national unity, solving future 
problems, and preventing instability. The poll was done by an 
American consulting firm for a group of Chavez opponents. An 
Argentine consultant, working under the auspices of the 
National Democratic Institute, did the focus groups. END 
SUMMARY 
 
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Chavez losing support 
--------------------- 
 
2.  (C) U.S. consultants Greenberg, Quinlan and Rosner 
Research, working for a group of Venezuelans opposed to 
President Hugo Chavez, polled 1,000 likely voters in the 
middle of March. Mark Feierstien briefed the Ambassador on 
the results of the poll on March 27. PolOff obtained 
additional poll information reported here separately on the 
condition it not be disseminated broadly. (Please protect.) 
 
3.  (C) The poll shows that President Chavez, approval 
numbers have declined from 51% opposed-44% in favor in 
October to 60% opposed-36% in favor now. Additionally, the 
percentage of the population willing to vote in favor of a 
presidential recall has risen from 52% in October to 62% now, 
while those who would vote against has dropped from 42% to 
31%. 52% of those polled declared they had voted for Chavez 
in 2000. March,s negative numbers closely resemble those of 
summer 2003, when Chavez, support was at its lowest. 62% of 
respondents disapprove of how Chavez is handling the economy, 
while 37% approve. In the government,s handling of crime, 
71% disapprove and 27% approve. This is significant, as 57% 
of respondent's said unemployment was one of their top 
concerns, and 34% put crime at the top, both far above any 
other factor. 
 
--------------------- 
CNE line backfiring? 
--------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Overall support for the CNE has also declined since 
October from 63% to 40%, with disapproval rising from 24% to 
56%. When asked why the CNE had ruled against the validity of 
so many signatures, 64% of those polled said it was for 
political reasons, while 31% said it was for technical 
reasons. There is a strong correlation between respondent,s 
evaluation of the nature of the CNE,s decision, and their 
intention to vote in a recall referendum. This suggests 
Chavez, perceived intervention in the process may be 
alienating voters. 
 
---------------------------- 
Referendum still has support 
---------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) The Greenberg poll shows 60% of respondents continue 
to favor the recall process, while 30% think Venezuelans 
should give up. A close correlation exists with the 58% who 
fear the failure of the process will lead to violence and 
instability, and the 30% who think things will settle down if 
the process fails. The OAS and Carter Center enjoy the 
support of 69% of those polled, while 25% disapprove. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Little support for anti-US rhetoric 
----------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) 70% of those polled blamed the Venezuelan government 
for the poor state of U.S.-Venezuelan relations, while 76% 
disagreed with President Chavez' threat not to sell oil to 
the U.S. General attitudes about the U.S. were divided, 
 
according to a part of the poll that measured feelings 
towards various institutions and leaders. The lowest levels 
of support were for members of the government such as Vice 
President Jose Vicente Rangel, CNE President Francisco 
Carrasquero, Supreme Court Ivan Justice Rincon, and former 
Infrastructure Minister Diosdado Cabello. 
 
--------------------------- 
Shift in political culture? 
--------------------------- 
 
7.  (U) Caracas daily El Universal reported April 4 the 
results of Graciela Romer & Associates focus group study 
conducted in February 2003. (Romer has been conducting the 
focus groups under the auspices of the National Democratic 
Institute) The study shows signs of an easing of political 
tensions, and demands for a more inclusive politics, capable 
of bringing the nation together, and solving problems. There 
was a recognition that the present government,s anti-poverty 
agenda was legitimate, and worth saving, and a recognition 
that whatever the outcome of the referendum process, the 
Chavistas are here to stay. 
 
8.  (U) Those questioned seemed increasingly worried, as the 
prospect of an actual referendum grew, of the likely 
long-term result. They stressed the need for the next 
government to have real solutions to the problems of the 
country, and for there to be some way of including the 
political losers of the process in the future political 
consensus. The zero sum game of pro or anti Chavez politics 
is seen by many participants as a dangerous fantasy, which 
fails to account for he fact that both positions have 
entrenched supporters. 
 
9.  (SBU) The Romer study indicates there may be a political 
center space in public opinion that is currently not 
represented in the political leadership of the opposition, 
the government, or the media. (In the poll, 44% of 
respondents identified with no political party.) Opposition 
supporters and independents recognized the value of some of 
the government,s anti-poverty programs, and its political 
mobilization of the country. Meanwhile supporters of the 
President acknowledge corruption and intolerance in the 
government. The study points to an increasing desire for 
national unity, and a tolerant inclusive dialogue on both 
parts. 
 
10.  (U) The focus groups saw the referendum as an 
opportunity to resolve the political impasse peacefully . The 
referendum was not, however, seen as a panacea. Many viewed 
the opposition with suspicion, as having too many links to 
the past, and being unable to present any vision of the 
future beyond getting rid of Chavez. The danger of the 
referendum simply reversing the roles of the opposition and 
the Chavistas, but not stabilizing the political situation, 
worried many of the focus group participants on both sides of 
the political divide. 
 
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COMMENT 
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11.  (C) The two studies reinforce one another. The GQR study 
indicates Chavez is being punished for undermining the 
referendum and exacerbating polarization since the signature 
verification process started. The Romer study suggests that 
the opposition is failing to generate strong positive support 
among the public, due to its inability to produce a unified 
positive and inclusive message, and the dominant position of 
political holdovers from the pre-Chavez era. The two studies 
are the only measures of public opinion we've seen so far 
this year. They present an important snapshot of the 
political situation as Venezuelans continue to toil to find a 
peaceful solution to the country's political impasse. 
SHAPIRO 
 
 
NNNN 
 
      2004CARACA01270 - CONFIDENTIAL 

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