US embassy cable - 04COLOMBO644

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000644 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, INR/NESA; NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
PLEASE PASS TOPEC 
 
E.O. 12958:    DECL:  04-15-14 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT:  In meeting, Norwegian Ambassador reviews 
recent discussion with President on peace process 
 
Refs:  Colombo 637, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. 
Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Norway expects a formal request from 
the GSL to continue its role as peace facilitator. 
Norwegians think the new Sri Lankan Government needs to 
realize it cannot make unilateral decisions on the 
course of the peace process.  No "Peace Team" in place 
yet.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar briefed 
Ambassador April 14 on the conversation he and Sri Lanka 
Monitoring Mission (SLMM) Chief Furuhovde had with 
President Chandrika Kumaratunga late evening of April 
10, following the delayed swearing-in of the new 
cabinet.  The meeting also took place as fighting 
between forces of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) chief Prabhakaran and breakaway leader Karuna was 
ongoing, before the collapse of Karuna's rebellion (see 
Reftels).  Brattskar said that the President complained 
that LTTE actions were a violation of the Ceasefire 
Agreement (CFA) and seemed to want the SLMM to do 
something immediately.  Brattskar explained that the CFA 
set out a procedure, and that the GSL would have to make 
a formal complaint to the SLMM, which would then 
investigate and make a judgment. 
 
3.  (C) The President said that she desired to restart 
the peace talks as soon as possible.  Brattskar said 
that he told the President that when the previous 
government took power, it had formally requested the 
Norwegians to continue their facilitation role.  Norway 
expected to receive such a request from the new 
government, with a description of what it expected 
Norway to do.  The President was surprised at this. 
Brattskar then said that he explained to the President 
that neither the GSL nor the LTTE could make unilateral 
decisions about the talks.  The two sides would have to 
agree to any decisions.  Brattskar told Ambassador (but 
not the President) that the Norwegians, and Deputy 
Foreign Minister Helgesen in particular, were disturbed 
by an interview which new Foreign Minister Kadirgamar 
had given to a local newspaper a few days ago in which 
he had made several categorical statements, such as that 
any new rounds of talks would be held only in Sri Lanka, 
not in foreign locations, and also laying out what he 
thought Norway's role would be.  Brattskar said that any 
such decisions would have to be agreed by both sides and 
should be discussed privately, not in the press.  He 
also expressed unease about statements by both 
Kadirgamar and new Prime Minister Rajapakse that India 
would have a new, and prominent, role to play in the 
peace process.  Again, this was something both sides 
would need to agree on. 
 
4.  (C) Alluding to the then-ongoing LTTE infighting, 
the President told Brattskar that she thought peace 
talks only succeeded when one side negotiated from a 
clear position of strength.  (This position is probably 
made moot by Karuna's collapse.)  Brattskar discussed 
with her a number of different peace processes, but said 
he did not think the LTTE could be pressurized in that 
way.  He told Ambassador that it reminded him of the 
strategy the President had followed in the mid-90s of 
"War for Peace," which had ended disastrously. 
 
5.  (C) Brattskar said it was also clear that the 
President had not yet put together a "Peace Team" to 
conduct the negotiations.  She told him she would keep 
the current Peace Secretariat, but change some of its 
personnel.  She did say that current Foreign Secretary 
and also Peace Secretariat Head Bernard Goonetilleke 
would be removed from both jobs. 
6.  (C) COMMENT:  The charitable view of this is that 
the new Government was unaware of the ways in which the 
Peace Process has changed and become formalized over the 
past two years, and will adjust to new realities.  If it 
does not, and tries to make unilateral changes and 
decisions, there could be a rough road ahead.  The 
Norwegians, no doubt feeling a bit buffeted by criticism 
of their role during the election campaign, are perhaps 
being over-sensitive.  Nonetheless, they have made a 
useful point to the President that their role cannot 
just be taken for granted. 
 
7.  (C) COMMENT (Continued):  No one doubts the 
President's commitment to peace.  What remains 
questionable are: (1) whether she has the vision to 
understand what changes a peace settlement will entail 
for Sri Lanka and (2) whether she can deal with the 
Process in a systematic, disciplined manner.  The weak 
nature of her government, beset on peace from within by 
its JVP partners and from without by the Buddhist monks, 
will make it all the harder.  END COMMENT. 
 
8.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
LUNSTEAD