US embassy cable - 04DJIBOUTI549

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DJIBOUTI 000549 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR S/CT, PM, AF, AF/E, AF/RSA AND DS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2014 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, MASS, MARR, MOPS, MCAP, DJ 
SUBJECT: ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COUNTER TERRORISM 
FORCE IN DJIBOUTI 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR MARGUERITA D. RAGSDALE FOR REASON 
1.4 (A), (B) AND (D) 
 
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Summary 
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1. (S/NF)  Pursuant to the goals of the East Africa 
Counter-Terrorism Initiative (EACTI), U.S. Embassy Djibouti 
wishes to use its security assistance (SA) program to 
establish a national counter terrorism (CT) force within the 
Djiboutian military.  Because of multiple actors within the 
Djibouti security services, the U.S. Embassy will need to 
engage the Djiboutian Government (DJG) to designate this unit 
of focus and set a clear chain of command. 
 
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Current Situation 
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2. (S/NF)  Building host nation capacity in the area of 
counter terrorism is an extremely important component of the 
EACTI.  Djibouti currently is lacking a single national asset 
that can adequately respond to and mitigate regional 
terrorist threats.  The clear intention of the USG is to 
fight regional terrorist threats and to build regional 
stability through the programs of the EACTI. 
Programmatically, the EACTI assigns the function of CT 
capacity building in Djibouti to the Terrorist Interdiction 
Program (TIP) and the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program 
(ATA).  These programs were funded at $500K and $2.3M 
respectively.  TIP and ATA are focused on customs and 
policing functions.  While important and vital to the overall 
CT effort, TIP and ATA do not allow for the crucial 
integration of the various governmental security elements 
that perform CT roles in the Republic of Djibouti. 
 
3. (S/NF)  Past discussions with several security 
organizations in Djibouti have indicated a desire on their 
part to participate in counter-terrorism training.  This is, 
in part, because of the current national architecture of 
security operations in Djibouti.  That architecture gives 
several different organizations responsibility for the 
various national assets within the country.  The Djiboutian 
Gendarmerie, for example, has responsibility for the 
International Airport and the maritime port perimeter.  The 
Djiboutian Army has responsibility for borders.  The Coast 
Guard has responsibility for approaches to the port.  The 
Republican Guard has responsibility for the Presidency and 
the Presidential residence.  Finally, the National Police 
have responsibility for security of the port's interior and 
Djibouti's cities and towns.  Yet, past informal attempts to 
get the Djiboutian security forces to consolidate their 
counter-terrorism mission into a single force were stiffly 
rebuffed.  Instead the DJG wishes to create such a 
counter-terrorism task force comprising all the elements 
listed above. 
 
4. (S/NF)  The creation of a task force would help mitigate 
the current scattered counter terrorism responsibilities of 
existing organizations.  That said, there remain many 
problems related to the effective accomplishment of any 
action executed by a force with multiple chains of command 
and organizational lines.  For a task force concept to be 
successful, a clear chain of command and control must be 
established at the outset.  The counter terrorism task force 
chain of command need not be a permanent realignment of 
forces.  It need only be an operational chain of command that 
takes effect in the event the Djiboutian National Command 
Authority assigns a mission to the counter terrorism task 
force.  The day-to-day functions of operations and training 
can remain the responsibilities of each security service. 
 
5. (S/NF)  Additionally, there are internal political 
dynamics within the DJG that must be considered.  A delicate 
balance of power exists currently between the various 
security services within the DJG.  Each service tends to act 
as its own lobby with the President and in some cases each 
has traditional family and clan ties that remain very 
important.  Giving each service a piece of the counter 
terrorism pie would serve to preserve this delicate balance. 
 
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The Way Forward 
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6. (S/NF)  U.S. Embassy proposes to formally approach the DJG 
and request establishment of a CT Task Force with a declared 
chain of command for the employment of it.  Once 
accomplished, a training case will be funded using Foreign 
Military Financing (FMF) money provided as part of the EACTI. 
 This training case will fund the necessary training modules 
to make the Djiboutian CG Task Force an effective force. 
RAGSDALE