US embassy cable - 04YEREVAN885

C O N F I D E N T I A L YEREVAN 000885 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, AM 
SUBJECT: DEFENSE MINISTER ON DOMESTIC SITUATION 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway for reasons 1.5 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C)  Defense Minister Serzh Sargsian joined the 
Ambassador in opening a EUCOM-funded hospital renovation on 
April 14.  During the course of the event, the Ambassador had 
a 30-minute one-on-one conversation with him.  On the issue 
of the dispersal of the anti-Kocharian demonstration on April 
12, Sargsian was uncompromising.  He defended the need to 
clear the streets, and blamed the opposition for creating a 
situation in which the authorities had no other course they 
could take.  He pointed out that they had not interfered in 
the April 9 rally, nor had they acted in any way against the 
"sit-in" conducted in the square adjacent to the Opera House. 
 They also had not acted to prevent the march up Baghramian 
to the blocking point in front of the U.S. Embassy -- and had 
let the rally continue for over eight hours.  It was not, he 
argued, that the government was trying to stifle the 
opposition in expressing its views.  Rather, in his analysis, 
the opposition had deliberately and purposefully chosen to 
conduct the Baghramian demonstration because the authorities 
had not reacted to the previous demonstrations.  For their 
own purposes, he said, they needed a reaction from the 
government that would, in their concept, stimulate further 
mass support from the populace.  Sargsian charged that in 
this analysis, the opposition had been gravely mistaken: 
there was not overwhelming support for them in the 
population. 
 
2.  (C)  The Ambassador told Sargsian that it was now 
imperative to begin a dialogue with the opposition, and take 
steps to involve them in productive political activity. 
Sargsian immediately responded that the opposition was not 
interested in a dialogue.  The Ambassador said that this was 
correct, but only for now.  It was important for the 
authorities to now reduce the pressure, release detainees, 
and stop raiding political party headquarters.  If this were 
done, it would create conditions that would be conducive to 
the dialogue.  Sargsian immediately responded, "of course, we 
will do all that."  He then veered off onto charges that at 
least elements of the opposition were violent, had committed 
criminal acts, and that calls for violent overthrow of the 
President were themselves criminal acts.  The Ambassador 
again urged that the police and prosecutors not pursue the 
vast majority of opposition figures who were using 
non-violent, political means.  Although he expressed 
continuing skepticism about whether the opposition would ever 
be prepared to enter into a dialogue, he reiterated that they 
intended to follow the very course the Ambassador had 
outlined. 
 
3. (C)  Comment:  Compared to the discussion with President 
Kocharian on April 13, Sargsian was if anything more intense 
on the culpability of the opposition, and on the need for 
tough measures to counter them.  However, unlike the 
President, he gave no sign that there was any consideration 
to continuing legal actions against the opposition.  While 
Kocharian was talking in terms of lessening the pressure if 
and only if the opposition engaged with the governing 
coalition, Sargsian presented that course as a matter of fact. 
 
ORDWAY