US embassy cable - 04KUWAIT1227

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(C) SCENESETTER: DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE VISIT

Identifier: 04KUWAIT1227
Wikileaks: View 04KUWAIT1227 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kuwait
Created: 2004-04-14 04:12:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PREL MARR PTER PGOV KU IZ
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T KUWAIT 001227 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR D, NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/IR, NEA/NGA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2014 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PTER, PGOV, KU, IZ 
SUBJECT: (C) SCENESETTER:  DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE VISIT 
 
Classified By: CDA FRANK URBANCIC; REASON 1.4 (D) 
 
1.  (C) Mr. Secretary, Welcome to Kuwait.  Your visit will be 
an excellent opportunity to continue the high-level 
engagement the Kuwaitis crave, building on the excellent 
reception the Defense Minister and Foreign Minister received 
in Washington two weeks ago.  We have requested meetings with 
the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister, and the Foreign 
Minister.  The GOK is committed to its strategic partnership 
with the United States.  It understands that we continue to 
pay a price in blood to bring about the peaceful, stable, 
prosperous Iraq that it wants and needs on its border.  But 
many Kuwaitis, including the leadership, were rattled by 
recent events in Fallujah and Najaf that they feared 
suggested Iraq might be spinning out of control.  We can 
never emphasize to our Kuwaiti partners too much that the 
United States is committed to staying the course in Iraq, 
that we have a viable plan and are making progress, and that 
the GOK is a vital member of the winning team. 
 
2. (C) The liberation of Iraqi Shiites increased the 
assertiveness of Kuwait's own Shia minority (about a third of 
the citizenry), incensing hardline Kuwaiti Sunnis.  Images of 
the fighting in Fallujah galvanized some Sunnis into forming 
a "popular-parliamentary" group "to support the Iraqi people 
against the American occupation."  The spokesman of the 
Salafi Movement (which holds only three of 50 seats in the 
National Assembly) called publicly for moral and material 
support to defeat the US "enemy."  Sunnis and Shiites have 
lived amicably in recent years, but potential for tension has 
risen sufficiently of late to prompt Prime Minister Shaykh 
Sabah al-Ahmed to hold a round of meetings with Sunni, Shia, 
tribal, and other political leaders as well as 
editors-in-chief of local newspapers, warning that 
sectarianism will not be tolerated.  Reports indicate he was 
sternest with the Shia, while promising to meet some of their 
demands for more equitable treatment. 
 
3.  (S) While still under control for the time being, the 
greatest security threat we perceive in Kuwait now is from 
the few but dedicated Sunni extremists.  Some of them are 
providing material support to anti-American elements in Iraq 
with impunity, as they so far cannot be convicted of breaking 
any Kuwaiti law.  You discussed counter-terrorism cooperation 
with Foreign Minister Shaykh Dr. Mohammed al-Sabah during his 
visit this month.  It would be useful for you to reinforce 
with the Prime Minister the need for a crackdown on Sunni 
extremists. 
 
4.  (C) The AIK fuel issue remains unresolved, but the fuel 
continues to flow.  Encouragingly, the Chief of Staff of the 
Armed Forces (whose budget takes the hit in the meantime) has 
approved deployment of an additional AC-130 aircraft for 
counter-insurgency operations; earlier, he had been unwilling 
to approve further deployments pending resolution of the AIK 
fuel issue. 
 
5.  (C) The GOK bureaucracy is trying to charge port fees for 
US military shipping related to OIF, going back to April 
2003.  The total could reach $200 million.  We are working 
with higher levels of the Government to ensure that this 
demand will be withdrawn.  The Defense Cooperation Agreement 
exempts us from such charges, but it is a classified 
document, therefore most of the bureaucracy is unaware of its 
provisions.  Its release to Islamists in parliament could 
only fuel their discontent. 
 
6. (C) We expect Kuwait will not move without further goading 
on bringing the Article 98 agreement into force, simply 
because a basic tenet of its foreign policy is to avoid 
antagonizing any major power if possible, and the Europeans 
remain vocally opposed. 
 
7.  (U) On the positive side, the Council created under the 
bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement meets for 
the first time in Washington on May 6-7. 
 
8. (U) Embassy Kuwait remains heavily involved in supporting 
the Iraq mission, and anticipates a sharp increase in the 
workload associated with the transition from CPA to Embassy 
Baghdad. 
URBANCIC 

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