US embassy cable - 04BOGOTA3703

UNCLAS BOGOTA 003703 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/AND, CA/VO/F/P, CA/FPP, CA/VO/L/C 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OTRA, CMGT, CVIS, CA, CO 
SUBJECT: COOPERATION WITH CANADIAN EMBASSY IN BOGOTA ON VISA 
PROCESSING 
 
REF: 03 SECSTATE 344544 
 
1.  (U)  Summary:  Reftel recommended that posts share 
information with Canadian colleagues regarding visa 
processing, and offered a "template" for cooperation.  The 
Consular Section in Bogota has long enjoyed a close 
relationship with the Canadian Embassy in Colombia.  Using 
the ideas provided in reftel, post will work to deepen ties 
further.  End summary. 
 
2.  (U)  Reftel recommended that post schedule regular 
meetings with the Canadians and counterparts from other 
appropriate countries to discuss and analyze developments 
and trends, including fraud trends.  In 2003, post organized 
a formal "Anti-Fraud Working Group," composed of 
representatives of 22 foreign embassies in Bogota.  The 
Group meets monthly to share information regarding fraud 
trends, such as categories of applicants where fraud seems 
to be on the rise.  It is a valuable forum for "talking 
shop," such as learning the factors European countries give 
the most weight to in interviews, or how Central American 
consular officials view applicants who have either received 
or been denied for a U.S. visa.  When George Suhr, acting 
officer in charge of the DHS office in Panama, visited 
Bogota, post arranged for him to address the Group. 
 
3.  (U)  Post supplements the formal activities of the Group 
with an informal monthly consular luncheon among a subset of 
the Group's members.  These usually include representatives 
of Canada, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, Austria, 
Italy, Spain, Mexico and Japan.  The luncheons provide a 
less structured opportunity to swap visa information. 
 
4.  (SBU)  These multilateral efforts complement nearly 
daily contact between the Canadian Embassy and post's Fraud 
Prevention Unit ("FPU").  Post provides the Canadians with 
the names of persons removed from the United States or 
"turned around" at the border.  We also occasionally perform 
namechecks on applicants to the Canadian refugee program. 
The Canadians send to the Deputy Fraud Chief the names of 
applicants for refuge whose applications are likely to be 
denied.  These include a number of persons who identify 
themselves as members of terrorist organizations (i.e., the 
FARC, the ELN, or paramilitaries).  Post then reviews those 
persons in its VISAS VIPER committee.  Less dramatically, 
about 90 percent of the refugee applicants rejected by the 
Canadians have valid U.S. visas.  Seeking refugee status 
brings into question the person's continuing ability to 
overcome INA Section 214(b).  Consequently, post examines 
whether those person's visas should be revoked.  In 
addition, U.S. and Canadian officials regularly consult one 
another by telephone to verify visas or stamps in the 
passports of applicants. 
 
5.  (U)  Reftel suggested that posts "conduct reciprocal 
tours of visa operations for all newly assigned officers." 
Canadian consular officials (together with officials from 
the British Embassy) toured post's Consular Section on 
February 20, 2004.  Officials from the Mexican Embassy 
toured the Section on February 27.  Consular colleagues from 
other missions also visited the Section in 2003. 
 
6.  (U)  Reftel also suggested that posts conduct 
appropriate joint training exercises and joint interdiction 
operations.  Post will seek opportunities to implement these 
suggestions. 
 
WOOD