US embassy cable - 04KATHMANDU693

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 KATHMANDU 000693 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY 
NSC FOR MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PTER, PREL, NP, Political Parties 
SUBJECT: NEPAL:  FACEOFF BETWEEN PARTIES AND PALACE 
 
REF: A. 03 KATHMANDU 652 
 
     B. 02 KATHMANDU 838 
     C. KATHMANDU 585 
     D. KATHMANDU 612 
     E. KATHMANDU 637 
     F. KATHMANDU 651 
 
Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E.  MALINOWSKI.  REASON:  1.5 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) April traditionally is a month of political ferment 
in Nepal.  This year, with all three of the country's 
politcal actors--the parties, the King, and the Maoists--in 
apparent overdrive, promises to be particularly interesting. 
Some commentators have expressed concern that the 
anti-government actions by the parties and the Maoists seem 
to be coinciding, at least in part, thereby stepping up 
pressure from both sides on the Government of Nepal (GON) and 
the Palace. While neither the constitutional monarchy nor the 
commitment to multi-party democracy seems in danger of 
imminent collapse, the lengthy and increasingly bitter 
standoff between the Palace and the parties poses growing 
costs to the vitality of both institutions.  Popular faith in 
the monarchy and in democracy risks being steadily eroded by 
the inability and/or unwillingness of the Palace and the 
parties to resolve their differences.  Sustained, consecutive 
protests and general strikes, moreover, increase the 
potential for civil disorder and general violence, offering a 
ready avenue to Maoist provacateurs hoping to polarize 
further the constitutional forces.  Despite these obvious 
dangers, we see little sign of compromise from either the 
King or the political leaders.  The Ambassador's upcoming 
round of farewell calls offers an excellent opportunity for 
him to underscore to them the urgency of the situation and 
the need for an immediate resolution.   End summary. 
 
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SEASONAL POLITICS 
------------------ 
 
2.  (U) April traditionally is a month of political ferment 
in Nepal, primarily for meteorological, rather than 
ideological, reasons.  Protests are almost a springtime 
ritual here, and the scent of spring flowers in the air is 
typically accompanied by the smell of burning tires, as the 
warmer, pre-monsoon weather draws various groups out into the 
streets to vent assorted grievances.  For example, in April 
2003 student groups aligned with the major political parties 
launched a series of nationwide protests and strikes against 
petroleum price hikes.  Some of the protests turned violent; 
one student was killed when police fired on stone-throwing 
students (Ref A).  Later in the month, nationwide general 
strikes, or "bandhs," called by competing student groups 
paralyzed business, closed schools and halted transportation 
repeatedly (April 20; April 23; April 28; and April 29).  The 
previous year the Maoists staged a five-day bandh (April 
23-27) that effectively shut down the country for much of its 
duration (Ref B).  April also proved the most critical month 
in the 1990 pro-democracy movement; a series of protests that 
killed dozens culminated in then-King Birendra's decision to 
lift the ban on political parties on April 9. 
 
3.  (U) This April promises to be especially active, with all 
three of Nepal's political forces--King Gyanendra, democratic 
parties, and Maoist insurgents--apparently planning to take 
full advantage.  The King just completed a 17-day program of 
visits to provincial capitals all over the country (Ref C); 
the five parties agitating against the King have pledged to 
continue the "decisive" protest launched April 1 (Ref D); and 
the Maoists enforced, through their customary intimidation 
and violence, a three-day general strike April 6-8 (Ref E). 
(Note:  The agitating parties have launched approximately 35 
such "decisive" protests against the Palace since September 
2002.  End note.)  Although protests and political 
grandstanding historically are more common in April than in 
other months, some commentators have expressed concern that 
the anti-government actions by the parties and the Maoists 
seem to be coinciding, thereby stepping up pressure from both 
sides on the Government of Nepal (GON) and the Palace.  On 
April 2, for example, Maoist leader Prachanda issued a press 
statement welcoming the "initiatives and efforts taken by the 
five political parties" and claiming "a historic 
responsibility" for "all real patriots and democrats to 
defeat the feudalistic and despotic system" of monarchy.  The 
parties, however, so far have not issued a reciprocal welcome 
to the Maoist statement.  Nepali Congress (NC) President and 
frequent Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala publicly 
dismissed the possibility of joining hands with the 
insurgents unless they renounce violence. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
NEPALI DEMOCRACY:  DELAYED DEVELOPMENT 
--------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) Nepal's young democracy has experienced some 
painful and severe delays in its development.  The nation has 
had as many democratic prime ministers (14) as actual years 
of democracy--a reflection of the constant in-fighting, 
persistent jockeying for advantage, and deep-rooted aversion 
to cooperation and compromise that most observers consider 
characteristic of the political leadership.  The popular 
perception is that democracy--at least as it is practiced in 
Nepal--has failed to satisfy popular expectations of improved 
living standards, more evenly distributed socio-economic 
development, and a more equitable and efficient 
administration of justice.  While these expectations may be 
unrealistic--Nepalis tend to compare their democracy with the 
U.S. and France, rather than more appropriate regional 
examples like Sri Lanka or Bangladesh--the pervasive sense of 
disillusionment nonetheless is quite real.  That said, most 
Nepalis seem to identify deficiencies in individual political 
leaders, rather than deficiencies in democracy as a system of 
government, as responsible for the shortfall.  Despite 
rampant criticism of the political parties' stewardship of 
democracy over the past decade, most sources indicate an 
overwhelming preference for democracy over any other form of 
government--an "I love democracy; it's the democratic leaders 
I can't stand" attitude. 
 
5.  (SBU)  While growing pains can be expected in any young 
democracy, Nepal, sadly, has had little grace period to 
develop the institutions needed to nurture this relatively 
new system of government.  More than half of Nepal's age span 
as a democracy has been overshadowed by the insurgency. 
Eight years of Maoist violence against grassroots party 
activists and government officials has helped create a vacuum 
at the local level that leaves many Nepalis in rural areas 
with no democratic alternative to a "people's government 
imposed through fear and intimidation.  In cities where party 
networks remain strong,  internal party structures have not 
matured into truly democratic organizations that encourage 
breadth of vision, allow dissent, and award leadership roles 
to those demonstrating talent and genuine popular appeal. 
Instead, the parties are dominated by powerful individuals in 
tight control of all decision-making and promotions.  In this 
system, advancement within the party hierarchy depends upon 
loyalty, longevity and family, rather than talent, 
intelligence or political acumen.  Party Central Committees 
function primarily as rubber stamps for the leaders' fiats, 
and dissenters are routinely suspended from the party.  Thus, 
ironically, after struggling for decades against the feudal, 
hidebound hierarchy of the Palace, the democratic parties 
have created autocratic fiefdoms of their own, perpetuating 
the same systems of patronage and privilege they had 
criticized in the royals. 
 
 
------------------------------- 
BANDHS AND BURNING EFFIGIES: 
LIMITED POST-DEMOCRATIC APPEAL 
------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C)  The parties' hierarchical structure leaves them 
largely ignorant of popular concerns and, consequently, 
largely unable to frame a vision for Nepal's future that 
resonates with the electorate.  Instead of developing a 
thoughtful, broad-based platform, the parties are reverting 
to the same old limited bag of tricks--protests/general 
strikes/more protests--in a bid to gain popular support for 
their movement.  The parties's hope that the current 
agitation will regenerate the fervor and spontaneous mass 
support of the 1990 pro-democracy movement, however, has not 
been realized for a variety of reasons.  First, the failure 
to broaden their message makes the agitation appear to the 
general public suspiciously similar to the same old 
self-interesed power struggles the parties have subjected the 
electorate to for more than a decade.  Second, in 1990 
democracy was a great and glamorous "unknown" that average 
Nepalis hoped would bring them higher living standards and 
greater security--a hope that all too plainly has not been 
met.  Third, the overwhelming concern for most 
Nepalis--especially those outside the capital--is the 
insurgency.  Battered by Maoist strikes and violence on one 
side, they have little appetite for pro-democracy strikes and 
violence on the other.  Moreover, since the insurgency began 
under the not-so watchful eye of the same democratic leaders 
now clamoring to be returned to power, there is little public 
optimism that they have suddenly acquired the wisdom and 
ability needed to resolve the crisis.  While the parties seem 
unable to persuade the public of their ability to govern, 
they are even less adept at making the case to the King.  The 
intermittent calls for a republic that punctuate some of the 
protests--and which none of the democratic leaders has 
formally endorsed--likely reflect more frustration at the 
protests' lack of success--and their own failure of 
imagination in devising other means to drum up support--than 
a genuine wish to abolish the monarchy. 
 
------------------------- 
RELATIONS WITH MILITARY: 
A KEY CONSTRAINT 
------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) The Palace's use of the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) to 
attempt to suppress the pro-democracy movement in 1990 has 
had important and lasting repercussions.  Strained, mutually 
suspicious relations persist between party leaders, many of 
whom were imprisoned, harassed or in exile during the 
struggle, and the Army.  Unfortuantely, the advent of 
democracy has done little to ameliorate this situation.  The 
1991 Constitution gave the democratically elected Prime 
Minister and his Cabinet oversight over all vital Government 
organs with one important exception--the Royal Nepal Army 
(RNA).  Although the Constitution gives the Prime Minister, 
as a member of the National Defense Council, nominal 
authority over the RNA, the King, as Supreme Commander, 
retains power over its mobilization and deployment.  (Note: 
Former Prime Minister and NC President G.P. Koirala claims 
the King rejected his request to deploy the RNA against the 
Maoists in July 2001.  The King later mobilized the 
Army--under a different PM--after Maoists attacked RNA 
installations four months later.  End note.)  While this 
separation of powers has kept the RNA insulated from Nepal's 
turbulent, bitterly partisan democratic politics, it has also 
inhibited the development of cordial relationships, based on 
trust and mutual interest, between the civilian and military 
leadership.  Whether fairly or not, most politicians remain 
deeply skeptical of the RNA's commitment to democracy, while 
many senior Army officers are just as skeptical of the 
politicians' commitment to governing in the national interest. 
 
------------------------------- 
GYANENDRA THE "ACTIVE" MONARCH 
------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C)  Poor governance, corruption, incompetence and 
self-absorption have clearly cost the political leadership 
much popular support over the past few years.  But the 
parties' declining popularity does not necessarily translate 
into popular support for the monarchy, especially as an 
alternative to democracy.  Just as the Nepali public seems to 
support democracy in principle--if not individual democratic 
leaders--so too do they seem to support constitutional 
monarchy as an institution--even if their views of this 
particular king are somewhat more ambivalent.  The traumatic 
circumstances under which Gyanendra acceded to the throne in 
June 2001--following the assassination of his brother by the 
Crown Prince, who then killed nine other members of the royal 
family, including himself--have altered most Nepalis' 
traditional reverence for the monarchy as sacrosanct and 
inviolable.  The prospect of Gyanendra's infamous son Paras 
as the next king, moreover, does little to refurbish the 
monarchy's bloodied image.  (Note:  Paras' involvement in two 
vehicular homicides while intoxicated (in 1997 and 2000)--for 
which he is shielded from prosecution by the 
Constitution--continues to provoke popular resentment. 
Although he has not killed anyone lately, his behavior is 
reportedly just as worrisome as ever, despite the King's best 
efforts to rehabilitate his son's image.  End note.) 
 
 
9.  (C)  Many Kathmandu insiders claim that Gyanendra had 
shown anti-democratic tendencies long before he became king 
and had been critical of his older brother, the late King 
Birendra, for yielding to the 1990 pro-democracy movement. 
It is difficult to determine to what degree these comments 
are colored by hindsight and to what degree they reflect 
actual reality, but Gyanendra's actions and statements since 
ascending the throne suggest some truth to these allegations. 
 After replacing the democratically elected government of 
then-Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba with his own royally 
appointed Cabinet, the King has consistently failed to make 
sincere overtures to the parties to resolve the impasse. 
Instead, he has used his public appearances and statements to 
castigate the parties' past bad governance and portray 
himself as the true defender of democratic values.  These 
harsh, often personalized attacks narrow the ground available 
on which the Palace can build future compromises with the 
parties and raise serious questions about the King's 
oft-repeated commitment to seeking a resolution to the 
impasse.  More recently, the Palace has highlighted the 
King's 17-day visit to district capitals to tout an image of 
a concerned and benevolent monarch--in tacit but pointed 
contrast to the democratic leaders' own past neglect of these 
remote areas.  But the large turnout at these these 
provincial "felicitation ceremonies," extensively covered by 
the state-owned press, is a better measure of the level of 
desperation in these remote areas than a valid indicator of 
the King's popularity.  Curiosity and a lack of other forms 
of diversion or occupation--the local population cannot 
venture into the Maoist-affected no-man's land outside the 
district headquarters and is more or less a captive 
audience--likely account for most of the turnout.  GON 
efforts to portray the crowds as demonstrations of public 
preference for the monarch only serve to antagonize further 
the political parties. 
--------- 
COMMENT 
--------- 
 
10.  (C) The wrangling between the parties and the Palace is 
all the more unseemly when viewed against the backdrop of an 
increasingly violent insurgency.  The Maoists are obviously 
benefiting from the prolonged impasse; as long as the parties 
and Palace are fighting each other the counterinsurgency 
effort will be weakened.  The parties' poor performance over 
the last decade has already diminished public confidence in 
their capabilities; an "active" King that cannot resolve the 
crisis either runs the same risk of tarnishing his image. 
For now most Nepalis seem to be questioning the personal 
abilities of their democratic leaders and their monarch, 
rather than the institutions of democracy and monarchy 
themselves.  If the stalemate persists, however, this view 
may change.  The failure of the constitutional forces to 
resolve their differences in the interests of the nation over 
the past month can do more to undermine popular faith in 
multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy than all the 
Maoist propaganda of the past eight years.  The sporadic 
calls for a republic notwithstanding, we believe the parties 
realize this and would welcome the chance to work out an 
accommodation with the Palace.  The King, on the other hand, 
should realize that he needs the parties' support to procure 
a workable political settlement to the insurgency. 
Unfortunately, the harsh rhetoric and rigid public posturing 
on both sides make prospects for compromise increasingly dim. 
 Helpful pressure from the international community might 
provide a face-saving deus ex machina to urge both sides out 
of their respective corners. 
 
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PROPOSED TALKING POINTS 
------------------------- 
 
11.  (C) As reported Ref F, the U.S., Indian and UK 
Ambassadors have decided to make another effort to urge the 
King and the parties toward reconciliation.  The U.S. 
Ambassador could deliver the points as part of his farewell 
calls.  Proposed talking points follow below: 
 
For the King: 
 
--As a good friend of Nepal, my government is gravely 
concerned by the deterioration in the political, economic and 
security situations in this country. 
 
--My government has provided substantially increased 
assistance to counter the insurgency and to improve the lives 
of the people here.  The continued impasse between the 
Government and the political parties benefits the Maoists and 
does nothing to help the people. 
 
--We are concerned that the stalemate is undermining popular 
faith in both the constitutional monarchy and multi-party 
democracy as institutions. 
 
--Resolving the impasse requires concessions and compromise 
on both sides. 
 
--The political parties' popular support should be reflected 
in a democratic government. 
 
--The parties have quietly indicated to us that they hope to 
resume dialogue with you. 
 
--We hope you will engage with the parties soon to resolve 
this deadlock for the good of the country. 
 
For the Parties: 
 
--As a good friend of Nepal, my government is gravely 
concerned by the deterioration in both the political and 
security situations in this country. 
 
--We are concerned that the stalemate is undermining popular 
faith in both the constitutional monarchy and multi-party 
democracy as institutions. 
 
--Continued protests increase the risk of violence and offer 
the Maoists an easy foothold for their own anti-democratic 
purposes. 
 
--Resolving the impasse requires concessions and compromise 
on both sides. 
 
--Forging consensus among yourselves as party leaders is 
crucial. 
 
--We encourage you to resume dialogue with the Palace for the 
good of the country. 
 
MALINOWSKI