US embassy cable - 04ANKARA2074

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002074 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKISH POST-ELECTION POLITICS: ASSESSING RULING 
AKP'S MOMENTUM AS A BROAD-BASED PARTY 
 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 2026 
     B. ANKARA 1905 
     C. ANKARA 1847 
     D. ANKARA 1842 
 
 
(U) Classified by Polcounselor John Kunstadter; reasons: 1.4 
(b,d). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: With electoral victory in his pocket, PM 
Erdogan faces the immediate challenge of getting a Cyprus 
settlement but remains outwardly confident that his 
strategies of becoming Turkey's "single man" and capturing 
the center and center-right are working.  A preliminary 
analysis of electoral results bears him out.  However, major 
challenges lie in his way.  End summary. 
 
 
2. (C) In the wake of his AK Party's (AKP) big win in March 
28 nationwide local elections, PM Erdogan faces the toughest 
political challenge of his 13-month tenure -- one with 
immediate ramifications for the strength of his prime 
ministership and leadership of the party.  This is the 
challenge of selling the draft Cyprus settlement domestically 
and in northern Cyprus, especially in light of the calibrated 
ambiguity displayed by the Turkish military (ref A). 
 
 
3. (C) Erdogan is nevertheless projecting broad 
self-confidence.  Spending the majority of his time abroad 
since AKP's local-election victory, and departing on an 
official visit to Japan April 10, he is leaving his party to 
wait and watch for his guidance on how to sort out the 
consequences of its victory (refs B,C) and to speculate on 
how extensive his long-rumored cabinet shuffle will be.  This 
approach of keeping his party waiting and guessing is a 
classic feature of Erdogan's leadership style.  Likewise, 
Erdogan prefers to broadcast an image of one who has as much 
time and political momentum as he needs to take decisions. 
 
 
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ELECTORAL VICTORY SEEMS SOUND 
----------------------------- 
 
 
4. (C) Regarding Erdogan's approach, he appears to be drawing 
strength from the following statistics, which indicate his 
strategies of becoming Turkey's "single man at the top" (tek 
adam) and capturing the lion's share of center and 
center-right votes remain effective: 
 
 
--AKP's share of eligible voters jumped from 26.4% in 2002 
general elections to 31.7% in March 28 local council 
elections, the best proxy for a national vote. 
 
 
--AKP votes were almost entirely votes for Erdogan, thus 
cementing his position and self-image as Turkey's uncontested 
political leader and tribune of the people. 
 
 
--AKP made significant inroads in southeastern Turkey, which 
for 13 years had voted solidly for a series of Kurdish 
parties, winning mayoralties in four provincial capitals. 
 
 
--In some areas (e.g., Sivas center and three small 
municipalities in Samandagi district of Hatay), AKP, which 
has heretofore not reached out strongly to Alevi (heterodox 
Muslim) communities, won Alevi support. 
 
 
--AKP won votes from across a far broader segment of society 
than that represented by the professedly political-Islamist 
Milli Gorus (National View) line. 
 
 
--With the continued decay of left-of-center CHP and despite 
the slight revival of rightist-nationalist MHP and 
center-right DYP, AKP faces no credible civilian political 
alternative for the foreseeable future. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
WHAT LIES BEHIND THE ELECTORAL VICTORY STATISTICS 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
 
5. (C) Our contacts in AKP acknowledge that, as "mayor of 
Turkey" (ref D), Erdogan faces party and domestic issues 
stemming from his local-election victory which will 
constantly test his leadership.  We have already highlighted 
some of those issues (ref D); others stem from the nature of 
his victory. 
 
 
Center and center-right votes 
 
 
6. (C) To understand how well AKP has been able to claim the 
center and center-right we will need to see analyses of 
voting shifts at the precinct level in key districts.  Until 
then, we can make the following observations.  First, AKP did 
attract some center/center-right votes that would have gone 
to ANAP or DYP if the latter parties had any juice.  However, 
the shift appears less pronounced than AKP had targeted.  One 
TV journalist close to AKP averred to us that the featureless 
quality of most AKP mayoral candidates (we have not met a 
single observer of any stripe who thinks AKP fielded 
impressive candidates) contributed to the lower than expected 
AKP percentage on a nation-wide basis. 
Women's votes 
 
 
7. (C) That only 0.4% of mayoral and council candidates were 
women did not dim the enthusiasm of AKP women's branch 
volunteers in our observations in urban sprawls and 
provincial centers and smaller towns across Anatolia.  AKP 
appears to have a solid grip on the votes of more 
conservative women.  However, key to understanding how well 
AKP attracted women in the center or center-right will be to 
use detailed precinct analysis to gauge the extent of a shift 
among women who do not cover their heads (note: uncovered 
women are a minority among Turkish women, although it is 
important to understand that the majority of covered women 
wear headscarves in a traditional style similar to what one 
would see in the Slavic world or even rural Britain.  End 
note). 
 
 
Kurdish votes 
 
 
8. (C) Two of the most experienced Kurdish politicians in 
Turkey, Hasim Hasimi and Serafettin Elci, have each told us 
Kurds in the southeast voted in significant numbers for AKP 
because (a) AKP appealed to the generally more conservative, 
pious nature of the population in the region (in agreeing on 
this point, Hasimi, the brother of a prominent Naksibendi 
sheykh, emphasized sheykhs' role in rallying votes for AKP, 
while Elci discounted their influence); (b) voters thought 
that, with AKP as the ruling party in Turkey, it will deliver 
on the commitments its local candidates made; (c) the 
performance of many of mainly-Kurdish DEHAP's mayors was 
disappointing and DEHAP's left-of-center election coalition 
partner SHP was seen as an arm of the statist policies which 
brought repression during the war against the PKK.  However, 
pointing to AKP's lack of a coherent program for the 
southeast, both Hasimi and Elci averred that AKP will fail to 
meet expectations in the southeast, much less deliver a 
comprehensive solution for the "Kurdish problem". 
 
 
9. (C) At the same time, in some other regions AKP appeared 
to wage campaigns which at best were cool toward Kurds as a 
group.  Consulate Adana reports that AKP lost a hard-fought 
campaign in Mersin because it did not appeal to the 
significant minority of the city's population which consists 
of poor, more recently arrived Kurdish migrants.  We also saw 
evidence of this approach in Gaziantep, where activists in 
AKP's women's branch acknowledged the paucity of Kurds (who 
through migration now make up a significant portion of the 
metropolitan Gaziantep population) in the branch's leadership 
and openly and repeatedly emphasized to us their preference 
for the 18% of the city which is "original Ganziantepers". 
 
 
10. (C) In the end, Gaziantep went more strongly for AKP than 
even the party had anticipated.  Aside from voters wanting a 
change and expecting to benefit from having a mayor from the 
same party as the one in power, our contacts have given us 
three reasons why some Kurds there voted AKP.  First, former 
mayor and defeated CHP candidate Celal Dogan neglected to pay 
attention to the piety of the average voter.  Second, they 
may have been enticed by reported massive handouts to voters. 
 The figures we have heard strike us as outlandish, but we 
include them because it was clear AKP -- which sent half the 
cabinet to campaign there -- was ready to do anything to win: 
Dogan made the unsubstantiated charge in the press that AKP 
distributed 20 trillion TL ($15 million); a member of Dogan's 
campaign team told us the figure was 17 trillion TL, provided 
by Gaziantep's most prominent business family, the 
Konukoglus, who imposed their man as AKP's mayoral candidate, 
and two other families. 
 
 
11. (C) Third, two Gaziantep sources, both of whom are pious 
and deeply linked to the Kurdish and Zaza communities, told 
us AKP, through its provincial chairman Okkes Eruslu, made an 
alliance with the Gaziantep branch of Turkish (i.e., Kurdish) 
Hizbollah, which controls some two dozen mosques in the 
metropolitan area.  Hasimi told us AKP and Hizbollah made 
electoral alliances in Bingol and Diyarbakir as well and he 
recalled AKP Diyarbakir M.P. Ihsan Arslan's links with 
Hizbollah in the past. 
 
 
Alevi vote 
 
 
12. (C) We await precinct voting pattern analyses to be able 
to make a general statement on voting trends among Alevi 
communities.  In the past, Alevi communities, wary of the 
majority Sunnis from bitter historical experience and aware 
of AKP's predecessor parties' intolerance, have voted heavily 
for CHP or other parties on the left, i.e., parties 
representing the "secular" Kemalist state.  From a 
preliminary review of the March 28 election results it 
appears that CHP held on to solidly Alevi districts. 
 
 
13. (C) However, AKP garnered Alevi votes in at least a few 
areas, e.g., Sivas city and a small section of Hatay, 
apparently as a result of the desire for change from 
long-term incumbents and prospect of a better flow of 
infrastructure funds from the AKP national government. 
Sadullah Ergin, an AKP deputy group chairman (whip) from 
Hatay, proudly told us that three Alevi municipalities in 
Hatay's traditionally-CHP Samandagi district went to AKP. 
However, an upper-mid-level officer of the national police 
(TNP), who visited the area in February, explained the 
voters' motivation in terms similar to those used by our 
Kurdish interlocutors: the municipalities in question are 
small and poor, starving for money for basic infrastructure 
projects, and desperately full of expectations that AKP will 
deliver. 
 
 
Influence of Milli Gorus (MG) 
 
 
14. (C) Ref (D) outlines the troubling aspects and the 
hypocrisy of political-Islamist MG, some of whose adherents 
abandoned MG founder Necmettin Erbakan to found AKP.  Given 
some exaggerated claims of MG influence on AKP, we treat the 
MG question at greater length septel. 
 
 
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COMMENT 
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15. (C) In AKP's 17 months in power the man in the street has 
not yet seen tangible benefits in terms of a pickup in 
employment or more money in his pocket.  Yet Erdogan remains 
winningly popular and Anatolia remains patient in the face of 
Erdogan's claim that he needs three years from Nov. 2002 to 
show results.  We expect the patience to hold at least 
through 2004 among those who voted for AKP.  No credible 
political alternative is visible (AKP's biggest rival at the 
moment is itself, i.e., its factions). 
 
 
16. (C) At the same time, many factors will test Erdogan's 
ability to anchor AKP as the broad party of the center and 
center-right and to keep various party and 
parliamentary-group factions in line.  Aside from the 
challenge of running the majority of Turkish municipalities 
or unforeseeable political or economic shocks, such factors 
include Cyprus, continuing wariness toward AKP on the part of 
core State institutions, the November two-year anniversary of 
the general elections (when M.P.s become eligible for 
pensions and thus less worried about changing parties), EU's 
December decision whether to give Turkey a start date for 
negotiations, and the extent to which corruption besmirches 
AKP's image. 
EDELMAN